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In an interdependent world of increasing public and political concern with social 
conflicts, this thesis is intended to examine the issue of social cohesion from the 
perspective of the activism of a civil society movement. The movement examined 
in this dissertation is associated with the name of Fethullah Gülen. He is a con-
temporary Turkish Muslim scholar who calls for dialogue and education as two 
means to construct lasting peace. It is precisely these two main methods of the 
movement – dialogue and education – for maintaining social cohesion on which I 
will focus in this thesis. 
In recent years, the movement has begun to attract academic attention. In 2007, 
the Australian Catholic University established the Fethullah Gülen Chair in the 
Study of Islam and Muslim-Catholic Relations. In 2008, Gülen was voted the 
world's top living public intellectual of the year in an internet poll organised by 
Prospect and Foreign Policy (Foreign Policy 2008a,b). Moreover, in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands several academic conferences 
have been convened about the movement and its contributions to global peace. 
More surprisingly, there is little scholarly work so far on the movement’s message 
regarding the causes and cures of social conflicts and rivalries. The current thesis 
therefore makes a contribution to the study of peace by providing insights into 
the management of ‘unity of diversity’ and the practice of multiculturalism and 
cohesiveness in pluralist societies. In addition, it is today a fact that diversity and 
pluralism are not only a phenomenon within societies but also between them. In 
this respect, then, this is not just a thesis about the Gülen movement, though by 
necessity it is that. This study also presents the thoughts and practices of Gülen 
and the movement associated with his name and elaborates on the reconciliation 
of social conflicts. My personal research interest on the subject of social conflicts 
and social cohesion is a result of an enduring curiosity about Fethullah Gülen’s 
ideas and his movement’s educational and intercultural activism, which emerged 
in Turkey and then received its articulation on the global scale. Especially after the 
fall of the Soviet Union, the movement has gradually evolved and grown in various 
areas of the world.
This dissertation is based on the compilation and adaptation of the following pub-
lished articles:
Chapter 3, ‘Fethullah Gülen as a servant leader’, by G. Celik and Y. Alan,  ●
The International Journal of Servant-Leadership, (2007) 3(1):247-265. 
Chapter 4, ‘Modern ideals and Muslim identity: Harmony or contradiction?  ●
A text linguistic analysis of the Gülen teaching and movement’, by G. Celik, 
K. Kirk and Y. Alan), in I. Yilmaz, E. Barker, H.J. Barkey et al. (eds). Muslim 
PREFACEii
World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement (pp. 246-267). 
Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. Chapter 4, together with 
Chapter 7, will be included as two separate chapters in a book to be ed-
ited by Professor Paul Weller, European Muslims, Civility and Public Life: 
Perspectives on and from the Gülen Movement (tentative title, forthcoming 
2009).
Chapter 5, ‘Gülen’s Approach to Dialogue and Peace: Its theoretical back- ●
ground and some practical perspectives’, by G. Celik and P. Valkenberg, in 
The International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and 
Nations (2007) 7(1):29-37.
Chapter 6, ‘Gülen’s paradigm on peaceful coexistence: Theoretical insights  ●
and some practical perspectives’, by G. Celik, K. Kirk and Y. Alan in Yil-
maz, K. A. El Fadl, M. J-M. Cros et al. (eds) Peaceful Coexistence: Fethullah 
Gülen’s initiatives in the contemporary world (pp. 297-312). Leeds: Leeds 
Metropolitan University Press, 2007. Chapter 6 will be also published as a 
chapter in a book edited by Professor Simon Robinson, Spirituality, Ethics 
and Practice in Fethullah Gülen (tentative title, forthcoming 2009).
Chapter 7, ‘Opening the Road to Dialogue: An Amalgamation of Gülen’s and  ●
Spinoza’s Ideas on Tolerance applied to the situation of Muslims in the Neth-
erlands’, by K. Kirk and G. Celik, in I. Yilmaz, K. A. El Fadl, M. J-M. Cros et al. 
(eds) Peaceful Coexistence: Fethullah Gülen’s initiatives in the contempo-
rary world (pp.169-182). Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007.
I conclude this Preface by expressing my gratitude to a number of people who 
have contributed to this dissertation in one way or another. First, I want to thank 
Professor Ruben Gowricharn and Professor Herman Beck for their supervision 
and coaching. Both critically commented on quite a few drafts of each of the chap-
ters. My personal thanks and appreciation also go to the co-authors of several 
articles. I am grateful to Kate Kirk, Yusuf Alan and Dr Pim Valkenberg for their 
cooperation and thoughtful reflections on the previous versions of the chapters 
this dissertation contains.
A special word of thanks is due to the Ph.D. Chamber of the Foundation for the 
Formation for Multicultural Cadre (SVMK), which has enabled me to realise this 
dissertation project. Moreover, I would like to extend my thanks to all my col-
leagues at Dialoog Academie in Rotterdam for helping and stimulating me to fulfil 
this dream. Particularly, I would like to thank Iris Creemers for her valuable support 
and Larry Spears, Yusuf Alan, Professor Shann Ferch and Dr Ihsan Yilmaz for 
their helpful comments on parts of the text and for their reflective correspondences 
and conversations. Kate Kirk read all chapters and provided her customary keen 
editorial insights and comments. I also owe a special debt of gratitude to Kate 
for her unstinting generosity, which greatly facilitated my work. Further, I would 
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like to thank my respondents who have significantly contributed to this disserta-
tion appearing at a time when humanity needs mercy, compassion and greater 
understanding more than ever. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) marks 2008 as ‘Intercultural Dialogue Year’. In 
this sense, it is important to note that everyone who contributes to dialogue and 
peace, to social cohesion, to rapprochement between cultures and civilisations, 
and to the principle of respecting and accepting people as they are, should be 
acknowledged and applauded altogether. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for supporting me to complete 
this thesis. In particular, I dedicate this work to my parents, Hasan and Havva 
Çelik, for their infinite love and trust. Not only do I look back on my childhood 
with great appreciation, but they both also contributed to this dissertation in very 
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Introduction: conflicts and cohesion
Conflicts1.1 
In the plural composition of today’s world, antagonism – often caused by religious, 
ethnic and cultural differences – between people of different origins has caused 
considerable turmoil and challenges to social cohesiveness and the prospects of 
peaceful coexistence. Approximately 190 million people worldwide live outside 
their native countries (FOM/FDJP 2008:10). The number of nation-states in the 
world is in excess of 180, and there are more than 600 major language groups 
and 5000 ethnicities1 (Macionis and Plummer 2005:287-302, 493-508). Besides 
the monotheistic (Abrahamic) religions and the other long established major world 
religions, there are tens of religious movements. This religious pluralism harbours 
potential dissenting and divisive problems on the national and international scale. 
It has been suggested that ethnic diversity leads to group distinctions that can pro-
mote group stereotyping and negative out-group feelings, and that endangers so-
cial unity and cohesion (e.g., Brewer 1997). Thus, resentment and fear shape the 
political policies in many countries. This also leads to the idea that ethnic diversity 
brings with it political instability and the likelihood of violence. As Bowen (1996:10) 
puts it, greater ethnocultural diversity is not associated with greater social stability 
but with interethnic and intercultural strife. 
However, it is a modern argument that communism and colonialism prevailed due 
to ethnic antagonism; and that nation-state building is an expression and func-
tion of globalisation (Berger 1996; Gowricharn 2006). Especially with the end of 
the Cold War, ethnic jolts and conflicts have become the centre point of political 
violence. The emergence of ethnic and religious diversity in western societies 
since the end of World War II also challenges secular nation states in Europe and 
in the United States. In particular, the persistence of ethnic identity, the influx of 
Muslim immigrants, and the partition of the former Yugoslavia,2 have redefined the 
boundaries of multicultural Europe. A similar process has occurred in other parts 
of the world as well, particularly in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.
The nature and causes of many conflicts are thus remarkably different. Conflicts 
can be generally characterised as local, with a relatively large number of internal 
factors, while at the same time being more global because they are shaped by 
transnational and international factors. Thus, conflict developed between Muslim 
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Crimean Tartars and Orthodox Russians in the Crimea, or the conflict in Bosnia 
exacerbates strong negative feelings and aggravates aggressive attitudes towards 
other ethnic groups. Conflicts in the Crimean situation, discriminatory practices in 
the Dominican Republic or violence in Sudan and Rwanda are of a different nature 
than, for example, the Turkish-Kurdish tension or the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. 
Another example are the riots that emerged spontaneously in suburban Paris. 
These riots have served to highlight the frustration felt by many immigrant youth 
in the banlieux of French cities. There was not only human aggression in France 
but, melodramatically, some immigrants have also been involved in social unrest 
and terrorist attacks, generating shock in British society, for example, when it be-
came clear that some of the London suicide bombers of July 2005 were born and 
raised in that country. Thus, these tensions in France and the United Kingdom are 
internal and again of different natures.
At the same time, increasingly, transnational social spaces and diasporic com-
munities challenge national boundaries. As stressed by Verkuyten (2005b:122), 
the growing emphasis is on long-distance relationships with ethnic and religious 
groups elsewhere, with the concomitant promotion of historical continuity, kinship, 
and ethnic and religious unity. In other words, what happens elsewhere can have 
consequences for how people define and present themselves ‘here’. Thus, people 
live not only in the ‘here and now’, but also in the ‘there and then’. In this respect, it 
is interesting to note that the Turkish-Kurdish tension is local and has national as-
pects, but also affects the relationships between Turkish and Kurdish people living 
in and outside Turkey (Kalyoncu 2008a; Van Bruinessen 2007). In a similar vein, 
the struggle between Israelis and Palestinians over the territory and resources 
they claim has had a powerful effect on the Arab world and Muslim residents in 
secular western countries and also on political and national identification on both 
sides.
Pieterse (1995:99-105) views globalisation as a process of hybridisation which 
gives rise to a global mélange and recombines existing practices with new forms 
in new practices. It is a fact that globalisation has intensified the nature of the 
worldwide social relations which are not simply one-directional processes. It links 
distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occur-
ring many kilometres away and vice versa. Never before in human history have 
issues of patriotism, identity politics, multicultural coexistence, long-distance na-
tionalism, intercultural contacts, peaceful public relations and the processes of 
cultural and demographic globalisation been as important in national debates as 
they are at present. 
The scale of intercultural contact will tend to increase in the future. Intercultural 
contact often involves people who look different, and have different physical ap-
pearances, cultural norms, religious beliefs, ethnic values, and behavioural pat-
terns (Lee et al. 2004:x). In many cases, such differences are exaggerated in 
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order to solidify ethnic boundaries and serve ethnic solidarity, to build up barriers 
and walls around groups rather than to acknowledge cultural diversity. In short, 
the conflict of cultures, mores,3 ideologies and identities often results in malad-
justments and social disorders and unrest. These conflicts and changes evoke 
responses both inside and outside the western world.
Responses to social conflicts
The world faces a perplexing paradox. There are seemingly homogeneous cultur-
al, economic and political discourses (on human rights and immigration flows, for 
instance) at the global level, whereas there is simultaneously a pronounced asser-
tion of cultural, ethnic and religious differences at the local level. The increasing 
diversification and distribution of cultures, identities and religions leads to policy 
responses from society and states. In this respect, social conflicts are overtly or 
latently related to ethnic minority groups and the level of their integration and 
participation in society. Various interventionist strategies and integration policies 
that have been implemented by western governments to create a stronger sense 
of attachment to the host society and improve intergroup relations have not had a 
sustainable impact. Most interventions have been aimed either at training in inter-
cultural communications skills and resolving discrimination by the majority group, 
or at improving (supposedly poor) social skills, networks for immigrants and their 
labour market and educational participation (Arends-Tóth and Van de Vijver 2003; 
Berry 1997; Entzinger, Siegers and Tazelaar 1994; Luijters 2008; Putman 2007). 
These interventions incorrectly emphasised subgroup identities, which may lead 
to polarisation and the stigmatising of immigrants. Interventions need to foster 
both the need for a positive subgroup identity (e.g., the ethnic identities of immi-
grants) and the need for a positive common identity (e.g., ‘we’, western society).
Simultaneously, migration and urbanisation have been seen as the major counter-
cohesion issues in western societies and are perceived as threatening and desta-
bilising because of several economic, political and social arguments. First, western 
governments fear that unemployment rates among immigrants constrain overall 
social cohesion. Consequently, increased minority group participation in the la-
bour market is considered to be the most effective way to reduce the number of 
claimants and increase their social inclusion and integration (Gowricharn 2002a). 
Second, the presence of immigrants is seen or supposed, by some political actors, 
to be the cause of insecurity due to their attitudes related to their religious beliefs 
and cultural traditions. Some Muslim immigrants are involved in criminal activities, 
and are at the centre of discussion related to issues such as the equality between 
men and women, and homosexual rights. Some western policies therefore pro-
mote cultural integration and even cultural assimilation strategies to solve these 
problems (e.g., Schnabel 2000).4 Third, the overwhelming majority of immigrants 
(e.g., Turks and Arabs) have Muslim backgrounds. These minority groups attest 
to a strong adherence to Islam. Policy debates about migratory flows into western 
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Europe are now dominated by the cultural impact of Muslim immigrants. As a con-
sequence, Muslim immigrants supposedly pose a threat to social cohesion and 
integration and undermine public support for immigration. These have all resulted 
in a remarkable ‘diversity of cultures’ versus ‘fears of differences’. Such realities 
have led to the development of policies by local and national governments to 
limit immigration flow into western countries. In particular, Muslim immigrants have 
been seen as the object of these policies.
In addition, European states’ policies towards immigrant populations may be seen 
as a significant factor shaping Islam in Europe. Western European countries have 
adopted various policies to integrate Muslim immigrants into their societies. In this 
regard, European multiculturalism is not so much an option for society as a whole, 
but largely for immigrants and ethnic minority groups. According to Verkuyten 
(2005b), this means that in western European countries there is more often a 
negative association between national identification and multiculturalism. In con-
trast, Canada, Australia and the United States of America are largely composed 
of immigrants and are characterised as settler societies, or traditional countries 
of immigration. However, there are also important differences between European 
countries. For example, France gives little room for multiculturalism and Germany 
follows an exclusionist strategy. Contrastingly, Great Britain and the Netherlands 
have taken a more supportive view on multicultural policies (Verkuyten 2007:282; 
Yukleyen 2004). 
However, much has changed in European countries over the last few decades. 
The previous ethnic minority policies have gradually been replaced by a policy of 
civic integration with an emphasis on knowledge of the host society and command 
of the native language (Entzinger 2007; Verkuyten 2007). In western societies, 
questions increasingly began to be asked about the massive immigration flow 
from the Muslim countries. Some argued that Muslim immigration should be com-
pletely halted. The picture of Islam presented brings out latent prejudices and the 
meta-discourse about Islam, and promotes a binary opposition between Muslims 
and western societies (Shadid and Van Konigsveld 2002:174-196). The current 
tendency towards polarisation exerts heavy pressures on social groups, both in-
side and outside the western world. These pressures reflect the fact that the proc-
ess of social unrest and cultural disputes is on the rise.
Responses of Islamic movements 1.2 
There are several Islamic faith-based movements, which are proactive, or are 
responding to social conflicts, in order to maintain peaceful coexistence and so-
cial cohesion among the world’s societies. There is thus a clear differentiation 
regarding the Islamic approaches to conflict resolution, which can be generally di-
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vided into two categories; radical approaches and moderate or liberal approaches. 
These voices of Islam, from moderate (liberal) to radical, have been institutional-
ised in various countries with a significant Muslim population. These Islamic and 
ethnic minority groups provide social and religious services that respond to the 
changing needs and concerns of Muslims worldwide. Moreover, one can argue 
that the solution of the religious problems has to come from the religion and the 
religious groups themselves. They also suggest that the possible solution com-
prises acceptance, self respect and a new identity in a new environment (e.g., 
Ramadan 1999, 2004).
The current debates about Muslims and their religious life in western civilisations 
have a long history of conflict. In recent history, relations have been hardened by 
the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979,5 and then by the Salman 
Rushdie affair6 in 1989 (Macionis and Plummer 2005:287). It continued to be so-
lidified by Huntington’s influential publication of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. 
Huntington (2000:609) argued that ‘culture and cultural identities, which at the 
broadest level are civilisational identities, are shaping patterns of cohesion, disin-
tegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world’. His major theme in this conflict 
of cultural incompatibility was between ‘authentic’ Islamic culture, as represented 
by the Islamic states, and modern Christian culture, as represented by the United 
States and other western societies. Huntington gives credibility and currency to 
the notion that Islam and the West are on a collision course and claims that it is 
an exacerbating cause of conflict. Barton (2007) argues that many radical Islamic 
groups, including al-Qaeda, which tries to realise its objectives through terrorist 
attacks, agreed with Huntington’s prediction of a looming clash between Islam 
and the West. This also goes for a number of radical Islamic groups active among 
Muslims, such as Hizb-ut Tahrir7 and Hizbullah.8 Also some reactionary political 
and religious movements are on the rise, like the Arab European League (AEL),9 
and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.10 
In addition to these movements, several activist Islamic movements have 
emerged in Turkey, such as the Milli Görüş, Süleymancı, Kaplancılar, Haydar 
Baş and Nurcu movements:
The ●  Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement was initiated by Necmettin Er-
bakan. In 1970, Erbakan and his followers founded the first Islamist party, the 
Milli Nizam (National Order) Party (MNP). The party was disbanded following 
the military coup d’état in 1971. In the following year, the former cadres of 
the MNP founded the Milli Selamet (National Salvation) Party. That party was 
also disbanded by another military coup d’état in 1980. When its party was 
disbanded, the movement founded a new one in 1983: the Refah (Welfare) 
Party, which was the predecessor of the Fazilet (Virtue) Party (1997–2001). 
After disbanding the Refah Party as a result of the military ‘soft coup’ in 
1997, the movement founded the Saadet (Felicity) Party (2001–present). 
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The movement also has links with socio-cultural institutions (e.g., the Na-
tional Youth Foundation) and media outlets  For instance, it publishes the 
daily newspaper Milli Gazete. This movement is seen as a form of political 
Islam in the Turkish context. 
The ●  Süleymancı movement, founded by Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan 
(1888–1959), is one of the oldest  Muslim groups in Turkey. Tunahan, a 
Naksibendi sheikh and religious scholar, developed a new repertoire of Is-
lamic activism by cultivating Islamic consciousness at a personal level and 
by forming new networks based on inward-oriented faith (Yavuz 2003b:33). 
To this end, the Süleymancıs focus on building mosques, the teaching of the 
Qur’an, and establishing student dormitories (Landman 1992:40-52). This 
Sufi-oriented movement is considered to be a mystical form of Islam. In dif-
ferent periods, the movement has been involved in political parties. Accord-
ing to Zürcher and Van der Linden (2004:119), the Turkish state has used 
the Süleymancıs as a potential counterweight to the ever-present communist 
threat.
Kaplancılar ● , or the Kaplan community, pursues a radical revolutionary goal, 
like that of the Hizb-ut Tahrir and Hizbullah. This community has mosques 
and thousands of followers in Turkey and European countires (De Ley 2008; 
Landman 1992:128). For example, they used to have fifty mosques in Ger-
many before being banned by the German authorities in 2001 (Goldberg 
2002:41). Their mosques are still active, but there is no coordination among 
them because Cemalettin Kaplan, the leader, was extradited back to Turkey 
and sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiring to change the secular na-
ture of the Turkish state (WRR 2004:136-7). They believe that Islam should 
still be an essential guiding principle in the organisation of state and society. 
More importantly, they are prepared to use violence to move closer to that 
goal.
The ●  Haydar Baş movement takes its name from its founder, Professor Hay-
dar Baş (1947–), and emerged as a branch of the Kadiri order (tarikat), 
founded by Abdul Kadir Geylani (1066–1116). They see dialogue with Chris-
tians and Jews as a threat to Islamic identity, and have therefore avoided 
interaction with non-Muslims. The movement spreads its religious-nationalist 
messages through its media outlets (Mesaj TV, Meltem TV, the newspaper 
Yeni Mesaj, and several magazines) and its political party, the Independent 
Turkey (Bağımsız Türkiye) Party. The movement has also business invest-
ments and a limited number of schools. This movement has developed a 
negative attitude towards western civilization and demonstrates an intolerant 
religious-nationalist framework (Kuru 2005).
The ●  Nurcu movement takes its name from its founder, Bediüzzaman Said 
Nursi (1876–1960), whose religious ideas and Qur’anic interpretations be-
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came known as the Risale-i Nur Külliyati (The Epistles of Light). Groups that 
met to read and discuss Nursi’s writings constituted a ‘textual community’ 
which evolved into a major faith movement, the Nurcu movement. For Nursi, 
Islam means three things: first, it is a normative order and a moral order to 
differentiate right and wrong; second, it is a worldview that informs one’s 
understanding of human reality and the world; the third aspect includes an 
inner force to constitute the self and to empower oneself against the odds 
of the modern age. The last layer of Islam was Nursi’s main focus. This faith 
movement differs from other Islamic movements in terms of its interpreta-
tion of Islam and its strategy for transforming society by raising individual 
consciousness (Yavuz 2003a:1-18) and by studying and employing modern 
western science (Zürcher and Van der Linden 2004:118). Yavuz (2003b:179) 
explains that there are currently different factions inside the Nurcu move-
ment, with ideas ranging from the extremely conservative to the modernist. 
For example, the Gülen movement is considered to be a liberal, moderate 
neo-Nur movement (Yavuz 2003a,b), practising the philosophy of Nursi. The 
Risale-i Nur11 has become a basis for Gülen’s philosophy and provides a 
shared vocabulary with which to discuss socio-political issues within and 
outside Turkey. Although influenced by Nursi’s vision, Gülen differs from the 
Nurcu tradition not only in supplementing his reading from diverse sources 
other than Nursi’s multi-volume thematic commentary on the Qur’an, but by 
also reinterpreting the mode and means of contemporary religious activism. 
Gülen disapproves of being labelled and called a Nurcu, one who follows 
the Risale-ı Nur principles. Yavuz (2003b:188) conceptualises Nursi’s under-
standing of Islam as from the ‘inside out’ and Gülen’s as from ‘outside in’. 
Thus, Islam, for Gülen, must be represented by actions (temsil), and these 
actions, in turn, are expressions of faith (iman). These different understand-
ings of the Islamic activism are responses to different conditions and needs 
in the era. 
The persistence of these Islamic voices creates its own market both in Turkey and 
the West. Such Islamic groups have been seen as a threat to social cohesion in 
secular Turkey and western democracies. The common feature of these move-
ments is that they all utilise Islamic discourse to garner popular support in the 
political and public arena, are composed exclusively of Muslims, and are, in gen-
eral, reactionary or revolutionary. These movements use political Islam in order to 
perpetuate their hold on society and power, and are religiously active by concen-
trating on religious education and establishing Islamic centres and political parties. 
Such an Islamic activism creates various social and political conflicts. Regarding 
social activism, the Gülen movement provides a paradigm shift. Its response to 
social conflicts includes investment in secular education and intercultural and in-
terreligious dialogue. The key concept of this movement is ‘hizmet’ (service). Its 
participants see service to the people as service to God, and seek God’s pleasure 
by serving humanity.
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The presence of radical political or religious movements as well as moderate faith-
based movements indicates that the supply side of the Muslim and non-Muslim 
market is varied. The Gülen movement, examined here, is a civic faith-based 
movement that is apolitical, non-state, non-profit, non-violent, and voluntary (Kuru 
2005; Zürcher 2007:291). Gülen himself, as a Turkish Islamic scholar, is a pious 
Muslim who strives to practise every tradition of the Prophet Muhammad in his 
own life and, accordingly, encourages others to do so as well (Saritoprak 2005). 
Although the movement has never directly participated in any political party in 
Turkey or abroad, it is remarkable that its participants have ties with the state and 
authoritarian governments (Sevindi 2008; Turam 2007; Yavuz 2003a,b). Moreo-
ver, the movement’s participants may have their own individual political choices, 
without having any commonly expressed preference at election times. They em-
phasise law-abiding conduct and seek the support of political rulers and social 
leaders of the country they live in.
The Gülen movement differentiates itself from other Islamic movements by stress-
ing the importance of ethics in education, media, business, and public life. In other 
words, owing to socio-political factors that impinge on and influence Islamic dis-
course, Gülen moves his focus from Islam to public ethics and from identity to edu-
cation; the ideal of a well-ordered, disciplined society is a logical outcome (Yavuz 
2003b:179-205). Gülen considers education and the media to be key instruments 
in the formation of this ethics and consciousness. The movement, unlike other Is-
lamic movements, is neither politically Islamist (since it does not seek to establish 
an Islamic state), nor a Sufi lodge (since it does not have a Sufi-type hierarchy). 
Rather, it is a hybrid of tradition and modernity (Aras 1998; Gulay 2007:62). It com-
bines Islamic and western values by synthesising traditional and modern forms 
of intellectual legitimacy and authenticity. More specifically, the movement offers 
Muslims a way to live out Islamic values amidst the complex demands of modern 
societies. This implies that the movement is open to the idea of progress and is 
dynamic in terms of adapting to new conditions (cf. Vogelaar 2008). The process 
of its transformation from a culturally Turkish movement to a transnational one is 
a sign of this dynamism. The majority of the movement’s current participants are 
Turkish Muslims, yet it increasingly includes people from various ethnic and cul-
tural backgrounds (such as Kurds, Albanians, and people from the Eurasian and 
African countries). 
In addition, the Gülen movement differs from radical Islamic movements by its 
seeking to reformulate Islamic issues dealing with new questions of the current 
age. Compared to the aforementioned Islamic movements, the movement is a 
proactive initiative, in the sense that it produces projects to solve social prob-
lems, especially ignorance, poverty and political anarchy. The movement has dis-
tinguished itself from so-called ‘fundamentalist’ Islamic groups by its search for 
reconciliation and moderation (cf. Aras and Çaha 2000; Özdalga 2006:560; Yavuz 
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2003b:179) through secular educational activities and intercultural encounters. 
Finally, the Gülen movement, unlike the other movements mentioned above, de-
veloped a constructive attitude towards globalisation and interaction. His views on 
the precepts of Islam are eclectic and contemporary (cf. Weller 2007:280).
Social cohesion 1.3 
Multiculturalism, religious pluralism and social cohesion give rise to lively public 
debates in western countries. Multicultural policies have been relatively accom-
modating to immigrants and given room for the expression of their identity in public 
sphere. However, the post-9/11 period has seen a sudden rise in western suspi-
cion and fear of Muslims. Thus, for many Muslims, living in the West has become 
particularly difficult. In order to increase their social incorporation, various social 
projects and interventions have been implemented by civil society and govern-
mental agencies. These projects aim to tackle the problems stemming from migra-
tion, the emergence of transnational communities and their role in (inter)national 
conflicts. All these efforts are made to preserve social cohesion.
Social cohesion12 is a concept used frequently in both academic and political dis-
courses. In spite of its popularity, there is hardly a consensus about its definition. 
In general, it is defined in opposition to undesired social conditions like crime, 
unemployment, poverty, and school drop-out rates. Gowricharn (2002b:22-28) 
distinguishes the following four meanings of social cohesion:
A 1. functional meaning that refers to the division of labour. This conception 
goes back to Durkheim and is centred around the division of labour, i.e., the 
economic interdependence of people in the economic process.
An 2. institutional meaning, referring to institutions like the market, the social 
assurance system, and the state. Again, there is an interdependence, this 
time between citizens and institutions. 
The 3. normative approach in which a wide range of particularisms are central. 
These encompass unequally distributed properties like tolerance, group loy-
alties, affinity of somatic appearances, and moral features such as the credit 
allotted to strangers.
Social 4. participation, referring to the incorporation of migrants in the educa-
tional system, the labour market, or the polity and other core institutions of 
the receiving society.
One relevant distinction is that between internal and external cohesion, entailing 
bonding and bridging (Putnam 2000). The former refers to members fostering an 
internal group cohesion, while the later refers to intergroup activities, thus bridg-
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ing the gap between groups. Striving for social cohesion is here perceived as the 
achievement of a stable social order in which different cultural or ethnic groups 
develop relations for mutual understanding and respect. In his teaching, Gülen 
takes as his point of departure the antagonistic relationship between Muslims and 
the western world. His conception of social cohesion – though he calls it peace 
– is the achievement of social harmony in and between different groups (Gülen 
2004a:33-34,95; 2005a:75). 
In his worldview, Gülen endorses the western values of democracy.13 Within his 
framework he sees education and dialogue as two crucial instruments to achieve 
peace. That is to say, he appeals implicitly to the democratic liberties of religion, 
speech and reconciliation. The adoption of the democratic framework and the 
instruments employed to pursue peace do not suggest that Gülen favours cultural 
assimilation. He argues that the preservation of ethnic and cultural identities re-
quires elements of mutual respect and tolerance. 
Gülen’s educational philosophy is based on four major values (cf. Aslandoğan and 
Çetin 2006:31-32; Canikligil 2008; Gülen 1997:60,98; 2004a:193-214): 
The first is an appreciation of education and of teaching or learning. Gülen  ●
presents education as the main duty in human life and the only lasting solu-
tion for society’s problems like ignorance, poverty and division. The solution 
of all problems is linked to knowledge and educated people. He has the 
conviction that as ignorance (cehalet) is the most serious problem, it is only 
defeated through education (Ünal and Williams 2000:305-31). Teachers who 
embody ethical values act as role models for their students and are the pri-
mary agents of the movement’s educational activism.
The second value is altruism in education or the establishment of altruistic  ●
social activism in the field of education and moral guidance. This value pri-
marily includes the use of experienced and altruistic teachers whose motiva-
tion is beyond financial interests. In this respect, Gülen makes a distinction 
between education and teaching. ‘Most human beings can be teachers’, 
he states, ‘but the number of educators is severely limited’ (1996a:36). The 
educator assists in the formation of the student’s character and personali-
ties, and enables them to develop qualities like self-discipline, tolerance and 
altruism. 
Gülen’s organisational view comprises a tripartite relationship of the educa- ●
tor, the parents, and the sponsor for the altruistic service. By finding spon-
sors and receiving support from the society through families and parents of 
students, the movement attempts to minimise the impact of politicians on 
schools. At present, the movement has a increasing number of educational 
programmes and manages more than five hundred (secular) educational or-
ganisations such as schools, universities, and language centres around the 
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world, sponsored by local entrepreneurs, altruistic educators and dedicated 
parents (cf. Foreign Policy 2008b; Hudson 2008)
The last value refers to integrating ethical values and religious tolerance  ●
into secular educational curricula. Given the lack of integration between 
scientific knowledge and spiritual and ethical values, Gülen and his follow-
ers introduced a new style of education reconciling these elements. Gülen 
(1996a:12) liberates the religious texts from the learned confines of the ma-
drasa and tekke (Sufi lodge), and presents Islamic knowledge in a more ac-
cessible framework by synthesising revelation and reason. He reinterprets 
reason in light of Islamic tradition and revivifies revelation with rationalist and 
scientific evidence (Gulay 2007:96). The movement embeds the unification 
of the mysticism (knowledge of God) and scientific reasoning through edu-
cating teachers in religious commentaries and scientific advancements.
Gülen has the conviction that the reliable and real road to peace and justice is de-
pendent on the provision of an adequate and appropriate multicultural and moral 
education integrating scientific knowledge and ethical values. Only then will there 
be sufficient understanding and tolerance to secure respect for the rights of oth-
ers. His conviction is that in this way the new generations will experience a resur-
rection.
Regarding dialogue, the other element of Gülen’s philosophy, he promotes a dia-
logue of civilisations through cooperation, mutual understanding and shared val-
ues (Carroll 2007). Dialogue requires a peaceful atmosphere with mutual trust and 
respect as constituting elements. Gülen (2004a,b,c) sees dialogue as a method 
to achieve peaceful coexistence, a tool for people to get closer, to know and learn 
from each other. Dialogue among members of different cultures is not possible 
without mutual understanding and practising tolerance. For him, it means accept-
ing others as they are and knowing how to get along with them. Thus, knowledge 
of others in their cultural setting is crucial. 
Gülen’s concept of dialogue embraces three successive stages. In the first stage, 
dialogue is a means to create mutual respect for each other’s identity, which does 
not necessarily imply mutual acceptance. The second stage consists of accepting 
the others, their values and identities. The third stage is sharing values in each 
other’s cultural settings. The last mentioned stage implies that people learn about 
each other’s cultural identity, religious beliefs and spiritual values. These three 
stages are essential to Gülen’s formula to approach the broader society and to 
realise dialogue with people of other religious persuasions.
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Methodology 1.4 
This thesis is a result of the compilation and adaptation of several peer-reviewed 
and previously published articles. These articles analyse Gülen’s teaching and 
his movement’s contributions to the resolution of social conflicts and to peaceful 
coexistence of Muslims and non-Muslims.
The current study primarily examines the movement’s contributions to harmony 
in societies with a growing Muslim population. This study also delivers insights to 
develop interventions and solutions for social cohesion and interethnic disputes 
and to counter the increasing challenges of religious radicalism.
In addition, the study compares Gülen’s ideas and initiatives with some European 
perspectives on the issue of social cohesion and peaceful coexistence. Its practi-
cal relevance includes an examination of a dynamic faith-based movement’s role 
in establishing peace through dialogue and education. This is a necessity due to 
problems of integration among Muslim immigrants and the emergence of ‘theo-
logically’ inspired terrorism and extremism in western societies. 
The analysis of Gülen’s thoughts and practices can help to develop a synthesis on 
social cohesion from the perspectives of dialogue and education. In a globalised 
world of increasing public and political concern with social conflicts, this study 
is also intended to help citizens and policy makers to understand and scrutinise 
conceptions of social integration, national identity, and the Muslim tradition in rap-
idly developing societies, and their implications for social, cultural and political 
change. 
In this thesis, I used case research strategy (Ragin and Becker 2002; Yin 2003) 
involving an in-depth examination of a single instance or event, that is the case of 
the Gülen movement. It is an empirical inquiry that investigates the Gülen move-
ment as a social phenomenon within its real-life context. My unit of analysis is 
thus a movement, not a country. This case study includes qualitative data, relies 
on multiple sources of data, and benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions of textual analysis.
The fact that the movement examined here is operating in many different coun-
tries helps to control environmental factors, and supports the generalisability of 
the research findings. If this movement has a homogenous and positive attitude 
towards globalisation and global social cohesion, one may claim that the results 
of this study are generalisable, or not bounded by Turkey’s ‘specific’ conditions. 
Instead, the cross-country examination explains the adaptability and diversity of 
the movement in different societies. 
In social sciences, the researcher takes an insider or outsider position with regard 
to his or her research object. This study has been conducted from an insider’s 
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perspective. This has served me particularly to gain access to sources (including 
interviews). During my study I have participated in the movement’s many educa-
tional and dialogue activities both in Turkey and abroad. Hence, the insider posi-
tion enabled me to develop numerous contacts with other people from the move-
ment and enhanced my understanding of the movement. However, the very same 
insider position harbours a risk concerning the critical distance to the researched 
object. Social researchers are taught to maintain a balance between involvement 
and distance. Because of my insider position and related sympathy, I have been 
called a ‘follower’ of Gülen, which would influence my critical distance. This is 
odd, for myself being sympathetic to the ideas of Spinoza, Erasmus, Greenleaf or 
Habermas does not evoke such controversy. Being aware of the risk of being too 
close to the research object, which inevitably stems from the insider’s position, I 
did my utmost to maximise the distance. It is up to the reader to judge whether or 
not I succeed in this purpose.
There is another point I would like to address. For a number of reasons, to be 
discussed in section 2.6, the Gülen movement is met with suspicion in some quar-
ters. The most widespread argument is that the movement is a religious move-
ment that opposes democracy. Based on my study I can contradict this allegation, 
but the point here is that the argument is political in nature and falls outside the 
scope of this study. Therefore, I will not enter into a political argument and will 
restrict myself to the message of the Gülen movement.
This study addressed the central question: what is the Gülen movement’s mes-
sage for the reconciliation of social conflicts? This required me to identify and 
apply suitable methods with an interpretive character to gather the necessary em-
pirical information and at the same time to connect the theoretical points of depar-
ture. Through internet research, participant observation and qualitative interviews, 
I gained a detailed picture of experiences and perceptions related to the research 
question. The following elucidates the sources consulted in this thesis.
Consulted sources
My study commenced with a systematic review of relevant documents and Gülen’s 
works. The purpose of the literature survey was to ensure that the current study 
was well informed about existing research and Gülen’s works to conceptualise the 
research theme. The literature survey was complemented by circulating an email 
to a wide range of contacts asking for assistance in collating relevant literature on 
Gülen and his movement. In particular, this exploratory search helped me to come 
to a considered operational plan and a selection of important elements with regard 
to the qualitative interviews.
Gülen’s works can be classified into two main genres of media; recordings and 
books. He mainly presents his views to the public through these two media. The 
INTRODUCTION: CONFLICTS AND COHESION14
former means his recorded speeches. Especially in the formative period of the 
movement from 1970 to 1983, Gülen travelled across Turkey as a state preacher 
(vaiz). Most of his series of sermons, talks, conversations and public speeches 
were recorded and transliterated into text format and, with minor revisions, pub-
lished as books. This form of delivery was unheard-of in the Muslim scholarly 
world, where custom had it that matters should be studied and presented in a 
rather loose, haphazard-style with no clear boundary. 
Gülen’s sermons include the following topics: Business Ethics (2 sermons in 
1974); the Oneness of God (14 sermons in 1975); the Qur’an (32 sermons in 
1976); Prophethood (39 sermons in 1975-76, 1989); Women in the Qur’an (6 
sermons 1977); Life after Death (12 sermons in 1977-8); Angels, Spirits and Meta-
physics (12 sermons in 1978); Destiny (5 sermons in 1978); Fasting (5 sermons in 
1979); Prayer (9 sermons in 1978); Pilgrimage or Hadj (5 sermons in 1978); Alms 
(9 sermons in 1979); Müeyyidat, The method of Guidance in Islam  (14 sermons 
in 1979); Economic Considerations (28 sermons in 1979), and Ethical Consid-
erations (14 sermons in 1980).  Thematically these sermons can be categorised 
as; the Essentials of Islam, and the Essentials of Faith. In addition, some of his 
other sermons  deal with separate topics: Upbringing of Children (10 sermons in 
1977); Qualities Raising the Human Being (10 sermons in 1989), A Voice Rais-
ing from Minbar (many khutba’s14 in 1975–1980); Towards the Light (8 sermons 
in 1973–1979); From Our Heart World (9 sermons 1979–1980); and the Rights 
of Parents (1 sermon in 1991). Furthermore, he has given sermons in mosques 
throughout the various cities of Anatolia and during the Islamic holy days and holy 
nights, such as Ramadan, Kadir, Miraç and Berat.
Most of Gülen’s sermons have been complied by his students and edited by him-
self. The books have been firstly published in Turkish and some of them later 
translated into English. Only a few of them have been translated into other lan-
guages (see www.fgulen.com). Below is a chronological list of his publications in 
English:
Towards the Lost Paradise » , Izmir: Kaynak, 1998. 
Pearls of Wisdom » , Fairfax, VA: The Fountain, 2000, and New Jersey: The 
Light, 2005. 
Questions and Answers about Faith » , Fairfax, VA: The Fountain, 2000. 
Criteria or Lights of the Way » , London: Truestar, 2000. 
Essentials of the Islamic Faith » , Fairfax, VA: The Fountain, 2000, and New Jer-
sey: The Light, 2006. 
Essays, Perspectives, Opinions » , Rutherford, NJ: The Fountain, 2002. 
Emerald Hills of the Heart: Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism »  (3 vol-
umes), New Jersey: The Light, 2004. 
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Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance » , New Jersey: The Light, 
2004. 
The Messenger of God. Muhammad: An Analysis of the Prophet’s Life » , New 
Jersey: The Light, 2005. 
The Statue of Our Souls: Revival in Islamic Thought and Activism » , New Jersey: 
The Light, 2005. 
Most of Gülen’s books can be categorised into two kinds. First are the compila-
tions of his editorials published in the periodicals of the movement. Their contents 
are literary analyses on concepts mostly about human values and way of service. 
An exemplary volume of these was translated into English as The Statue of Our 
Souls. Second are the transcriptional editions of some of his serial preachings and 
conversations, such as the analysis of the Prophet Muhammad’s life. Two books 
can be considered outside these categories. One is the compilation of poems, en-
titled Kırık Mızrap (literally, The Broken Plectrum). The other Gülen’s masterpiece, 
the only book he systematically authored, though the writing expanded to years 
and it was fragmentally published in the Turkish magazine, Sızıntı, and its English 
version, The Fountain, was translated into English as Emerald Hills of the Heart.
Below is an extensive overview of Gülen’s intellectual works in Turkish:
Life after Death  » (Ölüm Ötesi Hayat)
The Metaphysical Dimension of Existence ( » Varlığın Metafizik Boyutu)
From a Seed to a Cedar Tree: Another Perspective of Family Education  »
(Çekirdekten Çınara: Bir Başka Açıdan Ailede Eğitim)
The Axis of Guidance  » (İrşad Ekseni)
The Messenger of God, Muhammad: An Analysis of the Prophet’s Life  »
(İnsanlığın İftihar Taplosu)
Era and the Young Generation »  (Cağ ve Nesil). This series includes eight vol-
umes.
The Problem of Destiny from the Qur’anic  and Prophetic Sunna Perspective  »
(Kur’an ve Sünnet Perspektifinde Kader)
Reflections from the Qur’an on Our Understanding »  (Kur’an’dan İdrake Yansı-
yanlar)
Prophet Muhammad as Command » er (Cihad veya I’la-yi Kelimetullah)
Pearls of Wisdom  » (Ölçü veya Yoldaki Işıklar)
The Statue of Our Souls »  (Ruhumuzu Heykelini Dikerken)
The Essentials of the Islamic Faith »  (İnancın Gölgesinde)
Broken Pitcher »  (Kırık Testi), 6 vols.
Prism »  (Prizma), 6 vols.
From Time to Time »  (Fasıldan Fasıla), 5 vols.
Questions This Modern Age Puts to Islam »  (Asrın Getirdiği Terredütler), 4 vols.
Considerations on the Chapter  » Fatiha (Fatiha Üzerine Mülahazalar)
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The Broken Plectrum ( » Kırık Mızrap)
Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism. Emerald Hills of the Heart »  (Kalbin 
Zümrüt Tepeleri),3 vols
Gülen’s books, called ‘Diamond Books’ by his followers, can be distinguished 
even by their titles and cover designs. Here I will discuss briefly the chronological 
overview of his intellectual achievements, exclusively the published collections of 
audiotapes and visual materials out of his sermons.
In the 1970s, Gülen also began to address a different segment of the Turkish 
people through conferences. In 1977, he gave a series of conferences, entitled: 
The Prophet Muhammad; The Theory of Evolution and Truth; and Social Justice, 
the Golden Generation, the Qur’an and Science. In this period, Gülen chose to 
address his audience on topics that were very much alive and contested within 
the Turkish populace at the time. For example, the theory of evolution was used 
as a tool of onslaught against belief in God; social justice was a matter hotly 
debated within the context of communism and democracy, and the significance 
of the Qur’an in the modern age was being questioned in 1970s Turkey. In his 
speeches, Gülen referred constantly to scientific periodicals and journals such as 
Bilim & Teknik, the then most widely circulated Turkish scientific periodical.
In the early 1980s, Gülen introduced another novelty to the pulpit with his series of 
‘question-and-answer’ sermons. Gülen prompted the congregation to think, pon-
der and engage by encouraging them to write down any questions about social 
and religious issues, which he would then answer during the sermons. Audio re-
cordings of over one hundred such ‘question-and-answer sermons’ are circulated, 
entitled Miscellaneous for the vast and various topics they cover. Later, some 
parts of these sermons were transliterated into text format and published as a 
series of volumes, Asrın Getirdiği Terredütler (Questions this modern age puts to 
Islam). These books were later translated into English as Questions and Answers 
about Islam. The questions included in these books were those that related to 
either the fundamentals of belief or matters of some controversy and speculation 
in religion. It is clear that the transliterated version of these sermons was intended 
for a wider audience than the original congregation to whom the sermons were 
originally delivered. Gülen intended to reach practising as well as non-practising 
young Turkish Muslims with these books. Thus, whether intended at the outset or 
not, Gülen’s ‘question-and-answer sermons’ served three purposes. The first is to 
engage the congregation into attaining a critical level of thinking and a logical habit 
of reasoning. The second is to dispel the scruples or doubts the congregation may 
have by means of such reasoning, and thirdly these sermons aim to address a 
larger and wider Turkish, and now diverse global, audience to clarify matters that 
have been presented as the soft-spot of belief and religion. 
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During the embryonic period of his movement, Gülen also gave religious talks 
at the local Turkish coffee-houses. Gülen’s conference speeches and his talks 
at the coffee-houses also laid the foundation of the publication of Sızıntı (liter-
ally, Rivulet) in 1979. This is a monthly popular religious-scientific magazine and 
the first such periodical of the Gülen movement. Gülen has consistently written 
the preface article for each issue of this periodical since its very first circulation 
and this has allowed him another mode of communication with his sympathisers 
and the greater Turkish public. These articles are largely motivational abstract es-
says, and are systematically published in the form of a series, Cağ ve Nesil (This 
Era and the Young Generation). This series includes; Towards the Last Paradise 
(Yitirilmiş Cennete Doğru); Growing Thoughts (Yeşeren Düşünceler); The Horizon 
that Light Appears (Işığın Göründüğü Ufuk); A Movement Originating Its Own Mod-
els (Örnekleri Kendinden Bir Hareket); While Days Breath Spring (Günler Baharı 
Soluklarken); The Golden Piece of Time (Zamanın Altın Dilimi); and The Human 
in the Whirlpool of Chaos (Buhranlar Anaforunda İnsan). In these essays Gülen is 
seeking to rejuvenate his readers into a spirit of altruism and self-sacrifice.
In 1990, Gülen started to simplify the Risale-i Nur texts in piecemeal fashion in 
order to make them more accessible to the younger generation, who had difficulty 
in understanding the Ottoman vocabulary and style of writing. Periodically, the 
simplified text would be published in the Sızıntı and Yeni Ümit magazines, aiming 
thereby to eventually complete the whole Risale-i Nur Collection. However, this 
initiative attracted much criticism from the Nurcu groups in Turkey. They held that 
simplifying the text would result in losing its inner meaning and spirit. Whilst disa-
greeing with them on this point, but seeking to avoid discord, Gülen abandoned 
this project. Thereafter, Gülen decided on a different intellectual project, tracing 
the methodology of the concepts of Sufism (tasawuf)15 and proving its place within 
the foundations of Islam. For Gülen, as proven and established by al-Ghazali, Suf-
ism was the inner dimension and meaning of Islam. Therefore, it needed to be well 
preserved and presented. To Gülen, without Sufism, Islam would become a cold, 
didactic and burdensome set of rules. Hence, in these essays he was expounding 
and exploring Islam, coined as Sufism in the twentieth century. Therefore, for him 
this project was about representing the inner values and meanings of Islam to the 
world whilst tracing the path to becoming a ‘perfect person’ (insan-ı kamil). These 
essays have been compiled and also published in English as The Key Concepts in 
the Practice of Sufism: The Emerald Hills of the Heart (Kalbin Zümrüt Tepeleri).
Since 2000, Gülen has started his mid-afternoon conversations in the United 
States. He gives answers to the questions of his students and visitors. The an-
swers are recorded and published in a series entitled Kırık Testi (literally, Broken 
Pitcher), which already includes six volumes (see www.herkul.org).
One important point to note is that the new editions of Gülen’s books are pro-
vided with bibliographical references to the original sources. His hermeneutics 
INTRODUCTION: CONFLICTS AND COHESION18
are derived from the Qur’an, hadith16 and several Sufis and scholars like al-Rumi, 
al-Ghazali, al-Bağhdadi, and Nursi. Much of his work essentially takes the form 
of a synthesis, a rearticulation of the earlier works of his predecessors (cf. Barton 
2007:655). These sources of spiritual guidance all demonstrate the importance of 
loving good and detesting bad deeds. 
Parallel to this literature review, I have also studied the relevant works on the 
Gülen movement, amongst them:
Agai, B. (2003). The education-network of Fethullah Gülen: the flexible imple- »
mentation of modern Islamic thought. A comparison of three countries. Disser-
tation. Hamburg: Ruhr-Universität Bochum.
Ergene, M.E. (2008).  » Tradition Witnessing the Modern Age. An Analysis of the 
Gülen Movement. Istanbul: The Light.
Hunt, R.A., and Aslandoğan, Y.A. (2006). (eds).  » Muslim Citizens of the Glo-
balized World. Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Somerset, NJ: The Light 
& IID Press. 
Saritoprak, Z. (2005) (ed.). Islam in contemporary Turkey: The Contribution of  »
Fethullah Gülen. Special Issue. The Muslim World, 96(1):325-471.
Sevindi, N. (2008).  » Contemporary Islamic Conversations. M. Fethullah Gülen 
on Turkey, Islam, and the West. Albany NY: State University of New York.
Turam, B. (2007).  » Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement. 
Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
Yavuz, M.H. (2003).  » Islamic Political Identity in Turkey. London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Yavuz, M.H. and Esposito, J.L. (2003) (eds).  » Turkish Islam and The Secular 
State. The Gülen Movement. New York: Syracuse University Press.
Yilmaz, I. et al. (2007) (eds).  » Muslim World in transition: Contributions of the 
Gülen Movement. Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press.
Yilmaz, I. et al. (2007) (eds)  » Peaceful Coexistence: Fethullah Gülen’s initia-
tives in the contemporary world. Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press.
Yukleyen, A. (2004). Sources of Tolerance and Radicalism among Turkish- »
Islamic Organizations in Europe. Dissertation. Boston MA: Boston University.
Qualitative interviews
In addition to a systematic review of the works on and by Fethullah Gülen, a 
number of qualitative interviews were conducted with experts on Gülen and the 
movement’s participants. The experts are people who are knowledgeable on 
Gülen and the movement he initiated. They are the critics, academics, journalists, 
and the movement’s representatives in Turkey, Europe, Central Asia, Africa, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States of America. In this thesis, the movement 
participants refer to people who are inspired and influenced by his teaching. I 
prefer to use the term participant, rather than member, because the term member 
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may imply a kind of formal organisation, which does not exist. There is, however, a 
number of ‘elder brothers’ (büyük abiler) who offer a certain amount of knowledge 
of Gülen’s teaching and practices. Most of them are his students and know him 
personally. They informally talk to people in the movement about their projects and 
activities (cf. Aras and Çaha 2000:38; Yavuz 2003b:189). People who participate 
in consultation (istişare) meetings can be seen as the participants of the move-
ment. 
Qualitative interviewing is an excellent tool for the current study in which rich detail 
about the perspectives of participants is desired (Rubin and Rubin 1995). For my 
separate studies in each chapter, I prepared an interview protocol, and pre-tested 
the interview by interviewing a religious studies scholar and a leading participant 
of the Gülen movement. The interview guide was modified according to the sug-
gestions made by these people.
In this dissertation, a total of 43 semi-structured interviews were conducted face-
to-face, in either Turkish or English, lasting an average of one to two hours each. 
Some of the interviews were held via electronic mail. A list of the respondents is 
provided in the Appendix. I recorded several face-to-face interviews. However, 
most of my interviews were carried out in informal settings where I wrote notes be-
cause the interviewee did not feel comfortable about being recorded. Interviewees 
were selected using two separate methods. Some interviewees were selected by 
a method of quotation. These people often seemed to be recognised as experts on 
or representatives of the Gülen movement. Some other interviewees were select-
ed randomly from a group of Gülen specialists and some movement participants 
who know Gülen personally and are well acquainted with his ideas and initiatives 
as well. In order to gain distinct perspective, it is of particular interest to investigate 
what these respondents think about Gülen’s teaching, the movement’s structure, 
the role of Gülen in the movement, and the connection between Said Nursi and 
Gülen. It is also interesting to analyse how they interpret his discourses and ac-
tions, how Gülen inspires and influences individuals in the movement, and how 
the movement translates his ideas into practice. Interview questions were both 
open and close-ended and based on the issues discussed in different chapters. 
In this study, I have combined qualitative interviewing with internet and partici-
pant observation research. Participant observation provides insights because it 
supplies access not only to what people say, but also what they practise. How-
ever, gaining access to such information requires trust between researcher and 
respondents. I followed two strategies to accomplish this. Firstly, I visited and par-
ticipated in many educational and dialogue activities of the movement in several 
countries (e.g., Turkey, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Kyrgyzstan, 
the United Kingdom, the United States of America). My interest in the concerns 
of the movement’s participants also provided me with opportunities to contribute 
to development of the movement through tutoring in English and Mathematics a 
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couple of hours a week to students coming to the educational centres in the Neth-
erlands. In addition, I approached leading movement figures and explaining my 
research project to them. My previous contacts and informal connections helped 
me in gaining appointments and improving my relations to gain the trust of my 
respondents. 
For gathering the data, I used two different sampling techniques; ‘snowball sam-
pling’ and ‘purposeful sampling’ (Seidman 1998). Since it was difficult for me to 
locate my research population by other means, ‘snowball sampling’ was my first 
choice for this study. I contacted individuals through various ways, including my 
personal contacts, the movement’s intercultural organisations, educational institu-
tions, schools, conversation and consultation meetings. I asked my first respond-
ents to recruit their successors. In this way, I hoped to reach some key informants 
who could give me valuable information to complete this study (Hay 2000). This 
technique was adequate for reaching people who had distinct perspectives on the 
themes of my thesis. ‘Purposeful sampling’ was also crucial to my data collection, 
because I was interested in selecting respondents who would reflect the wide 
range of the movement’s activities and projects that I intended to study (Riessman 
1994; Ritchie and Lewis 2003; Siedman 1998). To select participants from differ-
ent strata of the movement, I used my connections in the Netherlands to contact 
different people inside the movement. After gathering information about move-
ment organisations and participants by talking to people, looking at their web-
sites or brochures, I purposefully selected people with distinct positions within the 
movement as well as from different generations to gain multiple perspectives.
Internet search and participant observation
In addition to the interviews, I spent a total of 50 hours viewing internet websites 
of the movement. I conducted internet searches on both Turkish and English sites 
related to the movement. Among the main sites in English are: www.fethullah-
gulen.org; www.fgulen.com; www.guleninstitute.org; www.thelightpublishing.com; 
www.fountainmagazine.com; www.fethullahgulenconference.org; www.gulencon-
ference.org.uk; www.dialoguesociety.org; www.interfaithdialogues.org; www.za-
man.com.tr; www.sizinti.com.tr; www.intercultural.org.au; www.gulenconference.
us; www.interfaithdialog.org, and www.rumiforum.org. 
Further, I spent several days in the Işık Evler (literally, Light Houses) of the move-
ment. These houses accommodate young people to develop their Muslim person-
ality in order to protect their morality.  I also attended major events like Ramadan 
Iftar dinners in the Netherlands and abroad, gatherings, conversation groups, and 
meetings organised by movement participants, in order to be informed from the 
insider perspective. I was always able to take my notes during the movement’s 
gatherings and conversations. Moreover, I listened to several selected cassettes 
of Gülen’s sermons and conversations monthly, sometimes even weekly. His con-
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versations are accessible on www.herkul.org. These are also published in the se-
ries, Kırık Testi (literally, Broken Pitcher, vol. 1–6). The recordings of the sermons 
are available via the movement’s publishing houses. 
Nevertheless, I gained my most interesting data and insights at unexpected times, 
such as an informal chat or email with an informant.
Data analysis
Directed data analysis was used to analyse the data collected from the qualitative 
interviews and participatory observations, while my research themes and sub-
themes served as an initial framework for content analysis (Hsieh and Huberman 
2005; Miles and Huberman 1994). First, existing literature on and by Gülen was 
consulted, and field notes were analysed to gain a first (general) impression. Sec-
ond, interview data were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Next, interview 
contents were characterised and classified, and then discussed in the light of the 
contemplative observations. To improve my study’s reliability and validity, I incor-
porated other sources, viewpoints and methods to some of the respondents, and 
systematically asked them if I have accurately interpreted and recorded what they 
meant. 
A series of compilation volumes containing Gülen’s writings and speeches on spe-
cific topics were also included in the analysis, including; Toward a Global Civiliza-
tion of Love and Tolerance; The Essentials of the Islamic Faith; The Statue of Our 
Souls: Revival in Islamic Thoughts and Activism; Questions This Modern Age Puts 
to Islam, among others, all translated from the Turkish. Gülen’s contributions to 
The Fountain17 and the SAIS Review18 were analysed, in addition to his Turkish-
language videotaped sermons, magazines, newspapers, and columns. Most of 
the primary-source material is accessible on Gülen’s English-language website, 
www.en.fgulen.com, which includes links to his writings in the original Turkish. The 
Turkish-language materials were consulted as a reference to identify important 
conceptual vocabulary.
Structure of the book 1.5 
This study comprises eight chapters. Following this introduction, which has de-
marcated the Gülen movement from other Islamic groups, the second chapter 
sketches the movement’s social and historic background and its local and trans-
local dynamics. Here, I use the discipline of the ‘sociology of knowledge’ (Berger 
and Luckmann 1967), which refers to all forms of analysis of belief, knowledge, 
discourse, culture and texts within society. Analysing the relationship between 
human thought and the social context within which the movement emerged and 
developed is necessary in order to understand Gülen’s ideas, the movement’s 
hizmet discourse, and its educational and intercultural activism. My contention is 
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that this chapter provides an overall framework to facilitate such confluences of 
analytical examinations. In addition, after an analysis of the movement’s charac-
teristics and determinants, this chapter closes with a discussion of the main criti-
cism of the Gülen movement.
Chapter three focusses on the leadership characteristics of Fethullah Gülen and 
aims to examine his leadership style using Islamic and servant-leadership per-
spective. In doing so, this chapter attempts to give insights into Gülen’s leader-
ship which are decisive to the movement’s attitudes and activism. This chapter 
attempts to inform how the followers, sympathisers and his audience experience 
and characterise his leadership style, from both insider and outsider perspectives. 
His leadership is seen as a catalyst in the successes and cohesiveness his move-
ment has achieved since its commencement in the 1960s. The concept of servant-
leadership is described here as a philosophy of life that promotes peaceful living 
and social justice and cohesion. Based on Gülen’s leadership style, this chapter 
also introduces an idea of leadership pertaining to the three aspects of intellect, 
spirituality and application of a leader. In this case study, it is important to analyse 
the paths and patterns of Gülen’s leadership to come to a conceptual framework 
of internal cohesiveness and solidarity which affects the movement’s social suc-
cesses or deficiencies.
In chapter four, the seven principles of textual linguistics (cohesion, coherence, 
intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality and intertextuality) are ap-
plied to Gülen’s teaching and his movement as an empirical case. This chapter 
primarily examines how and to what extent Gülen’s teaching and the movement he 
inspired are contributing to peaceful coexistence between Muslims and non-Mus-
lims. Secondarily, these textual linguistic standards are used as a new theoretical 
and methodological approach for exploring and analysing social movements and 
phenomena. The chapter includes the examination of the correlations between a 
movement and a text, and the processes of cognition, production of knowledge 
and its dissemination in the Muslim world. This chapter’s practical relevance lies in 
the fact that it facilitates an understanding of how the Gülen movement has been 
formed and accomplished, both nationally and internationally.
The fifth chapter examines the characteristics and theological foundations of 
Gülen’s approach to dialogue and peace, compared with one of the most promi-
nent proponents of non-violent resistance during the last several decades, Pope 
John Paul II. This chapter attempts to bring together the thinking of these theo-
logians into a kind of dialogue on the theme of ‘the ethics of peace and dialogue’ 
by summarising John Paul II’s position as a point of reference for the comparison. 
After an examination of Gülen’s theological references for dialogue, the chapter 
analyses his approach to dialogue in three successive stages (respecting, ac-
cepting and sharing), and from two diametrically critical viewpoints. Based on the 
analyses, this chapter introduces four dimensions of peace, which are discussed 
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in more depth in the next chapter.
The fifth chapter examines comparatively the characteristics and theological foun-
dations of Gülen’s approach to dialogue and peace among members of differ-
ent nations, religions, cultures and civilisations. From theological and practical 
perspectives, Gülen’s understanding of dialogue is compared with that of Pope 
John Paul II. Fethullah Gülen proposes dialogue as a way to build and establish a 
culture of peace among people of different ethnic, racial and cultural descent. He 
sees dialogue as a framework of mutual respect for each other’s identity. This is 
the first stage of Gülen’s dialogue concept: respecting the position of the other(s). 
Gülen believes that this dialogue concept will ultimately lead to peace and unity, 
through the recognition and acceptance of social, cultural, and religious diversity, 
mutual values and possibilities for collaboration. 
Chapter six contains an exposition of Fethullah Gülen’s model on peaceful co-
existence. His four dimensions of peace – eternal peace, inner peace, interper-
sonal or intercommunal peace, and global peace – are discussed as a practical 
guideline for those who seek to pursue peace. This chapter argues that these 
four dimensions of peace are possible only when accompanied by moral values, 
mutual knowledge and acceptance of cultural and religious identity. In particular, 
the chapter describes Gülen’s idea of education as a practical means to achieve 
peace, and his dialogue approach as an alternative for dispute resolution. The 
analytical exploration of Gülen’s teaching is helpful in challenging the thesis of an 
impending ‘clash of civilisations’ in two ways. First, to live in peace as a result of 
dialogue and education is vital in today’s globalised world. Second, Gülen pursues 
an inclusive middle way between fundamental futures of modernity and the Mus-
lim tradition – science and Islamic knowledge, reason and revelation, progress 
and conservatism, and free will and destiny – accepting them as two faces of the 
same reality. 
Chapter seven is a demonstration of  two perspectives – one rooted in Islam, the 
other in secular early-Enlightenment – that point to the same goal. The need for 
and the relationship between tolerance and dialogue are expressed in the writings 
of both Fethullah Gülen, and Benedictus (Baruch) de Spinoza, the son of Portu-
guese Jews who sought refuge in Amsterdam during the seventeenth century and 
became the leader of a ‘radical’ philosophical current which divorced philosophy 
from theology. This chapter explains how the amalgamation of their ideas demon-
strates in itself that a dialogue between ‘civilisations’ is possible and thus defies 
those who believe that Islam and the Judeo-Christian/secular West are destined 
to clash. Furthermore, this chapter debates how their philosophies contribute to 
social cohesiveness and the peaceful coexistence between secular and Islamic 
residents.
Using the insights gathered throughout this study, the concluding chapter reflects 
INTRODUCTION: CONFLICTS AND COHESION24
on the central research question and briefly discusses the specificities of the Gülen 
movement. The findings of this thesis are recapitulated into five main lessons 
learned from the Gülen movement, along with a reflection on the aforementioned 
central research question. This final chapter ends with closing thoughts.
notes
1. Ethnicity is a shared cultural heritage (Macionis and Plummer 2005:276). It is the cultural and 
hereditary characteristics that connect a particular group or groups of people to each other be-
yond a simple racial similarity. Ethnicity goes far beyond the modern ties of a person to a particu-
lar nation (e.g., citizenship), and focuses more upon the connection to a perceived shared past 
and culture. Race and ethnicity may thus overlap, but one has a firm sense of biological difference 
(now very muddled) and the other relies on accepting and understanding cultural heritage.
2. The ethnic violence in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a result of 
long-time hostility between the different nationalities, or rather ethnicities, who were being held 
together by the central power of the Communist government. Multi-faceted factors assisted the 
deterioration of the ‘good’ relationship between the federal entities. One of the most important 
factors was the assimilation of ethnic identity into national identity, Yugoslavian identity. Also the 
demise of Communism created the need for political reformation in order to maintain political 
power. These and other relevant factors combined together resulted in inevitable bloody con-
frontation in the late twentieth century. The war in Kosovo and other Yugoslavian Republics is a 
clear example of intolerance between ethnic groups and a misjudged political manipulation (see 
Ahmed 1997; Malcolm 1996).
3. Mores is a plural form of Latin mos. It is seldom used, and the anglicised singular more is practi-
cally never used. Mores are folkways which have come to be considered by a society as vital to its 
welfare. While violation of the folkways can often be done with relative impunity and only a minor 
amount of social disapproval, violation of the mores is considered a threat to the society’s welfare 
(Roucek and Warren 1957:173).
4. In public and policy debates in western Europe, multiculturalism is considered desirable and 
necessary for the development of secure ethnic identities and positive intergroup relations, but it 
has also been described as a ‘drama’ and a ‘failure’. Cultural assimilation has been proposed as 
the only viable option (e.g., Schnabel 2000). Some argue that this change in political and ideo-
logical discourse can have an impact on attitudes towards minority groups and on the patterns of 
group identification among these groups (e.g., Verkuyten and Zaremba 2005).
5. On 4 November 1979, the Iranians cruelly detained 53 diplomats as hostages in the US Em-
bassy in Tehran (see Foran and Goodwin 1993; Walzer 1989, 2002).
6. In 1989 Salman Rushdie published his controversial novel, The Satanic Verses, in Britain. One 
character in the book, the Prophet Mahound, appears as a figure of debauchery, foul language 
and obscenity. Sensing that this was a thinly disguised, blasphemous attack on the Prophet Mu-
hammad and the Islamic faith, British Muslims soon expressed their anger and requested the 
publisher’s apology for misrepresenting the Islamic faith. Matters rapidly escalated: the book was 
ritually burned in Bolton and Bradford; the media accused the Muslims of intolerance, voices were 
raised against Rushdie in India and Pakistan. The Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini issued his 
fatwa, including a call for execution, against Rushdie. Although initially a British affair, The Satanic 
Verses scandal escalated into an international one, symbolising battles between religious institu-
tions and secular cultures, and accompanied by a resurgence of anti-Islamic feeling in the West 
(Appignanesi and Maitland 1989; Macionis and Plummer 2005:287-487; Parekh 1989).
7. Hizb-ut Tahrir of Pakistan and central Asia has associations in several European countries 
(e.g., England and Denmark). In some countries they have been banned. They call for a theocrat-
ic state led by a Caliph in a Muslim-majority country. They believe that Islam cannot be complete 
without a state and Muslims should strive to realise this through a revolution or a coup to gain 
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control of the state. They have an active website where they propagate their views (see details 
on www.hilafet.org).
8. Hizbullah is a Lebanese Shiite Muslim political group, often involved in military actions. Hizbul-
lah, an Arabic word meaning ‘Party of God’, was formed in 1982, with Hussayn Musawi as leader. 
Hizbullah is an umbrella organisation with groups like Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Or-
ganisation, Islamic Jihad for a Free Palestine and Revolutionary Arab Groups as subdivisions. 
9. According to its website (www.arabeuropean.org), the Arab European League (AEL) stands 
both for the rights of the Arabs and Muslim communities in Europe and for solidarity with all Mus-
lim peoples in the world. For details, see www.arabeuropean.org, the official website of AEL.
10. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna, as an Islamic 
revivalist movement following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent ban of 
the caliphate system of government that had united the Muslims for hundreds of years. Al-Banna 
based his ideas that Islam was not only a religious observance, but a comprehensive way of life, 
on the tenets of Wahhabism.
11. For more information about the connection of Gülen with Said Nursi, see section 2.2.
12. Some scholars argue that the dominant conception of social cohesion is shifting. For example, 
Gowricharn (2006:10) claims that during recent decades it has shifted from the educational and 
labour participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities, to their culture (gender issues, religious 
aspects, lifestyles), to questions of citizenship and political loyalties.
13. Gülen recognises democracy as the only viable political system of governance in the modern 
state. He argues that whilst the Qur’an and the Sunnah speak clearly of religious values that 
should be reflected and upheld in the state they do not contain a blueprint for politics. He is firmly 
of the opinion that people should strive to modernise and consolidate democratic institutions in 
order to build a society where individual rights and freedoms are respected and protected (Gülen 
2001). He states: ‘Islam does not propose a certain unchangeable form of government or attempt 
to shape it. Instead, Islam establishes fundamental principles that orient a government’s general 
character, leaving it to the people to choose the type and form of government according to time 
and circumstances’ (ibid:134). In an interview in Sabah Daily (25 January 1995), Gülen endorses 
democracy specifically, arguing that it is the most appropriate form of government for the modern 
period and one that is entirely compatible with Islam: ‘Democracy and Islam are compatible. 
Ninety-five percent of Islamic rules deal with private life and the family. Only five percent deals 
with matters of the state, and this could be arranged only within the context of democracy. If some 
people are thinking of something else, such as an Islamic state, this country’s history and social 
conditions do not allow it […]. Democratisation is an irreversible process in Turkey.’ (see also 
Yavuz 2003a:28).
14. Khutba (Hutbe) is a sermon delivered at the noon prayer on Fridays.
15. The Sufi tradition is one of the main channels of Islamic heritage of thought and learning. The 
continual process of spiritual development in Sufism along a path of the innate human poverty, 
helplessness, and powerlessness before God is undertaken in the knowledge that everything 
comes from God.
16. Hadith (or Hadit) is Arabic for news or story. In religious terms, it is used for the spoken tradi-
tions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. They are revered and received as a major source of 
religious law and moral guidance. The development of Hadith was a vital element during the first 
three centuries of Islamic history, and its study provides a broad index to the mind and ethos of 
Islam.
17. The Fountain is a magazine published quarterly, with articles on scientific, literature, and 
spiritual thought. See, for the online version: www.fountainmagazine.com.




The social background of the Gülen movement
introduction 2.1 
This chapter provides a historical and political analysis of the social background 
of the Gülen movement in order to establish a contextual framework. Analysing 
the social and political context within which the movement emerged and evolved 
is necessary in order to understand Gülen’s ideas and the movement’s activism. 
Which social and political issues shaped Gülen’s generation? What were the so-
cial, religious and political problems? Why did the movement emerge and what did 
it stand for? Were there any particularities leading to the conception of the Gülen 
movement in his native Turkey and abroad? The answers to these questions will 
provide the necessary background from which to understand the movement’s ide-
ology, Gülen’s teachings and various perceptions thereof. Accordingly, adherents 
to the sociology of knowledge (e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1967) argue that the 
relationship between human thought and the social context within which it arises 
are inseparable. This approach surmises that any social action or phenomenon 
is a product of human construction and thus subject to multiple and contextual 
influences. For constructivism, individual actions are caused by a combination 
of social structure and the individual choices. Identifying the interplay between 
human understanding and multiple, yet conditioned, constructions of reality, this 
approach illustrates that the social movements can be properly understood only 
through hermeneutical and interactive methods. For example, globalisation and 
the expansion of public spaces play a critical role in the construction and articula-
tion of the social movements.
Identifying the movement’s ideological, social and historical background will de-
termine its characteristics. Additionally, a brief biography of Gülen’s spiritual and 
scholarly achievements is provided here. Textual sources have been analysed 
using discourse analysis, which provides a systematic identification of the key 
elements that have shaped the movement. The analysis was supported by obser-
vational data.
After studying the historical and socio-political context of the Gülen movement, 
I will deal with the expansion of the movement and its hizmet discourse. Here, 
I analyse the worldwide proliferation and institutionalisation of the movement. 
Thereafter, the major conceptions and ideological elements of the movement will 
be clarified. Special attention is given to Gülen’s concept of a ‘golden generation’, 
and his philosophy of education and dialogue. The chapter will close with a discus-
sion of the main criticism of the Gülen movement.
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Historical and socio-political context of the movement2.2 
Since the Ottoman Reformation (Tanzimat) period, Turkey, where the Gülen 
movement emerged, had been, and still is plagued by many political, economic 
and social problems. During the early 1920s, the war for independence led to 
regime change in Turkey, under the reign of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938). 
Atatürk was the founder and the first president of the new Republic of Turkey 
which appeared in 1923 on the map as an independent national state. This new 
regime, also called ‘Kemalism or Kemalist Ideology’, sought to create a modern, 
democratic and secular nation-state. After World War II, the emerging struggle 
between modernity and religion took its toll on Turkey. The new Kemalist regime 
had a staunch secular character and purged Islamic motifs from the public sphere. 
During this period, Turkish democracy was very fragile; it oscillated between a 
single-party (the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) CHP), and 
a multi-party system. 
The tarikats (mystical brotherhoods, dervish orders) were banned, and their local 
centres (tekkes and zaviyes) were closed, as well as the sacred tombs (türbes). 
The function of şeyhülislam, administrating religious affairs on behalf of the Otto-
man Sultan, was replaced by a new body, the Turkish Directorate of Religious Af-
fairs (Diyanet İşleri Bakanlığı), which fell directly under the prime minister. The use 
of the Arabic form of the call to prayer (ezan) was prohibited. Some other meas-
ures, such as dress codes banning traditional headscarfs, the replacement of Ara-
bic writing with the Latin alphabet, the introduction of the European calendar and 
European clocks, also had an indirect impact on the personal lives of people from 
all walks of life. All these reforms, from politics to daily life, caused dissatisfaction 
and a variety of responses.  Political and sectarian feuds, an economic crisis, and 
widespread poverty among other things had an influence on an entire generation 
of thinkers. Mardin (1998:225) argues that many of the conceptions – centre ver-
sus periphery, elite versus mass, military versus civilian and so on – in this proc-
ess of modern state construction, overlap with that of religion and secularism. The 
intellectuals of the Turkish Republic were heavily influenced by the overwhelming 
defeat of their once powerful Islamic civilisation (Yavuz 2003b; Yavuz and Es-
posito 2003; Zürcher 2007, 2000, 2007). After losing their religious freedom, the 
Islamic groups reorganised themselves to protect their religious identity. 
Between 1950 and 1960, the Democrat Party (DP), which was continuously sup-
ported by various religious groups, created a more liberal political atmosphere in 
Turkey (Bacık 2003:24). By virtue of this political support, the DP, in turn, removed 
several bans on religious life, for example, freedom for religious education, and 
the reintroduction of the Arabic call to prayer (ezan). In order to curb political Is-
lamic activism and to protect the secular character of the Republic, however, the 
Turkish army, the fervent defender of the Kemalist ideology, with a coup d’état, 
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gained full control of the country in 1960. The leader of the DP and the then Turk-
ish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, was executed after a judgment by a military 
court. Over the following years (1960–1980), the Turkish Islamic groups experi-
enced noteworthy transformations. In 1971, a new coup d’état changed the course 
of Turkish politics once again, followed by another military coup d’état in 1980.
This is the context in which Gülen grew up and developed his ideas, surrounded 
by ignorance, poverty, instability, and political anarchy marked by clashes between 
the leftist and rightist groups (Ergene 2008; Yavuz 2003a,b; Yavuz and Esposito 
2003; Zürcher and Van der Linden 2004). Education was sporadic, materialism 
rife and civic consideration replaced by egocentrism. Experiencing all this, Gülen 
set out to make a difference in the lives of his fellow country people through the 
promotion of education and economic activism. 
From the beginning of his movement in the late 1960s, Gülen has frequently, 
unlike Necmettin Erbakan, articulated that he is opposed to the idea of an Is-
lamic political party (Foreign Policy 2008b). Gülen gave new readings of religious 
texts which evoked voluntarism, an appreciation for worldly ascetics and a type 
of universalism that kept local values and customs alive.1 Gülen has developed a 
religious discourse and style of piety that has attracted a network of followers and 
sympathisers inside and outside Turkey. He has inspired a transnational civic faith-
based movement, including educational institutions ranging from primary schools 
to universities, many media outlets, business networks, interfaith dialogue forums, 
and multicultural encounters. He is considered by many to be a social reform-
er, who has developed a new sense of religiosity in touch with modern realities 
(Armağan and Ünal 1999; Hunt and Aslandoğan 2006; Saritoprak 2005; Yavuz 
2003a,b; Yavuz and Esposito 2003; Yilmaz 2007a,b; Yukleyen 2004).2 Since the 
1980s, the movement participants attempt to embody his interpretation of Islam 
through their educational and dialogue initiatives in secular western societies. Ya-
vuz (2004:223) explains the movement’s activism as the ‘coming out’ of the private 
Muslim identity into the public spaces.
Gülen’s conservative ancestry has also played a role in the formulation of his 
movement’s ideological basis. Official records note that Muhammad Fethullah 
Gülen was born on 27 April 19413 in the village of Korucuk of the Pasinler district 
of the provincial city of Erzurum on the north-eastern margins of Anatolia, just 
twenty-odd years after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment 
of the Republic of Turkey. Erzurum is known in Turkey for its cultural conservatism 
and its religious and nationalist populace. It has its own special kind of patriotism, 
sense of religious devotion and civic conviction. This is said to result from Erzu-
rum’s geographical ‘frontier position’ and the significant presence of Caucasus 
immigrants. Its culture necessitates security over all other concerns and assumes 
the protection of the Turkish border from a possible threat. Thus, Erzurum as-
sumed the cultural defence of Turkey and Islam against communism during the 
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turbulent 1970s. Later, the city became a stronghold against the perceived threat 
of religious radicalism.4 
Fethullah Gülen, called Hocaefendi5 as a mark of respect by his followers, is of 
Turkish origin and can be seen as a product of ‘Eastern civilisation’, having been 
born in eastern Turkey, and formed by Islamic tradition in such a way that it has 
been a constant and fixed point of reference for his own personal life, his inter-
pretations of the world, his teaching and actions (Weller 2006:75-6). According to 
Ergene (2008), he is a man of traditional values due to his conservative upbring-
ing. In reference to this point, several respondents indicated that Gülen has been 
considered to be a mujaddid (renewer of Islamic truths)6 and is a sayyid7 on his 
mother’s side. This is one of the most remarkable examples of the Islamic herit-
age that consisted in the sayyids and sharifs (Ahlul-Bayt, people of the Prophet’s 
house), for in Muslim society, the fraternity formed by the sayyids and sharīfs oc-
cupied a very special place in the Islamic social tradition. 
Gülen has been influenced by several Islamic scholars. Said Nursi, Alvarlı Muham-
mad Lütfi, and the influence of al-Rumi, al-Ghazali, and amongst others, played a 
significant role in his religious milieu of Erzurum. He was brought up in a close-knit 
family as one of eight siblings. His sense of religious devotion is largely attribut-
able to his childhood and upbringing. He received religious and Arabic instruction 
at an early age from his father, who was the village molla (religious teacher). He 
began elementary school in 1946 but this was cut short in 1949 as his family 
moved to another village. This was the only formal education he received, but 
he was educated at home by his mother, the village’s Qur’an teacher. His par-
ents and grandmother were devout Muslims. Gülen narrates how his grandmother 
would cry endlessly over the mention of God’s name, how she was immersed with 
love for God and how this awoke within him the same sentiments and feelings 
(Erdoğan 1995). Thus, religion was not imposed or made a means of undesirable 
control of his youth. It is evident that this permeates through his teachings. After 
years of home schooling, Gülen continued his education at a number of different 
madrasas.8 In 1956, he graduated to a mentorship with Alvarlı Muhammad Lütfi, a 
prominent regional Sufi master of his time. Under his instruction, Gülen committed 
the Qur’an to memory, mastered the Arabic language and studied elementary les-
sons in fiqh9 (Islamic jurisprudence) (Aktay 2003:141).
Gülen obtained his licence to preach from the State Directorate of Religious Af-
fairs (Diyanet) in 1959 at the age of eighteen, and from then on he began giving 
sermons at mosques, speeches at conferences, and talks at public coffee-houses 
in his native country. His ideal, and his objective, was to cultivate the perfect in-
dividuals (insan-ı kamil) who would combine spirituality with intellect, reason with 
revelation, and mind with heart. He wanted the new generation of Turkish people 
to have sound faith, motivational love, a balanced perception of science, and a 
new and a re-evaluated view of the human condition. This goal was to promote 
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free thinking and respect for freedom of thought where collective consciousness 
was combined with a multi-dimensional and mathematical logic and appreciation 
of art. Sevindi (2002:9) regards him as an Islamic intellectual who puts human 
development at the centre of everything. 
The Gülen movement emerged in the late 1960s as a local group in Turkey, has 
significantly expanded its educational network and currently operates in some 
hundred countries (World Economic Forum 2008:97). Yavuz (2003a) describes 
the movement shaped around Gülen’s ideas as comprising an inner cabinet along 
with a network of several million like-minded volunteers and sympathisers, rather 
than an organisation with a hierarchy or formal membership. The movement’s par-
ticipants – generally recruited via activities and projects – are inspired by Gülen’s 
ideas as expressed in his books and speeches. Gülen is highly respected by the 
movement’s participants, but is not considerd to be a sacred figure. He is not a 
formal leader, nor does he possess the ownership of any asset of the institutions 
that comprise the movement. Those who received religious education from Gülen, 
and therefore define themselves as his disciples, contemplate him as a wise and 
revered person. 
Şen (2007:329) argues that the Gülen movement has an organisational duality; 
the public sphere and its own private sphere. The former means foundations, 
associations, media institutions and schools, whereas the latter refers to an in-
ner, spiritual world containing its own particular language, symbols and rituals. 
Externally, the movement is independent of any state or group. Internally, it does 
not have a strict hierarchical structure. Instead, it is a loosely connected network 
of autonomous organisations (e.g., NGOs, charitable foundations, educational in-
stitutions, private corporations, and media and publishing enterprises) that are 
associated via shared hopes and values (cf. Aras 2000:48-51; Barton 2007:651; 
Vogelaar 2008:33-34; Yavuz 2003a,b). There is no registration of the movement’s 
participants.
The movement has founded several institutions, as a result of bottom-up participa-
tion. At the centre of these institutions are the movement’s schools. These schools 
pursue secular curricula, using modern pedagogical methods and stressing com-
mon concerns and values such as respecting others, promoting peace, and seek-
ing progress (Agai 2002). The schools initiated by the movement’s participants 
recognise both modern values (e.g., the rule of law, democracy and human rights, 
including freedom of conscience and religion), and the local cultures of wherever 
they exist. The movement’s participants (such as merchants, businesspeople, 
parents, teachers, students) support these institutions by their own resources, 
and constitute a board of trustees. Those who do not have any financial capital, 
contribute to the movement through their social capital (e.g., social ties, networks, 
labour) and their human capital (e.g., skills, competencies, ideas). One can claim 
that the altruism and the hard work of the movement’s participants have created 
a ‘trust capital’ felt by people inside or outside the movement. In fact, in the long 
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run that has become an opportunity and a substantial source of ‘credit’ for the 
movement.
Aras (1998) argues that Gülen appeared on the socio-political scene at a time 
when the Turkish government was desperately seeking to balance more radical 
Islamist movements. One can say that the Gülen movement and the state devel-
oped a symbiotic relationship. The movement incorporated respect for the state 
into its discourse, while the state in turn tried to use the movement as a potential 
counterweight to the ever-present communist threat, although the relationship be-
tween the state and the movement was frequently disrupted. Forbes magazine 
(18 January 2008) claims that Gülen supported the military coup of 1980 and the 
‘soft coup’ in 1997 in Turkey. Bulaç (2008) argues that the movement has a civil 
character, is not an extension of the state and is not opposed to the state. Another 
related characteristic some respondents10 pointed to is that the Gülen movement 
emphasises an apolitical, proactive and constructive type of activism at local, na-
tional and international level, by avoiding extremism and conflict. 
In addition, during his youth, Gülen found himself betwixt and between the ma-
drasa and Islamic culture, on one hand, and western culture, on the other. For 
three generations before him, people had been searching for an identity that lay 
between these two cultural worlds (Ergene 2008). This struggle to balance be-
tween two worlds is of course not specific to Turkey. All countries that are includ-
ing the realm of western civilisation have lived through this experience of identity 
debates. Ergene (2008) further argues that Gülen’s conservatism was neither sat-
isfied with solely watching developments and social changes from a distance, nor 
one that is shaped through pure reactionism. Gülen includes traditional values that 
have been formed through past experience and practices in the spirit of the time, 
as well as current social transformations through consciousness, awareness and 
participation.
The connection with Nursi
Gülen came into contact with the Risale-i Nur Collection at a young age through 
one of Bediüzzaman’s students. The Risale is a contemporary topic-based 
commentary on the fundamentals of belief written by Bediüzzaman Said Nursi 
(1876–1960), whose treaties on Islamic faith and morality have created an impor-
tant faith movement: the Nurcu movement. This collection of Nursi has three inter-
related goals; to raise the consciousness of Muslims; to refute the dominant intel-
lectual discourses of materialism and positivism; and to recover collective memory 
by revising the shared grammar of society (Yavuz 2000:7). This ‘print-based Is-
lamic discourse’ constitutes the base of the Nurcu groups (Yavuz 2003b:151). 
Gülen never met Nursi in person, Yavuz (1999; 2003b:179,304) uses the expres-
sion ‘neo-Nurcu’ movement to describe Gülen and his followers and argues that 
this detachment is a response to the secularist accusation in Turkey. 
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Gülen has been termed as a ‘Nurcu’. However, some respondents pointed out that 
in his writings and sermons, his public speeches, he never directly used the term 
‘üstad’ (my respected master) in reference to Nursi. According to the respondents, 
this means that Gülen is not a follower of Nursi, and his movement did not evolve 
out the Nurcu movement. In this regard, Gülen states that ‘this hizmet movement 
is neither the beginning of any movement nor its following’.11 Saritoprak and Griffith 
(2005:332) explain that Gülen nevertheless began to incorporate many of Nursi’s 
ideas into his own teaching. Several scholars and interviewees stressed that the 
main inspiration of the Gülen teaching comes from the Risale-i Nur12 Collection, the 
‘nur’ (light) discourse is dominant within Gülen’s thought and the movement he in-
spired. It could be argued that the Risale Collection has served as a source of firm 
belief, spiritual renewal and inspiration for the movement. In fact, Gülen’s project 
is to embody Nursi’s vision of reconciling religion and science in educational insti-
tutions. In other words, as a follower of Nursi’s vision on accommodating Islam to 
modernity and finding harmony between scientific reason and religious revelation, 
Gülen seeks peace based on justice on Earth and the hereafter through intellec-
tual and spiritual enlightenment. Rather than being a part of the Nurcu movement, 
Gülen presents itself as a separate peace and education movement. 
In addition to the formative influence of the Risale-i Nur on the development of 
Gülen’s thought, the Islamic intellectuals of the Turkish Republic,13 the orthodox 
Sunni Islam and some of the Sufi tradition have also shaped his religious dis-
course (Özdalga 2000:91; Yavuz 2003b:180). However, several respondents 
stressed that Gülen, known by some as ‘a modern-day’ al-Rumi,14 differs from the 
Sufi order in that the Sufi disciple is represented by the shaykh (religious guide), 
whereas Gülen’s programme is more open-ended and stresses positive action 
(müsbet hareket) or service to humanity (hizmet) more than spiritual exercises 
and devotions. 
The socio-political transitions of the movement 
As a result of socio-political changes and the new legal frameworks in Turkey, 
the Gülen movement has undergone several transitions. The focus of the move-
ment has changed from a religious community to the formation of a global and 
faith-based civil society movement (Yavuz 2003a:19-47). These transitions and 
changes can be generally categorised into three successive development stages 
since its inception in the 1960s. This categorisation is based on a combination of 
Gülen’s ideas and the contextual developments at national and international level, 
such as military interventions in Turkey and the fall of the Soviet Union.
The first stage encompasses the period spanning the late 1960s and up to the 
military government (1980–1983). In these nurturing and planning years, Gülen 
gave numerous talks, sermons and a series of conference speeches at gatherings 
organised by his followers and sympathisers. The formation of reading groups and 
summer camps in İzmir and other Anatolian cities also marks the formative stage 
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of the movement. These activities enabled him to reach a more representative 
cross-section of the population and to attract the attention of the academic com-
munity, especially students. In this embryonic period, Gülen also concentrated 
on inspiring the founding of student-dormitories and establishing Işık Evler (Light 
Houses) in various provinces in Anatolia. Based on my interviews, I can say that 
the objective behind the movement’s Light Houses, which still exist, is to provide 
students with a home, a network of friends and a daily routine making it easier for 
them to abstain from indulging in religiously immoral acts and maintaining a spir-
itual lifestyle. The Light Houses are rented to accommodate students and have, on 
average, between five or seven inhabitants. Some argue that these houses play a 
crucial role in involving new participants in the movement. 
Gülen was arrested for his religious activities amidst the general military crack-
down on politically motivated Islamists and leftists following the coup of 12 March 
1971. He was accused of indoctrinating his students in Islamist propaganda, an-
tithetical to the interests and security of the state. He was acquitted and released 
six months later, regaining his post as a preacher in İzmir, where he remained until 
1980 (Aras and Çaha 2003:143).
The second stage of the movement began in 1981 when Gülen retired as a state 
preacher (vaiz). After the termination of the military government in 1983, the move-
ment gradually loosened its boundaries and evolved as an education movement. 
Throughout the 1980s, Gülen and members of the new Anatolian bourgeoisie in-
spired by his teachings began to invest in advancing educational attainment in 
Turkey by establishing schools and learning institutions across Anatolia (Hendrick 
2006:23). Yavuz (2003a:35) argues that, owing to very difficult political conditions 
in the 1980s, the Gülen movement put its vision of producing a ‘golden generation’ 
into practice by utilising new political, legal, and economic opportunity spaces. 
After the political opening of the system in the 1980s, the movement developed 
close ties with state institutions and became involved in economic, cultural and 
media activities. In corporation with Turgut Özal, the then president and prime 
minister of Turkey, Gülen worked to transform the bureaucracy and the socio-
cultural landscape of the country to a democratic pluralist and liberal economic 
system. After his retirement as a state preacher, Gülen has also concentrated his 
efforts on building an atmosphere resulting in dialogue and peace among the fac-
tions representing different ideologies, faiths and cultures. 
The third phase commenced in the 1990s and extends to the present. In 1991, 
Gülen gave his last sermon and bid his final farewell as preacher to the congrega-
tion, due to the fear that the congregation might become the target of terrorist at-
tacks. In the 1990s, political and economic changes in Turkey, the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the structural weakening of the Turkish state monopoly over information 
and capital flows, and global developments in communication and transforma-
tion technology all contributed to Gülen placing more emphasis on international 
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educational encounters and dialogue activities among the adherents of different 
religions (Kuru 2005). To this end, Gülen visited and received leading figures, not 
only from the Turkish population, but from all over the world. Dialogue and mutual 
understanding evolved as the cornerstone of the Gülen movement. 
On 28 February 1997, the army mounted a ‘soft coup’ in Turkey. The military were 
extremely uneasy about the growing presence of religious reactionism within the 
state and public sphere and felt it necessary to intervene, albeit without toppling 
the government. This military coup is commonly known as the ‘February 28 proc-
ess’ because the military coup was not limited to the removal of the Erbakan-
led government but was also seen as a process of monitoring, controlling, and 
criminalising all Islamic activism as a security threat. This ‘February 28 process’ is 
called a ‘soft coup’ because the military mobilised the major business associations, 
media cartels, university rectors to force the Erbakan government to resign. Gülen 
also became a target of increased suspicion with the state, and a warrant was is-
sued for his arrest. At the time, he was in the United States of America receiving 
treatment for a heart condition, and he has quietly resided there ever since. Yavuz 
(2003a:43) identifies this exile as a significant stepping stone in Gülen’s intellec-
tual evolution. He sees Gülen in this stage moving from a concern with the specific 
issues of Turkey to a more global and liberal-oriented perspective.
As mentioned before, the movement’s educational and intercultural activism 
emerged initially in Turkey and then received its articulation at the global scale. 
Especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, the movement has gradually evolved 
and grown in various areas of the world. Widening and deepening of the worldwide 
movement continues by virtue of his speeches and writings. New not-for-profit 
organisations in the domains of education, media, academic studies, business, 
health and dialogue have been founded. With its theoretical and practical aspects, 
the movement, according to some respondents, offers solutions for many social 
and cultural problems, and attempts to construct a new Muslim identity in the 
modern era that meets the challenges of secularism and materialism. Although 
the Gülen Hizmet movement has been subject to criticism, especially on the side 
of nationalists and secularists, its activities and projects are now supported by dif-
ferent ethnic and social groups in modern democracies.
The emergence and expansion of the hіzmet discourse2.3 
The core concepts that constitute Gülen’s view, and thus the vision of movement 
participants, are bundled in the overarching hizmet discourse (service to one’s 
fellow human beings). Each underlining principle of Gülen’s teaching drives di-
rectly from the idea of living to serve humanity through ‘commanding good and 
forbidding evil’ (amr bi al-ma’ruf wa nahiy ‘an al-munkar). This involves promoting 
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virtues and trying to prevent the spread of vices (Gülen 1998b,c). These principles 
include having an ultimate goal (gaye-i hayal), altruism (diğergamlık), living for 
others (baskası için yaşama), sense of personal responsibility (mes’uliyet duy-
gusu), spirit of devotion (adanmışlık ruhu), and a person of heart (gönül insanı) (cf. 
Kalyoncu 2008a:19-32). Gülen considers these to be the sine qua non attributes 
of a person of hizmet. 
Having an ultimate goal is one of the most used concepts in Gülen’s writings and 
public speeches. He considers it to be crucial to one’s life and suggests that one’s 
ultimate goal should be seeking God’s pleasure by serving humanity. Gülen sees 
a symbiotic relationship between having a gaye-i hayal and well-being: one can 
live a productive life only if one has an ultimate ideal that serves the common good 
of society or all of humanity. An individual who lacks such an ideal glorifies his or 
her own interests, and judges himself or herself according to the standards of so-
ciety. He or she essentially becomes a walking cadaver who will, sooner of later, 
lose his or her spiritual essence. 
Gülen introduces two complementary concepts that enable one to live one’s life 
dedicated to having an ultimate goal (a gaye-i hayal); altruism and living for oth-
ers. He considers altruism and living only in order to be of benefit to fellow human 
beings as the essential source of strength for a person with an ultimate goal. Fur-
thermore, he introduces the concepts of a sense of personal responsibility and a 
spirit of devotion as two mobilising factors that enable one to make it one’s grand 
purpose to serve others. Although altruism and living for others complement each 
other and enable one to dedicate oneself to serving humanity, a sense of personal 
responsibility is the notion that encourages the individual to adopt the former two 
concepts and practise them in daily life. Spirit of devotion is another complemen-
tary characteristic that instructs one to remain motivated and focus one’s attention 
on obtaining the consent of God. In relation to a spirit of devotion (adanmışlık 
ruhu), Gülen introduces the person of heart (gönül insanı) who possesses a spirit 
of devotion and hence lives a life fully dedicated to serving humanity and God. 
Kalyoncu (2008a:32-39) states that these concepts of the hizmet discourse have 
been operationalised since the emergence of the Gülen movement through the 
following practices: sohbet (conversation) meetings, istişare (consultation, and 
collective decision making), mütevelli (board of trustees), and himmet (personal 
commitment) or verme duygusu (passion of giving). Personal commitment (him-
met) is related to both istişare and mütevelli. Mütevelli means that the movement 
relies on several small groups of local individuals who have volunteered to take 
on more responsibility than others. Through the sohbet meetings, the hizmet dis-
course is communicated to the local people. These practices provide a pool of in-
dividuals who volunteer to come to consultation meetings. In addition, joint events 
and field trips to cities where the movement’s vision has been put into practice, are 
frequently used to encourage individuals to transfer and adopt the movement’s 
hizmet discourse and all the values and practices embedded in it.
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Gülen organised summer camps and intensive courses in which young people 
could be guided in their studies and the tenets of Islam. His main aim has been 
to enliven the Muslim spirit through the cultivation of a new breed of idealistic 
Muslim youth, who are modern and rational as well as spiritual, with a deep love 
for humankind. As part of this project, Gülen (1997e:10-18) started the network of 
student boarding houses known as Light Houses (Işık Evler), which have taken 
over the tasks of the medreses (religious schools), tekkes and zaviyes (the Sufi 
lodges) in the sense that residents of these houses study the Qur’an and religious 
sciences. 
The respondents pointed out that Gülen offered a cheap alternative to the ex-
pensive private schools and student boarding houses used by the urban middle 
classes to give their offspring a good start in life. Over the years, countless pupils 
and students from impoverished backgrounds have also received the opportu-
nity to pursue a career in Turkey’s enormous bureaucracy. Shankland (1999:83-5) 
claims that this was the sort of ‘infiltration’ that greatly worries the army and the 
secular middle class. According to one respondent, Gülen answered this conten-
tion as follows: ‘Infiltration is passing through enemy domains. Children of this 
country [Turkey] have the right to work in all segments of the state and society. 
Instead, it is a kind of infiltration that strangers who have great distance from the 
folk, culture and the moral values of this country, occupy considerable places in 
high positions.’
In the 1970s and 1980s, Gülen was probably one of the few preachers whose 
sermons were attended by a large, diverse and educated audience. Before the 
1980s, Turkey had long been a battlefield on which intellectual currents struggled 
to gain dominance at the cost of tens of thousands of young lives. In the 1970s, 
the ideological confrontations between leftists and rightists had a profound effect 
on Turkey, and effectually lead to a military coup in September 1980. Gülen man-
aged to keep his followers and the great masses that he addressed away from 
all these clashes and conflicts (Ergene 2008). However, Zürcher and Van der 
Linden (2004:121) argue that Gülen’s popularity certainly benefited from the fact 
that he backed the coup. In the 1990s, the Gülen movement had close relations 
with Turgut Özal, the then prime minister, and later president. With Özal’s assist-
ance, Gülen presented himself as an advocate for a modern, forward-looking, 
and state-sympathetic Islam. The symbiosis of the Gülen movement and the state 
remained intact for a long time. In the mid-1990s, Gülen was still generally seen by 
the political establishment as the ‘acceptable face of Islam’ (Aras and Çaha 2000), 
and politicians across the spectrum, from the right to the left, praised him and 
met him publicly. At that time, Gülen also had good contacts with the Justice and 
Development Party (AK Party), which holds a majority in parliament and elected 
the prime minister and the president in Turkey (Kuru 2007). Recently, the move-
ment dropped its principle of political neutrality and supported the AK Party in the 
national elections of 22 July 2007. The chief editor of the movement’s newspaper 
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Zaman, Ekrem Dumanlı, explained the move as a means to protect democracy 
against authoritarian assaults (Dumanlı, 2007). 
 
A comprehensive survey of the Gülen movement would go far beyond the bounda-
ries of this study. The movement’s participants have established local, national 
and international business networks, like TUSKON (The Turkish Confederation 
of Businessmen and Industrialists), ISHAD (The Association for Solidarity in Busi-
ness Life ), and AGIAD (The Anatolian Young Businessmen’s Association). With 
the help of many businesspeople, entrepreneurs and local bourgeoisie, the Gülen 
movement has established hundreds of schools and colleges, organised aid pro-
grammes,15 set up two of Turkey’s largest daily newspapers (Zaman, Today’s Za-
man)16, six TV channels (Samanyolu, S Haber, Mehtap, Ebru, Yumurcak, Hazar), 
two radio stations (Burç FM, Dünya Radyo), a worldwide news agency (Cihan 
News Agency), some leading publishing houses (Işık Publishing, Nil, Kaynak 
A.S.), and a number of periodical magazines and journals, such as Sızıntı (on cul-
ture and science), The Fountain (on scientific and spiritual thought), Yağmur (on 
literature), Ekoloji (on environmental issues), Yeni Ümit (on religious sciences), 
Aksiyon (weekly news magazine), and Gonca (a children’s magazine). The move-
ment also has hospitals (e.g., Sema Hospital) and health clinics, and has set up 
an insurance company (Işık Sigorta) and a non-interest-bearing bank, Bank Asya 
(Başkan 2004:233-235; Jang 2005). Some companies associated with the move-
ment are in the music industry. Internationally, this movement has extended the 
reach of its educational and media efforts to Europe, Eurasia, Africa, the United 
States of America, Pakistan, Korea, Russia, Japan, Australia, Brazil, Cambodia, 
and in many other parts of the world (e.g., Agai 2003a,b; Yilmaz 2007a,b). The 
number of people actively involved in the movement is estimated at several million 
people worldwide (Kurtz 2005:380).
Yavuz (2003a:19) argues that Gülen has focused on personal and social trans-
formation by utilising new liberal and economic conditions. Gülen has not ad-
dressed the human condition from a purely intellectual standpoint, however (Yil-
maz 2007a,b). He emphasises the importance of sincerity and religiosity to the 
well-being of the state and the society. He believes that God is the most sublime 
result and justification of existence and the search for God is humankind’s most 
important purpose. He therefore interprets religious truths in a way that is in tune 
with the understanding and thinking of the times. Gülen coined the effort to spread 
belief in God as hizmet, that is service to make people know and love God for 
the sake of God. In that respect, Muhabbetullah (Love of God) and Marifetull-
lah (Knowledge of God) are very important to attain the consent of God. Ergene 
(2008) indicates that contemporary thinkers have generally concentrated on state, 
city and economy, while Gülen has directed his attention to the human being. If 
the individual is virtuous, he or she will be virtuous in all things; the state, the city 
and the economy. In his writings and speeches, Gülen frequently stresses that 
education is needed to cultivate such virtue in conjunction with modern science 
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and social skills. His intellectual activity demonstrates that Muslims can develop 
and establish the future through an intellectual and spiritual revival that reflects the 
world’s realities (Sykiainen 2006:117).
The movement’s participants have developed an enlightenment project to combat 
social ills through a variety of educational, dialogue and media initiatives (Sarito-
prak 2005:325). Weller (2006:76) affirms that Gülen’s discourse has been par-
ticularly aimed at encouraging the younger generations to encompass intellectual 
engagement with spiritual wisdom and to give expression to this through a com-
mitment to serving the whole of humanity. As a result of this approach, his move-
ment has invested heavily in the development of cultural centres as well as media 
outlets and educational institutions in Turkey, in the Central Asian regions after 
the fall of the Soviet Union, but also in Africa and North and South America (Agai 
2003a,b; Michel 2003). 
The movement has set out to produce, what Gülen calls ‘the golden generation’ 
(altın nesil), a generation that can integrate their Muslim identity and morality with 
modern realities. Agai (2002:37) sees the ‘golden generation’ concept as a re-
sponse to the Kemalist secular ideal. Gülen seeks to demonstrate that it is pos-
sible to be modern by practising Islamic values. To this end, he has developed a 
model for human life in which social aspects and ethical values have been brought 
to the fore. It is impossible for someone who has not acquired an independent 
character to make a positive contribution to the social sphere. Gülen argues that 
the individual and collective happiness lie in disciplining three innate faculties; 
reason, anger, and lust.17 This discipline is then refined by the ‘golden generation’ 
who have learned the theoretical aspects of ‘the middle way between modernity 
and tradition’ (Kuru 2003). Members of this generation are to absorb and repre-
sent both modern realities and Muslim morality and identity through their minds, 
their behaviour and their spirituality. This concept of the ‘golden generation’ has a 
historical resonance with the early Muslim ideal of the ‘best generations’ (Gülen 
1977; 1990). Agai (2003a) arguably states that within the evolving discourse on 
nesil (generation) the ‘golden generation’ has been transformed from the embodi-
ment of a specifically Turkish civil Islam18 to a more universal ideal. This includes 
the principle of gender equality, especially in regard to educational opportuni-
ties.19
In one of the audio-cassettes of his sermons dating back to the 1970s, Gülen 
described and explained to his audience the following six tenets of Islamic faith: 
(1) God loves those who represent Islam; (2) because of this love they love God 
in return; (3) they are humble before other believers; (4) are able to give orders 
and command respect in the face of hypocrites and wrongdoers, being aware that 
honour and dignity lie in following Islam; (5) they are constantly striving, in solidar-
ity with God’s way, to make Him known to others and guide new followers in their 
faith; and (6) they do not fear the censure of anyone who wishes to obstruct their 
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struggle to share the faith. According to Ünal (2006a:249), this doctrine will guide 
the new generations representing Islamic values. Gülen based his interpretation 
of the Qur’an, verse 54 of the Surah 5 (Al-Maidah):
Whoever of you turns away from his religion, [know that] in time 
God will raise up a people [group] whom He loves, and who love 
Him, most humble towards the believers, dignified and com-
manding in the face of the unbelievers [hypocrites and wrongdo-
ers], striving [continuously and in solidarity] in God’s cause, and 
fearing not the censure of any who censure. (Qur’an 5:54).20
In addition, in 1977 a conference was convened in Çorum, Turkey, on the topic of 
the ‘golden generation’ (Gülen 1977). Key elements articulated in the conference 
sessions included concepts such as self-negation, self-sacrifice, altruism, inner 
self-evaluation (muhasaba), love (ashq), friendliness (dostane), self-control, and 
reflection (muraqaba). This made the influence of Sufism on the movement clear 
since these terms refer to particular practices and spiritual stages on the Sufi 
path. The ‘golden generation’ is also seen as being antithetical to the chaos and 
hopelessness that some movement members believe marks the current age (Her-
mansen 2007:70). Agai (2003a) argues that the ‘golden generation’ constructs an 
alternative version of modernity in which religion remains an essential component. 
Balcı (2003:159) speculates that the educational activities of the ‘golden gener-
ation’ will constitute its most lasting significance. The main principle of Gülen’s 
teaching is an intellectual and spiritual enlightenment drawn from the traditional 
sources of Islam. His methodology is bottom-up and individual-centred (Sykiainen 
2006:116).
In another audio-cassette series of his sermons dating back to 1980, Gülen intro-
duced several principles recalling ethical values. His firm opinion is that the initial 
step of every action and work is ethic and self-knowledge. Based on a Qur’anic 
verse, Gülen explains that ‘Everyone acts according to his or her own disposition’ 
(Qur’an 17:84) and thus displays his or her own character. It is an important step 
in acquiring good moral values when a person knows, feels and perceives his 
or her own mistakes. Without seeing one own’s fallacies and faults, defects and 
deficiencies, it is not possible for a person to get rid of all these, to stay away from 
delusions and caprices and to find the right path. Therefore, each person is in 
need of binoculars and projectors that can show and stimulate him or her to sense 
his or her shames and bad character traits. In this regard, Gülen (1980) posits the 
following four principles:
The first principle refers to finding a guide; an educator, a teacher who will  ●
enlighten and inspire the individual in organising his or her life, who will redi-
rect him or her to right path. 
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The second principle is the selection of a good friend or a coach, a mag- ●
nanimously brave ally who reminds one of ethical values and shows one’s 
fallacies and mistakes.
The third principle in getting rid of fallacies and faults and adopting a good  ●
morality is to value what has been said, negatively or positively, about one-
self and to interrogate oneself proportionally. In this respect, a critically re-
flective attitude always offers a learning opportunity.
The fourth principle for gaining good moral values and eliminating bad habits  ●
and immorality is to be among people and to be involved in human society. 
This interaction enables each person to learn human values and to discover 
feelings and emotions about himself or herself.
In his teaching, Gülen states that among the living creatures in the cosmos, the 
human being is the most valuable. He symbolises human beings as mirrors for 
God’s names and attributes (Gülen 2000b:7-8). Humans are therefore distin-
guished from the rest of creation, because they have the honour of being re-
sponsible for making the Earth prosperous in God’s name. In his teaching, Gülen 
(2005c:5-10, 31-42) lays out a broad vision for a society and a world led by indi-
viduals of spiritual, moral and intellectual excellence. He calls these people ‘ideal 
humans’. They exemplify eight character traits and attributes: perfect faith; love; 
a balanced view of science with the trio of reasoning, logic and consciousness; a 
re-evaluated view of humans, life and the universe; free thinking and respect for 
freedom of thought; a habit of consultative and collective consciousness; mathe-
matical thinking; and appreciation for art, or artistic sensitivity (cf. Carroll 2007:53). 
Gülen’s (2004b:289-302) entire endeavour is to emphasise that, by virtue of draw-
ing attention to the relationship between God and humankind, humanity’s greatest 
achievement will be the attainment of a model of the ‘ideal’ human (insan-ı kamil). 
In his teaching, this is a prelude to one’s superlative person who sacrifices his or 
her own life’s pleasures and who lives for others (altruism). He argues that such a 
person will only take positive action in a social arena (Hermansen 2007:75).21
Gülen’s philosophy of education2.4 
Elaborating on the four major values which were briefly introduced in the previ-
ous chapter, this section will highlight the main features of Gülen’s philosophy of 
education. The focus of the Gülen movement is on caring for human beings and 
trying to equip them for the future in the best possible and appropriate way. To ac-
complish this, the education and development of individuals – by focusing on their 
behaviours (hands or habits), feelings (heart) and thoughts (head) – are essential. 
His philosophy of education is the source of inspiration of the movement’s activ-
ism. Education functions as the social engineering of the movement.
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First of all, Gülen appreciates learning and teaching highly and insists that it is an 
obligation on all humans. He presents education as the main duty of human life. 
The main duty and purpose of human life is to seek understand-
ing. The effort of doing so, known as education, is a perfecting 
process through which we earn, in spiritual, intellectual, and 
physical dimensions of our beings, the rank appointed for us 
as the perfect pattern of creation. (Gülen in Ünal and Williams 
2000:205).
Given the great importance of learning and teaching, we must 
determine what is to be learned and taught, and when and how 
to do so. Although knowledge is a value in itself, the purpose of 
learning is to make knowledge a guide in life and illuminate the 
road to human betterment. Thus, any knowledge not appropri-
ated for the self is a burden to the learner, and a science that 
does not direct one toward sublime goals is deception. (Gülen 
2004c:17).
Gülen proposes education as an effective method to realise global peace and 
progress and to curb extremism. He stresses that ‘Education is vital for both so-
cieties and individuals’ (Ünal and Williams 2000:306) to satisfy the needs of peo-
ple and societies and in turn to solve the problems of humanity, such as terror, 
anarchy and conflict caused by ignorance, poverty and disunity. Gülen has the 
conviction that these problems can only be overcome with knowledge (through 
education), work-capital (through labour) and unification (through dialogue). The 
respondents emphasised that the process of education for harvesting peace is a 
lifelong process. Related to the role of education in peace-building one respond-
ent stressed:22 
Gülen’s educational understanding for building peace encourag-
es learners to draw lessons and inspirations from the role models 
provided by innumerable human beings respected for practising 
values, virtues and conduct that transcend greed, animosities, 
and desires to control and possess others or things.
To several respondents,23 the movement’s schools form ‘white islands’ on the 
Earth, what Gülen (2005d) calls ‘islands of peace’.24 They narrated that the schools 
make a contribution to peaceful conduct and relations, and attempt to overcome 
conflicts and mutual misconceptions: 
The Gülen movement attempts to build on universal values such 
as peace, freedom, equal rights and social progress. The schools 
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form ‘peace islands’ where cultures and civilisations meet and 
reach a consensus. His volunteer movement is a framework of 
emphasising and gathering around universal human virtues, and 
a framework of respect for the position of those with different 
perceptions, beliefs, and thoughts.
It is claimed that the Gülen movement has been distinguished by its special at-
tention to establishing schools in areas where ethnic and religious conflicts are 
escalating, such as Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, the Philippines, Banda Ache, 
Georgia, and Northern Iraq. Saritoprak (2005:423) and Barton (2007:657) argue 
that these schools play a remarkable role in decreasing levels of conflict in these 
areas through educating the new generations. 
The second value of Gülen’s educational philosophy refers to altruism in educa-
tion. This primarily means the use of experienced and altruistic teachers whose 
motivation is beyond financial interests. Gülen emphasised character building as 
an integral part of his educational philosophy. Teachers should have an integral 
perspective so that they are able to nurture both the hearts and minds of their stu-
dents in a balanced way. In his educational philosophy, the focus is on example 
(temsil), not on preaching (tebliğ). Preaching alienates, it does not attract people 
(Balcı 2003:10-16). Representation over presentation is a guiding principle in the 
movement’s activism. According to Gülen, teachers should embody values such 
as truthfulness, trust, respect for parents, respect for the elderly, respect for one’s 
heritage, and love for human beings. Teachers should know their pupils, and ap-
peal to their heads and their hearts (Aslandoğan and Çetin 2006:37). In addition 
to setting a good example (temsil), educators should be patient enough in the 
process of education for obtaining the desired result (Gülen in Ünal and Williams 
2000:312-13). Barton (2005:28-29) describes that the Gülen movement applies 
this principle in all aspects of life, not only in the education sector, but also in their 
media and business activities.
Inspired by Ibn Miskawayh (c.930-1037), Gülen identifies the tripartite division of 
a human being – metaphorically speaking, Heart (spirit), Head (mind), and Hands 
or Habit (body or character) – as an encompassing perception of the individual 
and of human life in general (Can 1997). Teachers should educate the whole indi-
vidual; his or her mind, soul and character. Teachers not only provide information, 
but they also nurture the entire personality of the learner, in both intellectual and 
emotional aspects. Gülen’s moral education is based on this 3-H model, aspects 
that are essential to integrate Muslim identity with modern realities, and so to build 
a ‘golden generation’. Gülen (in Can 1997:75-78) explains that the new genera-
tions began to reconcile the fragmented, and even polarised, institutions in Turk-
ish society; modern science of the public schools (mekteps, colleges), religious 
knowledge of the madrasa (medrese), spiritual life and feeling of the tekkes and 
zaviyes (Sufi lodges), and the discipline of the barracks (kişla). 
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The movement’s schools advocate an ideal world in which learners will be able to 
interact in a harmonious way. Such an ideal world can be realised only by people 
who are equipped with moral values and the necessary competencies which en-
able them to approach their environment with confidence, awareness, tolerance 
and respect, and with the responsibilities this entails. For Gülen, teachers play a 
crucial role in  realising such an ideal world through education and being a role 
model.
The third value of Gülen’s educational philosophy refers to his organisational view, 
comprising a tripartite relationship of the educator, the parents, and the sponsor 
for the altruistic service. By finding some sponsors and receiving support from 
the society, through families and parents of students, the Gülen movement seeks 
to minimise the impact of politics on schools. The movement governs about five 
hundred schools all around the world (Agai 2003a,b), sponsored by local entrepre-
neurs, altruistic educators and dedicated parents.
Gülen’s conviction is that the parents are the first and most essential teachers of 
the child, stressing the social effects of a good education and its lack in the family 
and society:
The first school in which we receive the necessary education to 
be perfected is the home. The home is vital to the raising of a 
healthy generation and ensuring a healthy social structure. […]. 
Children can receive a good education at home only if there is 
a healthy family life. […] A dysfunctional family life increasingly 
reflects upon the child’s spirit, and therefore upon society. (Gülen 
in Ünal and Williams 2000:310-1).
Several respondents indicated that Gülen claims a holistic education requiring a 
learning circle that consists of family, school, friends, neighbours, faith and cultural 
organisations, and workplaces.25 This allows individuals from an early age to learn 
that they are members of communities (local or global) who need to live together 
in harmony and peace.
In the movement’s schools children from different ethnic, and cultural back-
grounds are educated by mainly Turkish graduates from renowned Turkish uni-
versities (Ateş, Karakaş and Ortaylı 2005). Thomas Michel (2003), who was active 
for years in Asia as part of the Vatican Council’s initiative for interreligious dia-
logue, was impressed by the schools. He describes how he came into contact with 
schools inspired by Gülen during his residence in Zamboanga, on the southern 
Philippine island of Mindanao. Michel reported that the Philippine-Turkish School 
of Tolerance in Zamboanga seemed to do justice to its name by employing an 
equal number of Christian and Muslim teachers, by educating Muslim and Chris-
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tian children, and by promoting cooperation with Christian institutions in an area 
characterised by outbursts of violence between Muslims and Christians.
The schools run by the followers of Gülen in Albania are another example of both 
the relationship between educator, parents and sponsor, and the establishment of 
a school in a religiously divided society. The population of Albania is comprised of 
Sunni Muslims, Bektashi Muslims, Roman Catholics and Greek Orthodox Chris-
tians. Bekim Agai (2002:44-6) argues that the teachers in Tirana aim to deliver 
a vision of humanity to the students because Albania had experienced a cruel 
dictatorship and a great gap in the human dimension during its communist era. 
For example, the teachers brought their students together with the handicapped 
and with people with living in poverty. By providing a quality education based on 
an international curriculum, they have won support from the government and the 
public. The parents appreciate teachers who neither smoke nor drink. The teach-
ers do not teach religion, even though many of them are inspired by Gülen’s ideas. 
They stress the teaching of ethics (ahlak), which is considered to be a unifying 
factor between different religious, ethnic, and political orientations. Agai (2002) 
concludes that such activities demonstrate how Gülen’s ideals are constructed 
around local needs.
Furthermore, in other parts of the world the population of the schools based on 
Gülen’s ideals is often diverse and not just Islamic. For example, in South Africa, in 
the city of Johannesburg, the pupils are mainly Christian Africans; in Durban they 
are chiefly Hindu Indian; in Cape Town, the school population comprises a mix of 
Christians and Muslims. I have personally observed that in Kyrgyzstan, in the cit-
ies of Bishkek and Narin, the pupils are all Kyrgiz. As secular schools, with pupils 
from diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds, the focus is on promoting ethical 
values. The moral ethos represented by the teachers is a distinctive feature of the 
movement’s schools.
In addition to these observations, many respondents maintained that build-
ing peace through education is a sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. 
Gülen’s educational vision involves not only schools, but also families, communi-
ties and the media (Carroll 2007:74).
The fourth value is related to integration between science and religion. Gülen 
(1995:134) sees both as ‘two expressions of a single truth’. In order to unify faith 
and reason, he has developed an approach to religion and science as two aspects 
of the same reality that complement one another. It refers to integrating ethical 
values and religious tolerance into secular educational curricula. His approach 
includes an education of the heart and soul as well as of the mind and character, 
reviving and invigorating the whole being to achieve competence and to provide 
goods and services useful to others. This educational approach implies an integra-
tion between scientific knowledge and spiritual and ethical values in a new style of 
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education. Some scholars argue that his intellectual works and educational efforts 
attempt to reconcile science and reason with morality (Agai 2002; Ergene 2008). 
According to Michel (2005a,c), Gülen constantly proposes that his followers har-
monise intellectuality with Sufi-oriented spirituality and humane activism in the 
modern context. Gülen’s ethic can be summarised in a few key directives or rec-
ommendations: teach peace, love, forgiveness and tolerance; seek God’s ap-
proval; remain aware of mortality; do good deeds (hizmet); and practise humility, 
sacrifice, and self-criticism (cf. Özdalga 2003a). He firmly argues that these are 
the fundamentals of Islam, whilst other things are incidental (Gülen 2004a:71; 
2004b; 2000a). His teaching aims to promote these values in order to coexist har-
moniously. Gülen’s interpretative paradigm represents a redefinition of reason and 
revelation in order to create a balanced, Islamic alternative to the exigencies of 
modernity and the pronouncements of revelation. Gulay (2007:96) argues that, in 
Gülen’s thought, reason is reinterpreted in light of Islamic tradition, and revelation 
is revivified with rationalist principles and scientific knowledge.
Dialogue as a step to peace 2.5 
Even though some Muslims have been radicalised, many Muslims still believe that 
respect for diversity, as exemplified in the discourses and practices of the scholars 
like al-Ghazali and al-Rumi, is a religious obligation. Yilmaz (2007b:40) and others 
conclude that al-Rumi’s26 discourse and practice vis-à-vis peaceful coexistence 
and his tradition of intercultural activism as the most important method of social 
cohesion are embodied in Gülen’s thoughts and practice. Nursi (1996a:49), an-
other of Gülen’s spiritual guides, stated in his Damascus Sermon of 1911 that ‘the 
thing most worthy of love is love, and that most deserving of enmity is enmity’. 
Gülen’s understanding of religion and society is anthropocentric (human-orient-
ed). This implies that Gülen seeks to find ways to build social cohesion through 
dialogue and commitment to values which bind individuals together first as people, 
before they are Muslim or Christian or Buddhist, old or young, rich or poor. One 
respondent interpreted Gülen’s statement as follows: ‘We are human beings first, 
and then we are people with an ethnic or religious background, such as to be Turk-
ish or Dutch, or to be a Muslim, Christian, Jew or atheist’. In order to promote his 
interpretation of Islam, Gülen stresses the role of dialogue and tolerance. Gülen 
(2004b:42) defines dialogue as two or more people coming together to discuss 
certain issues.
One aspect of Gülen’s teaching is the way in which he combines mystical and ex-
egetical Islamic thought with references to western philosophers and theologians. 
In his writings and speeches, Gülen (2000:244-45) makes his core point concern-
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ing dialogue: ‘Interfaith dialogue is a must today, and the first step in establishing 
it is forgetting the past, ignoring polemical arguments, and giving precedence to 
common points, which far outnumber polemical ones’.27 He also argues that the 
Qur’an urges Muslims to respect the followers of other religions and to accept 
former prophets and their books. Gülen insists that openness to dialogue is both a 
practical and theological requirement. His focus is to forget past arguments and to 
concentrate on common points. Valkenberg (2006:312-21) notices a convergence 
between Gülen’s attitude and those prescribed by the Second Vatican Council 
(1962–1965) which says, in its declaration on the relation of the Roman Catholic 
Church to non-Christian religions: ‘Over the centuries many quarrels and dissen-
sions have arisen between Christians and Muslims. The sacred council now pleads 
with all to forget the past, and urges that a sincere effort be made to achieve mu-
tual understanding; for the benefit of all, let them together preserve and promote 
peace, liberty, social justice and moral values’ (Nostra Aetate 3, 1996:571-72). 
Gülen posits four values – love, compassion, tolerance, and forgiveness – that are 
sustained by religion and are therefore to be promoted in interreligious dialogue. 
These four concepts may ease dialogue between Christians, Jews, Muslims and 
adherents of other faith groups, because they mainly offer profound spiritual teach-
ings with regard to these values. Moreover, dialogue will profit if the ‘People of the 
Book’28 (Muslims, Christians, and Jews) together could promote these values as a 
basic ethic for the whole of humankind. Gülen suggests that this agenda for coop-
eration and dialogue between co-religionists can be complemented with recogni-
tion of religious differences and an emphasis on non-violent conflict resolution.
According to Gülen, an individual’s guiding principle must be one of formulating 
a positive attitude in all areas. Dialogue and education, along with positive at-
titude or positive action (müsbet hareket), are the leading principles behind the 
Gülen movement (Michel 2003; Penaskovic 2007; Ünal 2008a). The need to act 
and think positively contains respect for one’s own outlook, avoiding enmity for 
other points of view, not criticising them, interfering in their beliefs and sciences, 
or in any way concerning oneself with them (Sirozi 2004:312). In fact, a positive 
action or attitude is one of the spiritual foundations at the heart of the movement 
in regard to educational and dialogue activities. In this respect, Ergene (2008) ex-
plains that one must stay away from all attitudes and behaviour that might lead to 
conflict, rivalry, envy, jealousy, pessimism or tension. Ünal (2008a) argues that the 
Gülen movement is socially creative and innovative in abandoning the self and its 
egoism, avoiding disputes, and working together with the spirit of love, optimism, 
morality (ahlak), and mutual consultation (shura). A person might have genius-like 
qualities and capabilities, but if he or she does not apply these in a harmonious 
relationship with society there is no way to benefit from them. This does not have 
to mean that an individual has to disregard or forget his or her preferences and 
experiences, however. 
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Gülen has the conviction that Turkish people have interpreted and applied Islam 
in a specific way (Ünal and Williams 2000:54-8) throughout history. He indicates 
that his theological views lie solidly within the Turkish Sunni/Hanafi mainstream29, 
while being more responsive to the modern world than other Islamic faith-based 
movements. Gülen states that:
Turkish Islam is composed of the main, unchanging principles of 
Islam found in the Qur’an and Sunnah,30 as well as in the forms 
that its aspects open to interpre tation assumed during Turkish 
history, together with Sufism. […] This is why Turkish Islam has 
always been broader, deeper, more tolerant and inclusive, and 
based on love. […] The Hanafi understanding and Turkish inter-
pretation domi nates [sic] more than three-fourths of the Islamic 
world. This understanding is very dear to me. If you like you can 
call this Turkish Islam. Just as I see no serious canonical obsta-
cle to this, I don’t think it should upset anyone. […] The Turk-
ish nation interpreted Islam in the areas open to interpretation 
[…] [I]t attained a very broad spectrum and became the religion 
of great states. For this reason, I think the Turkish Muslimness 
is appropriate. Another aspect of this is that in addition to pro-
found devotion to the Qur’an and Sunnah, the Turks always have 
been open to Sufism, Islam’s spiritual aspect. (Ünal and Williams 
2000:43,52,56).
Gülen is considerd to be one of the first to seek to implement the concept of ‘Ana-
tolian Muslimness’ or ‘Turkish Islam’ which was interpreted as a way of distancing 
the Anatolian people’s interpretations and experiences of Islam from those of oth-
ers, especially the Wahhabi (Saudi)31 or Shiite radical interpretations. Gülen has 
communicated this concept to the wider public as a liberal and tolerant way of non-
Islamic lifestyles (Özdalga 2006:560). He is of the firm opinion that the Anatolian 
Muslimness practised in Turkey is different from the Arab or Iranian Islamic under-
standing. He speaks of an Anatolian Muslimness that is ‘broader, deeper, more 
tolerant and inclusive’ (Turgut 1997:53). Ünal and Williams (2000:54-58) contend 
that Gülen speaks of a ‘Turkish Islam’ based on moderation, love, tolerance, dia-
logue, forgiveness, and Sufism which excludes harsh restrictions or fanaticism. 
By stressing these qualities he demonstrates that this form of Islam is not in con-
tradiction with modern liberal democratic values. On the contrary, there are some 
Turkish nationalistic and Islamic groups that criticise Gülen for making this idea so 
widespread. The critics argue that disseminating such Islamic thinking opens the 
way for a new religion, but Keles (2007:692) argues that Anatolian Muslimness is 
not a new religion, just a practice imbued with certain values. 
In parts of the world where Islam has had a particularly strong influence, such 
as the Middle East, the image of a ‘mosaic’ of religions and culture rather than a 
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‘melting pot’ of them has historically been invoked as one that offers the most ap-
propriate pattern for structuring these complex and challenging relationships. In 
many ways the classical expression of this was the millet system developed and 
practised by the Ottomans, which has often been held up by Muslims as an ex-
ample of the Islamic accommodation of the plurality of beliefs (Braude and Lewis 
1982; Lewis 1995; Ortaylı 2007). This millet system was inspired by the zimmi sys-
tem based on the Medina Pact between the Prophet Muhammad and the Christian 
and Jewish community living in Medina.32 
Turkish Islam represents a chain of development leading from the Central Asian 
Seljuk Ottomans to modern Turkey. A number of respondents pointed out that, in 
his Turkish-Islamic synthesis, Gülen builds on leading religious scholars and Sufi 
masters of the past, in whose footsteps he follows (cf. Gülen 2005b:26-28,67-90). 
He has been inspired by the likes of Junayd al-Baghdadi (830–910), Imam al-Ghaz-
ali (1058–1111), Ahmad Yasawi (1106–1166), Ibn al-Arabi (1165–1240), Mewlana 
Jalal ad-Din al-Rumi (1207–1273), Yunus Emre (1238–1320), Baha al-Din Naqsh-
band (1318–1389), Imam Rabbani (Ahmad Sirhindi) (1564–1624), Niyazi-i Misri 
(1618–1694), Shah Waliyyullah Muhaddith of Delhi (1702–1762), Mewlana Khalid 
al-Baghdadi (1776–1827), and Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1877–1960). Gülen is 
likely referring not only to the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad and his companions 
(sahabe), but also to these religious predecessors (salaf al-salihin) when he says 
that dialogue is not something that he has invented. 
The main critiques of the Gülen movement 2.6 
Since the inception of the movement, Gülen’s thoughts and practices and his 
movement have received criticism. The criticism mainly centres on three points, 
namely: the movement’s interreligious activism; claims about infiltration into the 
state; and the participation of females in the movement. This section outlines the 
criticisms related to these main issues.
First, the movement has been criticised on the ground of cooperating with Chris-
tians and Jews. Through interfaith dialogue activities the movement would aim 
to undermine the Muslim identity and territorial integrity of Turkey. Gülen’s focus 
on establishing a culture of tolerance and dialogue has been discussed by both 
nationalists and religious groups. In general, these critics argue that the Muslims 
who advocate dialogue with Christians and Europeans are either naïve, or igno-
rant or, far worse, traitors. They argue that Anatolia will be Christianised and that 
some people in Turkey are helping the Christians in this mission.33 More specifi-
cally about Gülen, the nationalists and religious groups claim that ‘the Papacy has 
‘bought’ some community (movement) to Turkey that has produced an adulterated 
and reformed Islam without shari’a, fiqh, sunnah and laws’ (Eygi 2000, 5 and 26 
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May). They state that Gülen34, and the movement’s participants as well, are the 
secret agents of the Papacy in Turkey. These critics also claim that there are se-
cret agreements between ‘a group’ and the Papacy as well as with the Orthodox 
Church (Aslandoğan 2006). They disapprove of Gülen’s visit to the Vatican City, 
where he met with Pope John Paul II, as they consider it a humiliation (Saritoprak 
and Griffiths 2005:336).
Further, other critics claim that Gülen is an adherent of the Korean Moon Church 
(Çetinkaya 1997, December 3) and even that ‘the CIA agents are Gülen’s pupils 
(mürid)’ (Hablemitoğlu 1999:3-9). 
Some points of criticism against the movement are extended to the ruling Justice 
and Development Party (AK Party). In general, Gülen (in Kalyoncu 2008b) notes 
that: ‘The worst government is better than the absence of a government, because 
the absence of a government would lead to anarchy and insecurity’. Accordingly, it 
is the present government led by the AK Party, and not the AK Party in itself, that 
automatically receives the basic support of both Gülen and his movement, just as 
they gave their consent to other previous ruling parties. Apart from this starting 
point, one can see that the movement shares some ideas with the present ruling 
AK Party government on several of Turkey’s social issues, like the Kurdish prob-
lem and the headscarf ban.
Secondly, the movement has been criticised on the grounds of religious reaction-
ism (irtica), aiming to penetrate the system to create an Islamic state (Shankland 
1999:83-5). According to Özdalga (2003a:61), Gülen engenders rejection among 
promoters of laicisation and ultra-secularists. These critics claim that the move-
ment is a secret power to challenge any political authority. A single word from 
Gülen, so they say, would be enough to activate a sufficient number of political 
and religious groups to attempt to topple the government. 
Gülen has been in the United States since 1999 because of the repressive political 
atmosphere in Turkey and due to personal health problems. Under then existing 
penal laws, in August 2000 a warrant was issued for his arrest, on account of 
building an Islamic groundswell in Turkey (ABC Radio National 2007). He was 
also suspected of forming an illegal network and organising infiltration into the 
state in order to change the secular nature of the Turkish Republic. In June 2008 
the charges were dismissed definitively by Turkey’s highest court, but Gülen has 
yet to return to Turkey. Some still consider him a threat to the country’s secular 
order (Foreign Policy 2008b). He has, de facto, become a political asylum seeker 
in the United States. The Economist (2008) mentions Gülen as ‘a liberal Muslim 
cleric who lives in self-imposed exile in America’. 
Thirdly, with respect to gender equality, one can claim that there is a gap between 
what Gülen teaches and how his movement participants adapt and behave. Gulay 
(2007:61) argues that Gülen deploys an eclectic array of sources of information 
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which is not uniformly ‘Islamic’. Yavuz (1999:125) explains that Gülen is more 
practical and progressive than his religiously conservative followers and attempts 
to bring them to a level of modern society. During the 1980s, the majority of the 
movement’s participants preferred to send their daughters to the Qur’anic courses 
or the female Imam Hatip schools in Turkey, instead of sending them to the sec-
ondary or high schools. Respondents narrated that Gülen received passive resist-
ance from his followers when he urged them to establish schools to educate the 
new generations. It is known that, for years, he publicly and privately encouraged 
his movement’s participants to educate all their children, regardless of gender. 
According to Yavuz (1999), Gülen wants to have a role in the modern world by 
reimagining religion in terms of its main precepts while overlooking the details. For 
example, Gülen states that he would prefer education if he had to choose between 
education or the headscarf for women, by arguing: ‘What is in the interest of the 
state and nation: education or illiteracy? Each person should decide in her con-
science on the issue of the headscarf. As far as I am concerned, she should prefer 
education’ (Ünal 1998; Yavuz 1999:142). Evidently, to him, the headscarf is furuat 
(a secondary method of jurisprudence). He has been criticised for this interpreta-
tion by fundamentalist Islamic groups (Sevindi 2008:142).35
The mobility of females in the movement is another discussion point. As some 
argue, female participants have a very restricted mobility in the Gülen movement 
and display very limited upward mobility within its core institutions in the field of 
education and media (Başkan 2005:858; Yavuz 1999:125). Surprisingly, little is 
known of the factors explaining the participation of women at the lower strata of 
the movement. Based on my observation, I can say that women’s practical po-
sition in the society and the movement’s conservative participants can form an 
obstacle for the female participants to move up to a position at the upper levels. 
There are only a few females in managerial positions of the movement’s media 
outlets or its schools.
notes
1. www.fgulen.org is the official English internet site of Fethullah Gülen.
2. This view is also held by leading journalists, academics, TV personalities, politicians, and Tur-
kish and foreign state authorities. In 2005, a book entitled Bridges for Peace: Turkish Schools 
Opening to the World, was published by Ufuk Publishing (edited by Ateş, Karakaş and Ortaylı) 
in order to evaluate the movement’s schools. The question ‘What do you think about the Gülen 
schools around the world?’ was addressed to 27 intellectuals of different views, including former 
Prime Minister Bület Ecevit, Professor Kemal Karpat, former Ambassodar Gündüz Aktan, former 
Higher Education Board (YÖK) Chairman Professor Mehmet Saglam, Professor M. Ali Kilicbay, 
Kyrgyz author Cengiz Aytmatov, Professor Umit Meric, Professor Niyazi Öktem, Professor Mum-
tazer Turkone, film producer Halit Refig, and journalist Gulay Gokturk. This book explains the 
teaching and mass support behind the educational institutions of the Gülen movement.
3. According to unofficial records, M. Fethullah Gülen was born on 10 November 1938.
4. See in detail L. Erdoğan (1995). Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi. Küçük Dünyam; E. Can (1998). 
Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Ufuk Turu, and A. Ünal. (2004). M. Fethullah Gülen. Bir Portre 
Denemesi. 
5. Hodja (in Turkish Hoca) is a title for imams, religious scholars, or people who are knowled-
geable on Islam. Hodja Efendi (in Turkish Hocaefendi, which means ‘esteemed teacher’) is a 
respectful way of addressing men whose knowledge or position on religious matters is recognised 
and acknowledged by the general public (see Ünal and Williams 2005:163-4). To the question of 
why Gülen is called Hocaefendi – traditionally used by Sufis for their master – he answers that the 
title carries no hierarchical or official significance or Ottoman revivalist connotation, but is simply 
“a respectful way of addressing someone whose knowledge on religious matters is recognised 
and acknowledged by the general public.” (Webb 1983:80).
6. In Islamic tradition, a mujaddid is a scholar who updates and renews the faith in times of his-
torical change. They are considered to be Islamic revivers who defend the faith against ritual and 
doctrinal accretions, and assert the proofs of Islam in the face of heresy and doubt. For example, 
Ahmed Sirhindi and Said Nursi are widely recognised as mujaddids of the second Islamic millen-
nium (cf. Gulay 2007:4).
7. Sayyid is an honorific title that is given to people accepted as descendants of the Prophet Mu-
hammad (Ahl al Bayt) through his grandson Husayn ibn Ali. Other Arabic honorific terms include 
sharif. Sharif is someone who is descended from the Prophet Muhammad by way of his grandson 
Hassan ibn Ali. Both were the sons of the Prophet’s daughter Fatima al-Zahra and his son-in-law, 
Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth Caliph after the Prophet Muhammad. The word ‘sayyid’ literally means 
‘master’; the closest English equivalent would be ‘sir’ or ‘lord’. (e.g., Kılıc 2006). 
8. Madrasas refer to the educational religious institutes. In fact, the word madrasa, which is the 
same as medersa, madrasah, medrese, literally means ‘a place where learning and teaching 
is done’. However, the word has lost its original meaning and stands for ancient schools which 
existed before establishing the republican regime in Turkey. Therefore, people refer directly to a 
Qur’anic school once they use the word madrasa.
9. The body of Islamic jurisprudential thought. In the Sunni tradition of Islam, there are four major 
schools of fiqh; Shafi, Maliki, Hanafi, and Hanbali.
10. Author’s own interviews with Ahmet Kuru, Mehmet Kalyoncu, Ahmet Kurucan, Ozcan Keles, 
Cemal Usak, Kerim Balci, Huseyin Gulerce, Alper Alasag, Muhammem Atlig, Bahattin Aydin, and 
Yavuz Cicek in the spring of 2007.
11. The information is based on the author’s personal interviews and observations within the 
Gülen movement in the spring of 2007. 
12. The Risale-i Nur (Epistles of Light) written by Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1876–1960), contains 
logical proofs and explanations of Qur’anic messages, and deals with the Qur’anic descriptions of 
Divine activity in the universe. The followers of Said Nursi, found primarily in Turkey and second-
arily in the Arab world and in the Western societies, focus on studying Nursi´s writings (Risale-i 
Nur). (see e.g., Abu-Rabi 2003).
13. There are a number of ideational influences on the formation of Gülen’s social and Isla-
mic vision, like Ahmet Hilmi of Filibe (1865-1914), Ferit Kam (1864-1944), Mustafa Sabri Bey 
(1869-1954), Babanzade Ahmet Naim (1872-1934), Mehmet Akif Ersoy (1873-1936), Elmali Mu-
hammad Hamdi Yazir (1878-1942), Necip Fazil Kisakürek (1905-1983), Süleyman Hilmi Tuna-
han (1888-1959), and Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (see Gülen 2005b:67-90). Gülen also read the 
books of socially conservative intellectuals such as Nurettin Topcu and Sezai Karakoc (Yavuz 
2003b:181).
14. A series of conference speeches, entitled ‘From Rumi to Fethullah Gülen’, given from 23 to 
27 May 2007 in various cities in the Netherlands, discussed Fethullah Gülen as a representative 
of the Rumi’s thoughts in the contemporary world. Mewlana Jalal ad-Din al-Rumi (1207–1273) 
is an outstanding poet and spiritual teacher of the thirteenth century (see Can 2005; Celik 2007; 
Kandur et al 2006). See also Eustis (2006), ‘“The Cry of the Nightingale”: Fethullah Gülen – A 
Modern-Day Rumi?’.
15. Kimse Yok Mu Association, a non-governmental organisation, is the major solidarity and aid 
organisation of the movement in Turkey, and has been active worldwide in the last few years. It 
has helped people, for example, earthquake victims in Bandah Aceh Indonesia, Pakistan and so 
on; sent aid in goods and cash to Lebanon after the conflict between Lebanon and Israel in 2006. 
The official website of this association is www.kimseyokmu.org.tr.
16. Zaman is a leading highly-respected daily newspaper with more than ten different language 
editions, sometimes in a bilingual format. It is also the first Turkish daily to be published on the 
Internet. Today’s Zaman appears in English and is the largest English-language newspaper in 
Turkey.
17. Since the time of Ibn Mis ka wayh (c.930–1037) human faculties or innate “drives” have been 
dealt with in three categories; reason, anger, and lust. Ibn Miskawayh is a Mus lim mor a list, phi-
los o pher and his to ri an who adopted the Platonic tripartite division of the soul. His mor al trea tise, 
Tah dhib al-Akh laq, also in flu enced by the Ar is to te li an con cept of the mean, is con sid ered one of 
the best state ments of Is lam ic phi los o phy. His uni ver sal his to ry, Kit ab Ta jar ib al-Umam wa Ta’aq-
ub al-Hi mam (Eclipse of the ‘Ab bas id Cal i phate), was not ed for its use of all avail a ble sour ces 
and great ly stim u lat ed the devel op ment of Is lam ic his to ri og ra phy. Cf. M. Fakhry (2002). Al-Farabi, 
Founder of Islamic Neo-Platonism. His life, Works and Influence. Oxford: Oneworld Publications 
(pp.70-95).
18. Civil Islam is an alternative to political or military challenges to the world, and emphasises a 
pluralistic worldview. Civil Islam maintains democratic participation rather than the central ideo-
logy of sovereignty. As opposed to Civil Islam, the State Islam is mainly based upon an official 
religious ideology with obscure totalitarian tendencies. The objective was to reform the world, not 
by ‘becoming Muslim’ but by ‘making Islamic’ (Bulaç 2006:93-4; see also Yilmaz 2005a).
19. Islam teaches that Adam and Eve were created, sinned, and forgiven equally; that men and 
women are equal in God’s eyes; and that they are equal as regards their responsibilities and du-
ties towards God and others. As God states in the Qur’an (3:195): ‘I shall not allow to go to waste 
the deed of any doer among you, whether male or female. You are one from the other.’
20. In this dissertation, I have used the English translation of the Qur’an by A. Ünal (2006a): The 
Qur’an. With annotated interpretation in modern English. New Jersey: The Light.
21. Examples of such persons include Hacı Kemal Erimez (d.1997), or Hacı Ata as he was known 
by those closest to him. He was Gülen’s dearest friend until he died while working to open schools 
in Tajikistan. Another example is Adem Tatlı, a teacher and the general director of Gülen schools 
in Mongolia, who died in a car accident on his way to visit family in Turkey, aged just 39. One 
respondent said that his last request, which was respected, was to be buried near his school in 
Mongolia. See also the book by H. Tokak (2007), Önden Giden Atlılar, with a foreword by Fethul-
lah Gülen. The book eulogised various Turkish teachers who had gone to far-flung reaches of the 
world to work in Gülen schools. Also, a special DVD has been developed about Adem Tatlı and 
his altruism and activism in the movement.
22. Excerpt from interview the author conducted with Erkan Toguslu in January 2007.
23. Excerpts from the author’s interviews with Ergun Capan, Atilla Alan, Huseyin Gulerce, and 
Ozcan Keles in the spring of 2007, and author’s conversations with Bekim Agai, Enes Ergene, 
Abdullah Aymaz, Mustafa Can, and Macit Aslan in the autumn of 2006.
24. On 26 October 2005, the Romanian commission of UNESCO presented Fethullah Gülen 
with an award for his contributions to peace and dialogue through his educational efforts towards 
cooperation between the nations of the world (see www.fgulen.com).
25. Author’s interview with Atilla Alan and Ilhan Yildiz in the spring of 2007. 
26. According to Gülen (2004e:199), a believer does not hesitate to communicate with any kind of 
thought and system; while one foot should remain at the centre, the other could be with the other 
“seventy-two nations”,  like a compass (al-Rumi’s famous metaphor). Thomas Michel concluded 
(as cited in Yilmaz 200b7:183-91): “It is not an exaggeration to say that Gülen is a modern Muslim 
thinker and activist whose life work of promoting an Islamic appreciation of love, tolerance, and 
universal peace is in fact a renewed interpretation for our times of the central insights of Mew-
lana”. Gülen stresses that Islam does not reject interaction with diverse cultures and change as 
long as what is to be appropriated does not contradict the main pillars of Islam. He views action as 
an inseparable aspect of tasawwuf (Sufism, Islamic mysticism), and Muslims should be actively 
involved in the community, share their knowledge and experience with others, strive to help others 
and bring peace to the global village (see Gökcek 2006:173-74).
27. Gülen’s paper on “The Necessity of Interfaith Dialogue” was presented at the Parliament of 
the World’s Religions in Cape Town, South Africa, in 1999.
28. The term “People of the Book” or Ahl al-kitab (also called “Abrahamic faith traditions”) is men-
tioned in the Qur’an twenty-four times, referring to Christians and Jews in particular. The context 
of these Qur’anic references varies. Some of these verses praise the People of the Book for their 
righteousness and good deeds and faith in the Afterlife (Qur’an 3.113). Other verses rebuke the 
People of the Book for not following the way of God (Qur’an 3.99). A group of these verses invite 
the People of the Book to a common ground between Muslims and themselves (Qur’an 3.64). 
Another group of these verses indicates an intimate relationship between Muslims and Christians 
(Qur’an 5.82). The relationship between Muslims and the People of the Book (Jews and Chris-
tians) has been a subject of discussion among Muslims throughout the centuries.
29. The majority of the world’s Muslim population follows the Sunni branch of Islam, and approxi-
mately 10–15 per cent of all Muslims follow the Shiite branch. Shiite Muslims, who are seen as 
heterodox by the majority, are mostly concentrated in Iran, Iraq and Bahrain. The Hanafi school 
of jurisprudence (madhaps) is one of the the four main schools within the Sunni Muslims. The 
other mainstream legal schools within the Sunni branch of Islam are Shafi, Maliki and Hambali. 
Approximately 90 per cent of the Turkish Muslim population belongs to the Hanafi mainstream 
(see Blanchard 2006,; Yilmaz 2005a:6; Esposito 1998:84-5).
30. Sunnah refers to the way of the Prophet Muhammad. It is the tradition recording his every act, 
word, and confirmation. It is the second source of Islamic legislation (the Qur’an being the first 
one). The Qur’an and authentic prophetic traditions enjoin Muslims to follow the Sunnah. It also 
defines what is stated in general terms in the Qur’an by referring to particular instances, and it 
defines the general principles underlying statements in the Qur’an that are in themselves specific 
and particular. Besides, the Sunnah (like the Qur’an which it embodies) is also concerned with 
moral guidance, so the Sunnah provides inspirations and the horizons for moral and spiritual 
instructions in all spheres of life, as well as providing the inspirations and horizons (limits) within 
which Islamic legislation may be effected (see Ünal 2006a:1348).
31. The Saudi branch of Salafism is known as Wahhabism. It is a puritanical form of Sunni Islam 
and is practised in Saudi Arabian and Qatar. The word Wahhabi is derived from the name of a 
Muslim scholar, Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1791). Most adherents of Wahhabism 
prefer to call themselves “Salafi” or “Salafiyya”. The term derives from the word salaf meaning to 
“precede”, a reference to the followers and companions of the Prophet Muhammad (see Blan-
chard 2008).
32. The Medina Pact was made in 622 after the Prophet Muhammad had migrated to Medina 
from Mecca. It gave the Medinan Christian and Jewish community significant rights and liberties 
and allowed for each ethnic and religious community to be governed by its own rules and laws 
on matters pertaining to itself (Haylamaz 2007). In reality this was historically far from perfect, 
with Christians and Jews often being treated as inferior members of the Islamic empires (Ma’oz 
1978). But in due course reforms granted Christians and Jews official equality within the political 
community, although those who insisted on their legal rights of emancipation were often bitterly 
opposed.
33. For an analysis of pro-globalisation and anti-globalisation Islamic movements in Turkey, see 
Kuru’s article (2005), entitled “Globalisation and diversification of Islamic movements: Three Turk-
ish cases”, in Political Science Quarterly, 120(2):253-274. Kuru (2005:275) analyses the Gülen 
movement, the Haydar Baş movement and Erbakan’s National Outlook (Milli Görüş) movement 
and concludes that: “The Gülen movement and the younger generation of the late Milli Görüş 
movement developed positive attitudes toward globalisation because they benefited from inter-
national opportunities and they had tolerant normative frameworks. The Haydar Baş movement, 
the early Milli Görüş movement, and the elders of the late Milli Görüş movement developed anti-
globalisation views because they did not benefit from international opportunities and had intoler-
ant normative frameworks (religious-nationalism in the first case and political Islamism in the 
second and third cases)”.
34. In many issues of the religious-nationalist Haydar Baş Movement’s daily newspaper, Yeni 
Mesaj, Gülen has been criticised as being a secret cardinal of the Catholic Church. See www.
yenimesaj.com.tr.
35. In relation to debates around the niqab in Turkish society, where the issue of female head 
covering in the public sphere is extremely divisive, Gülen stated that he regards this as a matter 
that is not an ‘essential’ but a ‘detail’ of Islam, which differs in form in relation to its appropriate 
implementation according to the cultural context in which it is found. In Gülen’s own words: “If 
a person takes her headscarf off, she does not become an unbeliever. This subject belongs to 
furuat [secondary methods of jurisprudence]. That is not like the conditions of amentu [basic prin-
ciples of belief]. It is not the same as not accepting the basic tenets of Islam.” (Akman 2004b).

chaPter 3
Fethullah Gülen as a servant-leader
introduction3.1 
The literature on leadership often enumerates different leadership types and qual-
ities (Celik 2002; Northouse 2002). This chapter aims to examine Islamic and 
servant-leadership using an empirical example with a coherent theoretical basis, 
centred on Fethullah Gülen. Bulaç (2005) defines Gülen as a harmonising leader 
and an intellectual scholar (alim, singular of ulama) focussing on social reforms 
and mentality change. It is interesting to analyse the role of his leadership in the 
transformation process and the extension of his movement. This chapter attempts 
to give an answer to the following question: which characteristics and dynamics 
behind Gülen’s leadership style play a part in the spread and success of his move-
ment? 
An exhaustive analysis of Gülen’s leadership can help in understanding his philo-
sophical and theological anthropology and his views on the human condition. In 
this chapter, I will analyse his views and practices, with an emphasis on both his 
formative and determinant leadership characteristics. In seeking to address this, 
I will take the servant-leadership concept as my main context, where appropriate 
references will be made to the various dimensions of his leadership. My main 
objective is to obtain the interviewee’s experiences, including personal contacts 
with him, moments from their life stories, their values, philosophies, emotions and 
frustrations concerning Gülen’s leadership style. Within their personal contacts 
with Gülen, I especially wanted the interviewees to elaborate on certain areas of 
his leadership, such as communication, intellectuality, foresight, action and spir-
ituality, to make a cluster of values and ideas crystallise for each of them. In this 
way, three main dimensions of his leadership emerged, with similar and different 
characteristics; spirituality, intellectuality, and application or action. In my analysis 
of his leadership, I used not only direct quotations and writings of Gülen, but also 
examined his actions and deeds in order to provide a well-rounded picture of his 
leadership qualities.
Gülen frequently emphasises that his own position is more like that of an inspira-
tional and guiding thinker than the formal leader of a movement. In January 1995, 
the journalist Nuriye Akman of Sabah newspaper asked him: ‘Can humility change 
the reality? Since a group has gathered around your name, don’t you automati-
cally become a leader?’. Gülen replied as follows: 
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I insist on saying ‘I am not a leader’ because I expressed my 
thoughts for thirty years in the pulpits [of mosques] and people 
sharing the same feelings and thoughts responded. For exam-
ple, I said to them: ‘Establish university preparatory courses. Es-
tablish schools.’ As an expression of their respect for me, they 
listened to what I said. This might have been a mistake, but they 
listened and we met at that point. I saw that just as I was say-
ing ‘schools’, I found that a lot of people were saying ‘schools’. 
They come to ask about other, especially religious, issues as 
well. Sometimes they even ask about economic matters. I tell 
them that ‘such issues require subject-specific expertise’, and 
send them to experts. (Akman 1995; Akman in Ünal and Williams 
2000:34)
In spite of this disclaimer, it is clear that for many Fethullah Gülen does indeed 
stand at the head of a transnational movement, one which has achieved and 
seems likely to continue to achieve considerable and repeated successes in its 
chosen fields. In seeking to identify the immediate causes of this achievement and 
his leadership, I shall examine his own writings and statements about education 
and dialogue. In the following sections, I will discuss the concept of leadership in 
Islam in general, and the leadership pattern of Gülen in particular.
Leadership from an Islamic perspective3.2 
Leadership in Islam is based on trust and emphasises sincerity, integrity and 
compassion. It is thought of as a psychological contract between a leader and 
his or her followers, guaranteeing that he or she will try his or her best to guide 
them, to protect them, and to treat them justly. Leadership in Islam is rooted in 
belief and willing submission to God. It centres on serving Him. This means that 
a Muslim leader acts in accordance with the injunctions of the Creator and His 
Prophet, and must develop a strong Islamic moral character. The Islamic moral 
character requires that leaders emphasise the following five key parameters of Is-
lamic behaviour; justice, trust, righteousness, the struggle within oneself towards 
self-improvement, and promise-keeping (Beekun and Badawi 1999:25-33). These 
principles are gleaned from the character and deeds of the caliphs and other great 
Muslim leaders as well.
Furthermore, from a general and historical approach, I would divide the leadership 
types in Islam into three categories; spiritual leaders, opinion leaders, and ‘appli-
cation leaders’. Spirituality refers to leaders in the areas of Sufism and religiosity. 
Religious leadership can be seen as a relevant part of spiritual leadership. Opinion 
leaders include Muslim intellectuals, scholars and those who mainly contribute to 
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the intellectual development of the followers and the wider society. ‘Application 
leaders’ refer primarily to pioneering activists in Islam.
It is clear that the aforementioned ways of leadership do not refer to the caliphate 
institution of Islam. In Islamic history, the caliph held supreme religious and politi-
cal authority and was advised by a consultative body (shura or majlis). Caliph is 
the term or title for the Islamic leader of the Ummah (community of Islam). The 
last caliphate was held by Ottoman Turkish sultans until it was abolished by Kemal 
Atatürk in 1924. Some claim that the last Ottoman caliphate title was transferred 
from the Ottoman family line to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (parliament), 
meaning no individual could thereafter possess the title. The Turkish Directorate of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet) still fulfils the duties of the caliph within Turkey.
In addition, the two primary leadership roles from an Islamic perspective are those 
of servant-leader and guardian-leader. First, leaders are servants of their follow-
ers (sayyid al qawmi khadimuhum) (Çaldıralı 1998). They look out for their welfare 
and guide them towards what is good. The idea of a leader as a servant has 
been part of Islam since its beginning, and has recently been further developed 
by Robert Greenleaf (1991). I will describe this later and attempt to explain the 
leadership characteristics of Gülen from the perspective of servant-leadership. 
A second major role of the Muslim leader is that of guardian- leader who aims at 
protecting her or his community against tyranny and oppression. Guardian lead-
ers also encourage consciousness of God and taqwa (piety), and promote justice, 
trust and integrity (Beekun and Badawi 1999:15). In other words, leaders are con-
sidered honest to the extent that there is ‘consistency between word and deed’. 
In the Qur’an, the Prophet Musa is described as ‘strong and trustworthy’ by one 
of the young ladies (Qur’an 28:26) and the Prophet Yusuf is pictured as one who 
is truthful (Qur’an 12:46). It is reported from Sahih Bukhari (Hadith 3.733) that 
the Prophet Muhammad said: ‘All of you are guardians and are responsible for 
your wards […]’. Gülen (1996b:92-124) characterises the Prophet of Islam as a 
unique leader, and indicates that the Prophet Muhammad has modelled the way 
for Muslim leaders and his followers for all time. Successful Muslim leaders en-
deavour to acquire practical knowledge as well as the competence to apply it in 
appropriate situations. People are more likely to follow a leader’s directives if they 
believe that this person knows what he or she is doing. Additionally, in Islam aspir-
ant leaders are encouraged to emulate such attributes as strength of character, 
patience (sabr), humility, magnanimity, self-understanding, the willingness to seek 
consultation (shura), equity (impartiality), modesty (simplicity), and responsibility 
(Beekum and Badawi 1999:37-47).
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Servant-leadership3.3 
In social life people have a window (status or entitlements) through which they see 
others and are seen. If the window is built higher than their real stature, people try 
to make themselves appear taller through vanity and assumed airs. If the window 
is set lower than their real stature, they must bow in humility in order to look out, to 
see, and be seen. Humility or modesty is the measure of one’s greatness, just as 
vanity or conceit is the measure of low character. ‘The greater one is the one who 
is the modest’ is a well-known adage in the Islamic tradition (Gülen 2005e:297-8). 
To Nursi (1995:315), humility is the most important aspect of the leaders’ servant-
hood. 
The Prophet Muhammad defines a leader as the servant of the people. Once, 
when he was serving his friends, a Bedouin came in and shouted (in Celik and 
Alan 2003:10):1 ‘Who is the master of this people?’. The Prophet Muhammad an-
swered in such a way that he introduced himself while expressing a substantial 
principle of Islamic leadership and public administration: ‘The people’s master is 
the one who serves them’. Ali, his son-in-law, also reported that among people the 
Prophet Muhammad was one of them. This leadership principle was also inscribed 
on the wall of the historical town hall of the city Den Bosch in the Netherlands as 
follows: ‘People can only be led by serving them’.
Robert K. Greenleaf (1904–1990) was the scholar who delved deeply into this 
leadership concept during the second half of the twentieth century: ‘The servant-
leader is servant first. It begins with the natural feeling that one wants to serve. 
Then conscious choice brings one to aspire to lead’ (1991:7-8). The servant-lead-
er seeks to involve others in decision-making. His or her philosophy promotes 
ethical and caring behaviour, and it enhances the personal growth of workers 
while improving the caring and quality of organisational, intellectual and spiritual 
life (Celik 2002). 
Servant-leaders may or may not hold formal leadership positions. This leadership 
principle is one of the important keys to unlocking a dilemma of humanity: Is it pos-
sible to be virtuous and powerful, to serve and to lead? Opposites are blended in 
the universe. Synchronous manifestation of opposites causes a sort of wise and 
beneficial contest. Opposites transgress one another’s bounds, and this brings 
conflict and change into being. The universe is subject to the law of change and 
transformation and the principles of progress and advancement. The dilemma 
of opposites opens the door to striving, which would be the means of all human 
progress. Servant-leadership is a dynamic balance to produce and reproduce 
knowledge, identity and culture in a global world with dialogue, trust and sincerity 
(Laub 1999). Gülen defined servant-leadership as the way of the Prophets and it 
has itself developed in the daily life of leaders since the beginning of Islam.2 Serv-
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ice accompanies the servant. A servant is a person who makes efforts to be useful 
to his or her nation or society and to the whole of humanity.
Gülen and the ten characteristics of a servant-leader3.4 
Spears (1998a,b) has identified a set of ten characteristics which he ascribes 
to the servant-leader. These characteristics of servant-leadership have been ex-
tracted from the writings of Robert Greenleaf and are by no means exhaustive, 
and often occur naturally within individuals (Celik 2002:39-48; Spears 1998a:1-3). 
The possession of these characteristics marks the greatest and most prominent 
leaders in history and in the contemporary world. I applied these characteristics to 
Gülen to analyse his leadership path and patterns. 
Listening:1.  Leaders have traditionally been valued for their dialogue compe-
tencies, communication and decision-making skills. Listening, coupled with 
periods of reflection, is essential to the growth and well-being of the servant-
leader. Gülen is experienced as a person and leader with a deep commit-
ment to listening intently to others and seeks to identify the will, perceptions 
and intentions of his audience, and helps to clarify their will and views. He 
listens receptively to what is being said and to what is left unsaid. His listen-
ing also encompasses the idea of getting in touch with one’s own inner voice. 
He has strong willpower and resolve. All respondents have indicated that 
they never saw Gülen experience even one moment of hopelessness.
Empathy:2.  People need to be accepted and recognised for their special and 
unique spirits. The most successful servant-leaders are those who have 
become skilled empathetic listeners. According to the respondents, Gülen 
strives to understand and empathise with others, and he is characterised as 
a person who puts himself in the position of the other and tries to understand 
another person’s perceptions and experiences. The cultivation of empathy 
gives one the basis for detachment, the ability to stand aside and see oneself 
in a perspective relative to the context of one’s experience. 
Healing:3.  The healing of relationships is a powerful force for dialogue, trans-
formation and integration. One of Gülen’s great strengths is his belief in the 
potential for healing one’s self and one’s relationship to others. Many people 
have broken spirits and have suffered from a variety of emotional traumas. 
Although this is a part of being human, servant-leaders recognise that they 
have an opportunity to help make whole those with whom they come in con-
tact. Gülen dedicates his life to solving social problems, satisfying spiritual 
needs (Gülen 2004b), and healing relations between people; he encourages 
interpersonal and intercultural dialogue (Gülen 2004a). 
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Awareness:4.  General awareness, and especially self-awareness or aware-
ness of personal responsibility, strengthens the servant-leader. Awareness 
helps one in understanding issues involving ethics, power and values. It 
lends itself to realism and being able to view most situations from a more 
integrated, holistic position. As Greenleaf (1991:20) observed: ‘Awareness 
is not a giver of solace; it is just the opposite. It is a disturber and an awak-
ener. Able leaders are usually sharply awake and reasonably alert. They do 
not seek solace. They have their own inner serenity’. Everything should be 
directed towards fulfilling awareness of personal responsibility. In no way 
should servant-leaders be seduced by the world’s charms and life’s attrac-
tions. Gülen understands the issues and prevailing conditions as they actu-
ally are, and is aware of all the advantages and disadvantages. His mes-
sages and demands do not contradict reality. His students also indicated 
that he produces intuitive insights in the future when needed, and his doors 
of perception are open wide. 
Persuasion:5.  Gülen is reliant on persuasion and absolute belief in his mes-
sage, rather than on positional authority, when making decisions within his 
community. He seeks to convince others, rather than coerce compliance, 
and is effective at building consensus within groups, and promotes a sincere 
dialogue among cultures, religions and civilisations. Gülen (2004a:1999) has 
noted that in the modern world the only way to get others to accept your 
ideas is by persuasion. This message comes to the fore both in his ser-
mons as an emeritus preacher and in his activities. This principle originated 
with one of Gülen’s inspirations: Bediaüzzaman Said Nursi. Gülen frequently 
cited the following from Nursi: ‘Victory with civilised persons is won through 
persuasion’. In this respect, Gülen can be characterised as a person with a 
high level of persuasion. The respondents emphasised that his conviction 
has never faltered, and that he never renounced his mission. Persuasion is, 
according to respondents, also related to Gülen’s personal courage. Even 
if left alone, he has enough courage to persevere and to resist all the dif-
ficulties he might encounter. Gülen shows great confidence in his followers, 
is very persuasive, and is very proficient in his use of the body and verbal 
language. Gülen also makes effective use of storytelling, including the use of 
symbolism and metaphor in order to motivate his audience. I have observed 
in his speeches and sermons that he frequently uses stories about the Com-
panions of the Prophet Muhammad in order to motivate and persuade his 
audience.
Conceptualisation:6.  Gülen seeks to nurture his abilities to dream great 
dreams. The ability to look at a problem or a society from a conceptualising 
perspective means that one must think beyond day-to-day realities. Gülen 
stretches his thinking to encompass broader-based conceptual thinking, 
and seeks a delicate balance between conceptual thinking and a day-to-day 
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operational approach. He always takes local conditions and circumstances 
into account. The respondents also indicated that Gülen pays a great deal 
of attention to scanning and studying his environment and conditions, and 
hones his actions and words to suit the situation and the conjecture of the 
society. Gülen’s activism and global thinking strongly affirm his capability to 
conceptualise.
Foresight:7.  Leaders are expected to have a sense of direction and a long-term 
vision for their organisation or community. This characteristic is also closely 
related to conceptualisation and the ability to be goal-centred. Foresight en-
ables the servant-leader to understand lessons from the past, the realities of 
the present, and the likely consequence of a decision for the future. Accord-
ing to the respondents this aspect of his leadership is deeply rooted within 
his intuitive mind. Foresight remains a largely unexplored area in leadership 
studies, but comes to the fore as the most conspicuous characteristic of 
Gülen’s leadership when I look at his leadership within the movement he in-
spired. All respondents confirm that Gülen is farsighted and goal-centred. He 
is able to discern and plan for potential developments. He is able to evaluate 
the past, present and future to reach a new synthesis. 
Stewardship:8.  Peter Block has defined stewardship as ‘holding something 
in trust for another’ (cited in Senge 1999). Gülen’s views of all institutions 
is one in which all members of the movement played significant roles in 
holding their institutions in trust for the greater good of society. Servant-
leadership, like stewardship, assumes first and foremost a commitment to 
serving the needs of others. Gülen also emphasises the use of openness 
and persuasion, rather than control, and points out that dialogue, persua-
sion, and discussion based on evidence are essential for people who seek 
to serve humanity. According to the respondents, Gülen has a strong char-
acter and praiseworthy virtues. He is determined but flexible while carrying 
out decisions, and knows when to be unyielding and implacable or relenting 
and compassionate. He knows when to be earnest and dignified, when to be 
modest, and is always upright, truthful, trustworthy, and just. 
Commitment to the growth of people:9.  Servant-leaders believe that people 
have an intrinsic value beyond their tangible contributions as workers. This 
means that the leader should have personal knowledge of followers. Lead-
ers should be fully aware of each follower’s disposition, character, compe-
tencies, shortcomings, ambitions, and weak points. If they lack this knowl-
edge, how can they fill vacant posts with the appropriate people? As such, 
Gülen is deeply committed to the growth of each and every individual within 
his movement, especially through his writings, speeches and conversations. 
He recognises the tremendous responsibility to do everything in his power 
to nurture the spiritual, personal and professional growth of all people within 
his movement. From Gülen’s perspective, this includes encouraging people 
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to keep on serving humanity, involvement in decision-making, and caring for 
each other.
Building community:10.  The servant-leader senses that much has been lost in 
recent human history as a result of the shift from local communities to large 
institutions as the primary shaper of human lives. This awareness causes 
the servant-leader to seek to identify some means for building a community 
among those who work within a given institution. Greenleaf (1991:30) said: 
‘All that is needed to rebuild community as a viable life form for large numbers 
of people is for enough servant-leaders to show the way, not by mass move-
ments, but by each servant-leader demonstrating his or her unlimited devo-
tion to a quite specific community-related group’. The movement which has 
formed around Gülen is itself a concrete example of the principle of building 
community of servant-leadership. The majority of the respondents stressed 
that modesty, an absence of worldly ambitions, and abuse of authority are 
the crucial aspects of his enlarging movement. Leaders should live like the 
poorest members of their movement or community. They should never dis-
criminate among their subjects; rather, they should strive to love them, prefer 
them over themselves, and act so that their people will love them sincerely. 
They should be faithful to their community, and secure their community’s 
loyalty and devotion in return. Gülen concentrates on making the movement 
very clear and distinct, by separating it from other movements. He constantly 
attempts to build the image of the movement in the hearts and minds of his 
followers.
Based on my analysis, I argue that Gülen possesses a sufficient number of the 
servant-leadership qualities mentioned above. The majority of the respondents 
believed Gülen to be realistic, and felt convinced that the message he conveys 
to the people is true. He has a courageous nature, and has strong willpower. He 
remains buoyant and hopeful despite the tensions of self, life, and community. He 
is aware of his responsibility and of the possible hindrances and stumbling blocks. 
Systematically and purposefully he is working on his projects and activities. He 
is far-sighted and pro-active, and has determined his goals well. He knows his 
students as well as his friends individually and mobilises them to reach their goals 
and ambitions. Furthermore, the respondents describe him as a person who does 
not cherish worldly ambitions or abuse his authority. 
Gülen is characterised as a charismatic figure and has primarily been seen as a 
religious leader and as a prominent source of inspiration concerning establishing 
intercultural dialogue and initiating educational projects and institutions throughout 
the world.3 An overwhelming majority of the respondents emphasised that Gülen is 
a servant first, and then a leader. According to Karakaş’s (2006) analysis, Gülen’s 
way of leadership is closer to servant-leadership than charismatic leadership. I 
also found allusion to this conviction in his conversations, interviews, sermons and 
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writings. In 1995, a journalist (Akman 1995) put the following question to Gülen: 
‘You always emphasise that you’re not a sheikh [or the leader of a dervish order], 
nor do you show any tendency to accept that you are a leader of a religious com-
munity. However, I would like to discuss your leadership.’ Gülen answered this 
question from the perspective of a servant and ‘slave’ instead of a leader: 
I’ve never called myself a leader. I’m an ordinary man. A leader 
is someone with capabilities, genius, charisma and high perform-
ance. I don’t have any of those (Akman 1995).
Gülen is further typified as a man of deliberate action who never hung back in 
putting his plans or decisions into action. Respondents have indicated that consul-
tation (shura) is one of the eminent practices demonstrating his decision-making 
process. Furthermore, he has been described as a leader who gains the love and 
trust of his followers by solving their problems, whether personal or public, related 
to individual, private life, or to social, economic or political affairs touching the 
movement as a whole. 
Gülen offers great hope, more caring, and responsibility for the future genera-
tions in producing and working better. He promotes the value and development 
of people, the building of movement, the practice of authenticity, the providing of 
leadership for the good of those led, and the sharing of power, knowledge and 
status for the common good of each individual and the total society. According to 
my analysis, Gülen’s leadership supports people who choose to serve first, and 
then lead, as a way of expanding service to individuals, institutions and societies. 
His leadership style encourages enthusiasm, synergy, trust, foresight, listening, 
and the ethical use of power and empowerment. 
In addition to the above characteristics, Gülen’s experts and students whom I 
interviewed, pointed out that his understanding and praxis of leadership bears 
primarily on his faith and concerns some theological bases. Some excerpts from 
the interviews:
Gülen’s ultimate aim is to have the consent of God. His under-
standing of leadership is premised on the belief that there is no 
aim or reward beyond the approval and love of God. The easiest 
way to acquire this is obeying the rules explained by the Prophet 
Muhammad, and imitating the Prophet’s way of life. 
Gülen’s purpose is not to be or becoming a leader, he would 
rather be a ‘slave’ and servant. He has so many followers even 
he does not have a desire to lead. He regards his ‘reputation’ as 
a credit from God, and uses this to motivate people. One who 
cannot manage his or her worldly desires cannot rehabilitate 
someone else. 
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Gülen never ‘contaminates’ the realities, and does not ‘shade’ 
the realities with any personal interest. Therefore the message 
reflects what is in his mind and heart and illuminates people. 
Gülen always interrogates himself and never deceives himself. 
He practices what he preaches. It is this sincere and honest 
search for reality that has won him millions of followers all over 
the world. His followers are disciples of sincerity, honesty and 
compassion. 
In the end, the respondents stressed that Gülen’s inspiration comes from God and 
it is God that makes people follow him. 
Conclusion3.5 
In conclusion, I would argue that although Gülen is classified as an Islamic scholar 
and spiritual guide, he is also an example of a leader possessing extraordinary 
competences such as intuition and foresight. Gülen promotes collectivism within 
the movement through his emphasis on joint decision making and consultation. 
From my analysis I have concluded that he has led his community successfully (at 
an intellectual, spiritual, and social level), and has transformed a traditional civic 
movement in Turkey to a worldwide social movement in touch with modernity. 
Some scholars describe him as a charismatic figure. Rather than having cha-
risma, he describes himself as a servant. He has been seen as a caring lead-
er of profound appreciation of the Islamic sciences and contemporary-modern 
thought, and a passionate activist (Saritoprak 2005). Successful leaders represent 
and express what they desire to reach through their actions, and then translate 
their actions into words. In Gülen’s own words: ‘For us action precedes thought’ 
(1998c:91), and this is a distinguishing characteristic of his leadership style. 
Moreover, I can say that Gülen possesses two important leadership characteris-
tics. He developed his own philosophy and knows his way very well (clear vision), 
and he is reliable and has set out on the way (deliberate actions). It is a common 
saying that ‘the whole world steps aside for the person who knows where he or 
she is going’. This leadership principle is also accompanied by the charm and 
grace needed to create followers. He is able to persuade other people (his audi-
ence) to go with him. People follow others that they personally admire. Legitimate 
leaders gather followers through dint of personality and charm, rather than any 
form of external power or authority.
Great leaders have various leadership qualities and are able to be leaders not only 
in one aspect of life, but they can – and should – lead their movement, community 
Conclusion 67
or organisation to success in every field. The greatest and most influential com-
manders, statesmen, community leaders, religious leaders, and spiritual guides in 
human history have done this. From this point of view, I can characterise Gülen as 
a servant-leader of his movement in particular and of humanity in general. 
In sum, Gülen is an example of a servant-leader. Servant-leaders are necessary 
to solve the common problems of humanity; ignorance, poverty and discord (cf. 
Furkan 2004). One of the primary aims of his leadership is the building of the 
‘golden generation’, more humane relationships, institutions, and societies. What 
can be learned from his example is that effective leaders need to develop the dy-
namism, harmony and critical imagination required to embrace individual, organi-
sational, and global change from a stance of dialogue, peace, cooperation, hope 
and courage. This study is not enough to analyse all the aspects and patterns of 
Gülen’s leadership. For those interested, further research could focus, for exam-
ple, on the ‘Leadership Trihelix’; the intellectual, behavioural and spiritual aspects 
of Gülen’s leadership. 
notes
1. See also M. Ibn Hisham, “Beirut”, 2:137.
2. Some notes from the meeting programme of Fethullah Gülen between 21 and 28 August 2003, 
in Pennsylvania. Not published. 




Modern Ideals and Muslim Identity: Harmony or 
Contradiction?
A textual linguistic analysis of the Gülen teaching and movement
introduction4.1 
The modern world has undergone radical, social, economic, political and intel-
lectual changes over the last few decades. Today increasing numbers of Muslims 
living in western democracies are offering a model for society that is pluralist, par-
ticipatory and wealthy in economic terms. However, the need for peaceful coex-
istence between Muslims and non-Muslims within and between nations has long 
been recognised. Consequently, both globally and locally, there is a growing need 
for a new sense of Muslim identity in harmony with modern ideals (Esposito and 
Voll 1996; Göle 2000; Gülen 1998a; Küçükcan 2004; Kuru 2003; Heffner 1998; 
Izetbegovic 1984; Nasr 1980; Rahman 1982; Shadid and Van Koningsveld 2002). 
While people struggle to balance different, often opposing identities, there have 
been notable failures in attempts to make the world more integrated.  
This chapter primarily examines how and to what extent Gülen’s teaching and 
the movement inspired by him are contributing to the dynamic and peaceful co-
existence of Muslims and non-Muslims. First, in order to explore and analyse this 
concept of coexistence, seven textual linguistic principles (cohesion, coherence, 
intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality and intertextuality) (Alan 
2005; Beaugrande and Dressler 1981; Demir 2004; Tas 2004; Van Dijk 1998) are 
applied to Gülen’s teaching and movement. Second, these linguistic standards are 
modelled on social sciences as a new theoretical and methodological approach 
for exploring and analysing social movements and phenomena. The originality of 
this chapter is specified as the correlations between a movement and a text, and 
the processes of cognition, production and reproduction of knowledge and its dis-
semination and transition in the Muslim world, multicultural societies and liberal 
democracies. In this current chapter, Fethullah Gülen is, metaphorically, consid-
ered as the ‘writer’; his teaching and movement are the ‘text’; and the ‘readers’ 
are the members of the Gülen movement, the transnational community and the 
whole of humanity. This research’s practical relevance lies in the fact that it helps 
conceptualise the formation and progress of his teaching and movement. 
 
By applying seven metaphorical textual linguistic principles (standards of textual-
ity) to the Gülen teaching and movement as an empiric case, I examine—in the 
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following sections—the assumption that modern ideals and Muslim identity are 
harmonising or contradicting. Text is defined as a communicative occurrence that 
meets seven standards of textuality (Beaugrande and Dressler 1981; Van Dijk 
1998). After briefly outlining each standard of texuality, I will apply questions re-
garding the correlation of these standards to the Gülen teaching and movement. 
The chapter closes with conclusions and discussion rested on the findings.
Cohesion4.2 
‘When a text is analysed in terms of cohesion, the continuity has an important role 
at a grammatical level. The continuity can be supported by sub-items which help 
to form and give meaning to a text’ (Demir 2004). Cohesion refers to the gram-
matical unity of a text in which different components exist. Here the importance 
lies in the surface components, which depend on each other according to gram-
matical forms and conventions (Tas 2004). The question I will answer is: What are 
the elements of social cohesion in Gülen’s teaching and movement regarding the 
surface structure? The surface structure in a text is composed of tangible words, 
clauses and sentences. These explicit factors are interlinked through references, 
parallelisms or paraphrases. In the context of a social movement, the tacit fac-
tors are members, institutions, publications and activities. These elements in the 
Gülen movement are connected loosely to each other. There are no organic links 
among the related institutions. Each institution is independent and can survive 
even if all the rest become ‘extinct’.
The cohesion within this loosely structured network is realised through reading 
and watching common media sources (e.g., Zaman, Samanyolu TV, Mehtap TV, 
Sızıntı magazine, published works by Gülen), sharing knowledge (correspond-
ences, seminars, conferences), visiting the successful organisations (national and 
international), and applying the best practices (such as the Science Fairs of the 
educational centres in Turkey and Europe). With respect to the movement, the so-
cial cohesion is also expressed, according to the respondents, in social networks 
of people who are inspired by Gülen’s vision and who make efforts in the fields of 
education, media and dialogue, in which they are supported by business people. 
On his website (www.fgulen.com), Gülen is described as an Islamic scholar who 
encourages peaceful coexistence through education and dialogue. He preaches 
and teaches about Islam and the importance of understanding and tolerance. Ac-
cording to the respondents, his message embraces all humanity and is deeply 
averse to atheism, injustice, anarchy and conflict (Bayramoğlu 1995). His inter-
cultural and interfaith dialogue call for social cohesion and a respect for education 
and an end to ignorance and dissention. His call for dialogue is bipartite. First, 
people should learn about the other’s cultural identity, religious beliefs and spir-
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itual values, and second, this knowledge should be used to learn more about their 
own moral and cultural values. One of the most important points in Gülen’s texts 
and speeches is the toleration of differences in order to live together. The sig-
nificant factors in his teaching are collective consciousness, shared vision, social 
responsibility, tolerance, respect, spiritual depth. In Gülen’s writings (2004c:21; 
1987:96-98), speeches and conversations there is no greater religious concept 
and action than love: ‘Love is the most essential element of every being, and it is 
the most radiant light, and it is the greatest power; able to resist and overcome 
all else’. Everyone should make an effort for the well-being of the society in which 
people live. In order to promote social cohesion in Gülen’s teaching, both educa-
tion (a means developing forbearance) and dialogue are of eminent importance. 
Gülen stimulates people of different religious and ethnic groups in any society to 
have dialogues with each other so that they respect, understand each other, and 
in doing so ultimately cooperate in favour of the well-being of the society in which 
they live. The respondents characterise the individuals in the Gülen movement as 
peaceful within themselves (internal peace) and with their environments (external 
peace). They have an optimistic view for the future and put emphasis on living 
peacefully.
Endogenous process of the social division of labour can be considered as the 
Gülen movement’s main tenet. In the movement, different groups deal with dif-
ferent voluntary services that complete the surface structure. Different institutions 
and their functions complete and help each other like the components of a house; 
door, windows and roof etc. together make a house. The sacrifices made by the 
pioneers of the movement and their responsibility are very important factors for 
the continuity of the movement. Having no worldly expectations is an effective 
virtue for the new followers. The transnational aspect of the Gülen movement 
is regarded as a healthy interaction and dialogue with all peoples without any 
discrimination. The members of the community have a main goal: to attain the 
consent of God by internalising and representing the perfect character of Prophet 
Muhammad.
An alternative explanation of the Gülen movement’s social cohesion from a sur-
face structure perspective would come from human basic needs. ‘Light Houses’ 
(Balcı 2003:158; Hermansen 2007:69-70) and youth hostels, along with dormitory 
schools and university preparatory courses, provide for the individuals’ intellec-
tual, spiritual, physiological, safety and belonging needs. Volunteers from around 
the globe involved in the Gülen movement provide shelter and guidance, and all 
of this for the sake of friendship and support for each other, regardless of ethnicity, 
religion or wealth. Furthermore, the international aspect of the movement furnish-
es a great deal of vision, self-esteem, great achievements and dignity.
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coherence4.3 
Coherence is the second textual linguistic principle and refers to the continuity of 
senses in a text. Cohesion deals with the surface structure whereas coherence 
refers to the deep structure (experiences or thoughts). In this section, I will give an 
answer to the following question: What are the elements of social coherence in the 
Gülen teaching and movement regarding the deep structure?
The deep structure of a text is related to intangible concepts such as reputation, 
trust, and social capital. Culture and tradition are not limited to the tangible. Styles 
of life, customs, aesthetic sensibilities, and ideas are intangible, invisible aspects 
of culture and tradition. The continuity of sense is the base of coherence. The 
Gülen movement has a particular shared vision, to serve humanity for the sake 
of God. ‘Hizmet’ (service) is a key concept which binds members and institutions. 
Gülen frequently used concept of dar al-hizmet (country of service). It means, if 
one’s intention is to serve Islam by presenting a good example, then one can stay 
wherever one desires (Yilmaz 2003:234). In the countries where sympathisers 
reside, they utilise this concept and either establish interfaith organisations, asso-
ciations, and societies, or are in close contact with ‘People of the Book’. Without 
the concept of hizmet, which is utterly represented by the personality of Gülen, the 
movement may keep its cohesion but would probably lose its coherence. Being 
the servants of One God, and the ummah (community) of one Prophet, reading 
one Book (the Qur’an) and turning to one qiblah (direction of prayer) are the most 
significant spiritual ties among the members, and of course the whole Muslim um-
mah globally.
Many respondents indicate that there is no contradiction in Gülen’s texts, speech-
es and actions. There is a social coherence between the local and the global. This 
means that members of the movement experience no serious problem between 
the local and the global, and have a holistic perspective. Common values unite 
people. Thus, common concepts such as compassion, love, tolerance, and dia-
logue are internalised through conversations and common media, and knowledge 
sharing. One respondent stated:
Owing to the principles of diversity, love and dialogue, the move-
ment does not focus on instilling Islamic principles, but instead 
opts to teach what Gülen considers the principles, like compas-
sion, generosity, kindness and humility. Gülen’s idea is that you 
change the world and build peace through education, educat-
ing others to consider interfaith and intercultural dialogue, to be 
modern and change the world through the education within an 
ethical framework. He proposes an education of the heart and 
soul as well as of the mind and character, aimed at reviving and 
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invigorating the whole being to achieve competence and provide 
goods and services useful to humanity.
Dialogue, peace, tolerance, compassion, and forgiveness are the key elements of 
social cohesion in  Gülen’s teaching and his movement. The respondents stress 
that Gülen’s understanding of tolerance is the acceptance of differences that arise 
from dialogue in order to further the wider goal of cooperation among all strata of 
the society. To him, tolerance is based on the idea of charity, or love, and therefore 
it is a duty to God (Agai 2003a:64).
Gülen (1997:60) states that a peaceful social life depends on the balance and 
dialogue between the two groups of people in society; elite (rich) and common 
(poor) people. He contends that this dialogue and balance, which will manifest it-
self in peace, is based on care and compassion on the part of the elite, or the rich, 
and respect and obedience on the part of the common people, or the poor. The 
imbalance between these two has destroyed social peace for several centuries, 
especially in Europe’s social upheavals, all of which are rooted in the centuries-old 
struggle between labour and capital. Gülen’s followers and experts pointed out that 
he developed a modern and innovative education model pertaining to the com-
bination of spirituality with intellect, reason with revelation, and mind with heart, 
which is applied in Turkey but also in many other countries. According to Gülen, 
education is vital both for societies and individuals (Ünal and Williams 2000:306), 
and is the best way to serve humanity and to establish a sincere dialogue with 
other cultures and religions (Bakar 2005; Gülen 1987; Michel 2005a,b,c, 2006). 
Gülen’s teachings are seen, especially by Turkish Muslims, as a new guideline for 
practising Muslim morality in modern societies.
Another significant element of social coherence of the movement is consultation 
(shura), which means reaching consensus among followers and resolving com-
mon issues and possible problems. Gülen (2005b:43-58) teaches that mutual 
consultation is the first condition for the success of a decision made on any issue 
related to society. Before they take one step, they should talk about all the prob-
able consequences. They call their activities ‘serving’ and they see themselves as 
servants. Servanthood is a central theme in Gülen’s teaching (Gülen 2007a,b,c). 
A continuous need for a deep spirituality in the movement is also a remarkable 
aspect of the social coherence. The members of the movement believe that every-
thing they have is a gift of God. Their activities are just a prayer of thanks for those 
gifts. They believe that social development is only possible when individuals are 
developed in heart and mind. Love is stronger than hate. For this goal they spend 
their time and money even if they are without sufficient means themselves.  
The deep structure could also be perceived as the backbone of the Gülen move-
ment, the unique explanation as to the degree of dedication and commitment to 
the voluntary activities. The very basic questions facing humanity have yet to be 
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answered and neither philosophy nor any other field of hard science has been 
truly successful in answering fundamental questions such as: Who am I? What is 
my  purpose on this planet? Is there an afterlife where the soul and body will be 
rewarded or punished for deeds done on Earth? The previous section, focusing on 
the surface structure of the Gülen movement has only portrayed an earth-bound 
set of explanations; however, the real engine of activity in Gülen’s movement 
comes from these questions and attempts to provide the most satisfying answers. 
These activities gave birth to a new understanding of education, where spirituality 
and positivism were brought together and proved that religion and science are not 
mutually exclusive but perfectly complementary. 
According to several respondents, the notion of ‘identity’ lies at the basis of the 
social cohesion of the Gülen movement. Gülen preaches that a human being de-
velops his or her own identity by attaching importance to his or her own historical 
background, and that with regard to the Turkish society or nation, mainly to the 
religious values (e.g., Sufi Islam, tasawwuf), which have played a prominent role 
in their history. This identity, resting on historical and religious values, is of impor-
tance for the social cohesion in the surface structure in two respects. (a) People 
who know their own identity have a strong basis and therefore it is not threaten-
ing for them to have a dialogue with the other. Each one shows respect for the 
other’s cultural and religious identity. As people have the idea that their identity is 
respected and accepted, they are able to enter more easily into a dialogue and 
they are rather willing to work together on common interests and issues in the so-
ciety. (b) Those who have found their identity in religious values, will discover that 
their goal lies in obtaining the approval of God. This approval can be obtained by 
‘love for the creation for the sake of the Creator’ (Gökdemir and Gökdemir 1990). 
Striving for this approval, and the understanding that love for fellow human beings 
is a condition for tolerance, is necessary to enter into dialogue with the other(s) 
in their context. It is also a precondition to deploy one’s self for the welfare of the 
others and of the society; a goal that will ultimately lead to social cohesion and 
peaceful coexistence.
Intentionality4.4 
The writer of a book produces a text to achieve a specific goal. This may be the 
expression of oneself, informing others, criticising, and so forth. Whatever the aim 
is, the text must be produced in a cohesive and coherent way so that it serves the 
text-producer’s intention (Tas 2004). Regarding intentionality I will focus on the 
following questions: (a) What is Gülen’s intention? (b) What is the ultimate ideal 
behind Gülen’s teaching and movement? and (c) How does the movement avoid 
irrelevant messages and/or actions regarding his intentions and vision?
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The respondents stress that Gülen’s ultimate intention is to be accepted, loved 
and honoured by God. He frequently states that there is no attractive goal beyond 
this one (cf. Gülen 2007a,b,c). In order to reach this goal he serves humanity, en-
courages  everyone to solve world problems such as ignorance, poverty and disu-
nity, respects the rights of God, the rights of human beings, the rights of creatures, 
and the rights of his own soul, promotes what is good, right and beautiful, and 
discourages what is bad, wrong and awful. According to Gülen, belief necessitates 
a climate of freedom, peace and stability to flourish and breathe. In justification of 
this point, Gülen states that the Qur’an, in reference to the Hudaybiyah Pact,1 con-
siders peace as victory for the believers; a believer must always seek to establish 
peace and stability. Furthermore, the constructive form of activism required the 
dismantling of discord, disunity and division. The respondents agreed that Gülen 
is of the firm opinion that the existing social tension and ideological rifts in Turkey 
and abroad need to be overcome and this can only be achieved through dialogue, 
tolerance and understanding. Therefore, the initial objective behind worldwide 
dialogue initiatives was to calm public tension, normalise relations and create a 
sense of mutual trust and tolerance. In addition to the aforementioned arguments, 
Gülen experts and followers whom I interviewed pointed out that his intention and 
ultimate ideal bears primarily on his faith and concerns basic theological founda-
tions:
Gülen’s ultimate aim is to have the consent of God. His teaching 
is premised on the belief that there is no aim or reward beyond 
the approval and love of God. The easiest way to acquire this 
is obeying the rules explained by the Prophet Muhammad, and 
imitating the Prophet’s way of life.
Many respondents emphasised that his intention is to produce a humane world by 
educating new generations and contributing to world peace. All the movement’s 
activities are done for the sake of such a peaceful world and a harmonious co-
existence. This peace and harmony can be realised through the cultivation of 
eternal happiness based on attaining the consent and love of God. Every activity 
or message should be considered as God’s will. In his teaching, Gülen (2004a:52) 
frequently emphasises this ultimate goal of attaining the approval of God. The 
respondents affirmatively say that as a religious intellectual and peace activist, he 
has influenced a whole generation of Muslims throughout the world, and inspired 
them to play an important role in charity and education projects and foundations. 
His aim has always been to profess Islam’s message of peace; to serve people 
regardless of faith, colour, or national origin. In other words, Gülen strives for a 
peaceful society, in which there is space for dialogue and diversity. He has the 
conviction that reconciliation between modern society and religious values based 
on the Turkish-Ottoman model of tolerance and drawn from Sufi Islam is a condi-
tion for this peaceful society. To this end, Gülen proposes that education serves as 
a tool to be used to establishing a culture of peace, stating: ‘Education is the most 
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effective and common tongue for relations with others. We are trying our best to 
do this; we have no other intentions’ (in Ünal and Williams 2000:331). Indeed, 
worldwide peace is indicated as his ultimate purpose, and is a long-term gain. In 
this regard, education is utilised as a major medium. To one respondent, the short-
term gain Gülen has in mind is, however, the birth of an exemplary generation, 
a generation of ‘role models’ who can exert influence on the society in particular, 
and the world in general. He promotes a holistic education aiming to educate 
responsible citizens and empathetic human beings who are open to science and 
rationality, as well as the religious morality (Aslandoğan and Çetin 2006:31-54).  
Gülen’s intentions have always been questioned and thus questions concerning 
his mindset (Aslandoğan 2006) and convictions are answered in various ways by 
the respective people include leading journalists, academics, TV personalities, 
politicians, and Turkish and foreign state authorities (Ateş, Karakaş and Ortaylı 
2005; Ünal and Williams 2000;). In contrast, some groups have accused Gülen of 
attempting to ‘take over state control, bring “darkness” and introduce sharia using 
force and violence’ (cf. Aslandoğan 2006). However, some respondents pointed 
out that Gülen never made choices for ‘himself’ but lived, and thought how to 
live, for others (altruism). If there is an ultimate goal, one that limits itself to this 
world, that would be none other than truly understanding the religion of Islam in its 
entirety, which enlightens the contested minds and souls of today’s Muslims, and 
engaging with other groups. The movement’s intention can also be understood 
and explained through a functionalist approach. The functionalists (Rosamond 
2000) argue that cooperation and coordination in the sectors rather than politics 
bring new areas of cooperation dependent upon the success of the previous at-
tempts, the ‘spill-over’ effect. The movement considers politics as of secondary 
importance and focuses on technical issues like economic cooperation and social 
interaction. Technical issues can be considered as a general framework. Affirming 
this, one respondent indicates that Gülen’s understanding rests upon a tripod en-
compassing life’s ‘economic, cultural, and spiritual aspects. The tripod of econom-
ics, education, and religion is the main dynamic of his view’s vitality.’
According to another interviewee, Gülen claims that the modern world is plagued 
by the individual’s lack of faith, and in particular, the failure to adopt scientific 
methods while preserving moral values and belief in God. Gülen contends that 
faith can be scientifically proven, and science benefits from, and indeed requires, 
a moral foundation from religion (Bakar 2005). In insisting that science is not to be 
separated from religion, Gülen (Kiyimba et al. 1998:32-60) argues that there is no 
contradiction between religion and science. 
With respect to avoiding irrelevant messages and actions regarding Gülen’s inten-
tion and vision, the respondents stress that his followers do not deal with politics. 
Common interests are regarded as more important than personal ones. Self-crit-
icism and self control make the movement’s members proactive. They are not 
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busy with the circle of interest, but are focused on the circle of influence. Moreo-
ver, the respondents argue that cooperation and collaboration both in his native 
Turkey and abroad bring new opportunities for common projects and dialogue. 
The activities supporting the national and international interests are accepted by 
different societies. Once again, the members abstain from politics and want to 
contribute to the well-being of the society in a concrete and practical way. Over 
the years the movement has developed a culture of ignorance towards nega-
tive publicity or messages. Instead, Gülen calls for putting the best of hearts into 
action, to streamline each day’s activities with the light of faith and to continue 
to serve Islam while continuing to fight prejudice and developing a constructive 
culture of dialogue. This, however, does not mean that the movement keeps quiet 
on political issues. On the contrary, the media and education tools are used as a 
way to keep in touch with the rest of the world and provide all there is to know in a 
constructive and transparent way.
Acceptability4.5 
Readers of a text receive that text for various purposes. Reading a text means 
expecting something from it. Consequently, for the matching of readers’ expecta-
tions with what is meant in the text, there must be a coherent and cohesive set 
of components forming it. In this sense, the type of the text and readers’ intention 
as well as the producer’s intention must build a whole body. This is, to some ex-
tent, dependent on such factors as text-type, cultural setting and the desirability of 
goals. For example, if the topic is about sports yet the body of the text focuses on 
some irrelevant subject matters other than sports, then it cannot be acceptable for 
a reader who wants to read something about a branch of sport. (Tas 2004). 
Using this textual linguistic principle, the following questions will be answered: 
(a) Who are the ‘readers’ of Gülen’s teaching and movement and what do they 
expect? (b) Do the intentions of Gülen and his community’s situation build a whole 
body? (c) Are there any unacceptable messages and/or actions?
The readers are both the insiders, the members of the movement from all seg-
ments of the society, and the whole of humanity. More precisely, the readers of 
Gülen’s teaching are students, academics, businessmen, alumni of universities, 
the whole society, and the secular segment in Turkey, Africa, Asia, Australia, 
America and Europe. Probably, the insiders expect to be inspired and motivated 
by Gülen’s preaching, through his example as a guide for their life and activities. 
Academics and other highly educated people are able to reproduce an image 
reflecting the nature and characteristics of Gülen’s preaching and his movement. 
Academics thus have the important role of bringing the ideas and teaching to the 
readers of the movement. 
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The distinction between ‘were’ and ‘are’ should be introduced in defining Gülen’s 
‘readers’, his movement’s members. During the movement’s early years, the read-
ers were a rather overlooked minority whom the state considered as ‘harmless’ 
as long as they were a ‘minority’ and lacked any capability of intellectualism that 
would raise critique and give birth to any sort of progressive activity that would 
foster ‘the minority values’. As the movement proved its sincere intentions over 
the decades and the fruits of its new approach to education became tangible, the 
readers of Gülen’s movement have expanded greatly. Today they constitute an 
array of professionals in almost every field, from the business world to academia, 
and interestingly followers of other beliefs, even agnostics.2 The main engine of 
the movement is faith based on Gülen’s teaching of Islam. The movement is like a 
firm body which can mobilise and adapt itself into new situations rapidly, despite its 
ever-growing size. Those who are inspired by Gülen’s texts and speeches regard 
themselves as pious, however, there are also other people supporting educational 
and dialogue activities who are not necessarily motivated by piety. A respondent 
stresses that the members of the movement expect to see the fruits of their efforts 
(and they have already been seeing those), and that humanity is waiting for the 
useful solutions of the movement (and so many have already witnessed those). 
Another respondent indicated that they do not all have a common expectation.
The overwhelming majority of the respondents argue that Gülen’s intention and 
the situation of the movement combine to build a whole body:
Although Gülen’s vision is far beyond those of members, the com-
munity represents the teaching and ideals very effectively. Espe-
cially, the humbleness, sincerity and altruism of the young teach-
ers and businessmen are a significant dynamic in the movement. 
The movement grows every day, but those who accept the main 
Gülen’s ideas constitute the character of the movement. Readers 
of the movement include all parts of the society. They are the dif-
ferent segments of the whole body. They expect to learn how to 
evaluate the teachings of the Prophet and the Qur’an as well as 
their responsibilities and potential contributions. Representatives 
of the movement express their understanding and purpose to 
everybody with whom they are in touch. Readers want to be par-
ticipant in the process and they act in accordance with Gülen’s 
views.
One thing that is unacceptable within the movement is lying idle, instead of either 
seeking spiritual endowment or providing it. Further, the movement may some-
times be associated only with Turkish culture and even missionary endeavour, 
however, it has a broader and indeed global character, which facilitates integration 
and social harmony. Another important point is that each member knows only the 
activity with which he or she is closely related. Nobody knows and deals with every 
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activity. In addition, in such a fast growing movement, personal interpretations 
may sometimes be wrong, and these cannot be generalised. 
Briefly, Gülen’s approach to dialogue and peaceful coexistence has been criti-
cised from several points of view (Celik and Valkenberg 2007). Radical Islamic 
groups and ultra-nationalistic circles in Turkey opposed Gülen’s dialogue with 
members of other religions, asserting this will lead to the assimilation of Muslim 
identity, and Muslim distinctiveness must not be compromised even to the degree 
of giving precedence to matters and grounds of common concern and belief. The 
adherents of the Kemalist state ideology in Turkey also see the Gülen movement 
as a threat to the secular and laicised nature of the modern Republic of Turkey 
and its political and societal institutions (Saritoprak and Griffith 2005:336; Yilmaz 
2005b:385-411). On the other hand, those in favour of celebrating pluralism and 
cultural diversity have also criticised Gülen for placing far too much emphasis in 
meeting on common ground issues. Some respondents argue that his common 
ground approach is not targeted at those in favour of engagement and dialogue 
but at those who are not. By emphasising matters of common belief and inter-
est, Gülen is attempting to persuade people that human beings have sufficient 
commonality to build a peaceful future. On the contrary, some others stress that 
Gülen’s efforts and underlying philosophy regarding dialogue and tolerance may 
be seen as a political strategy to avoid the convulsive debate on laicism which 
was introduced by Atatürk in Turkey to create an secular political culture (Yavuz 
2003a,b). However, several respondents see Gülen as a role model who discuss-
es secularism by constantly bringing the importance of dialogue and tolerance to 
the fore. Suspicions that Gülen would want to take over and to establish an Islamic 
state are unfounded. In 2008, the Turkish Republic’s Supreme Court dismissed all 
charges against him. Gülen maintains the conviction that power lies in practising a 
positive influence on the society, through the combining integrity, spiritual values, 
and professionalism in the context of modern life.
Informativity4.6 
Informativity is concerned with how unexpected/expected or known/unknown are 
the occurrences in the text. This is an unneglectible standard for an effective text, 
which can be grouped as: First order informativity, second order informativity, third 
order informativity. The first requires ordinary trivial knowledge such as articles, 
prepositions et cetera. It is not about the content, thus it receives little attention; 
the second, normal standards, is content related; the third, is a much attention-
demanding occurrence which is caused by discontinuity and discrepancies. (Tas 
2004). 
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The questions are thus: (a) What makes the Gülen teaching and movement 
unique? (b) How do they manage the balance known/unknown for their ‘read-
ers’?
According to some respondents, the uniqueness of the Gülen movement can be 
seen as twofold. It provides, on one hand, a new perception of spirituality and 
science, and on the other hand, an unprecedented degree of commitment, loyalty 
and sincerity with no intentions of seeking worldly flattery. Following the enlight-
enment, ‘religion’ has been criticised for not providing satisfying answers for the 
modern world and dismissing scientific endeavours. The movement seeks the 
‘best fit’ between modernity and spirituality. Gülen (1997a)3 has stated that a com-
mitted Muslim should not only read the book of Islam, but must also ‘read’ the 
book of the universe, since the universe is also a verse, an art work of the Crea-
tor. Only then can the true harmony between universe and religion emerge. The 
metaphor used for this is that of a bird needing two wings to fly, hence the uni-
verse and spirituality are these two wings. Gülen’s teaching is not intended just for 
some intellectual goals, but for spiritual richness. To respondents, his compassion, 
sincerity and altruism are unique. Members practise what they preach. People 
soar intellectually, socially and spiritually with the support of the movement. The 
positive developments manifest themselves very quickly. Further, the discourse of 
‘individual and society’, and ‘local and global’ makes the movement unique. 
According to one respondent, it is the clarity and originality of perception of so-
cial, scientific, educational and cultural issues that makes the Gülen movement so 
unique. The fact that the members combine the ‘old’ and new is also unique to this 
movement. Dialogue concerns not only accepting and respecting the other in his 
or her own position, but also sharing one’s own cultural and religious values in the 
context of the other. Sharing implies that people should learn about the other’s cul-
tural identity, religious beliefs and spiritual values, of religious understandings and 
scientific results, of the modern man and religious conviction within an individual.
Gülen was the first Muslim scholar to publicly condemn the attacks of 9/11, with an 
advertisement in the Washington Post and in other major newspapers in sixteen 
languages. He strongly argues that: ‘There is no such thing as a Muslim terrorist; 
a terrorist cannot be a real Muslim; a true Muslim [who understands Islam in every 
aspect] cannot be a terrorist.’ (Akman 2004a; Çapan 2005). He declares that from 
the point of view of Islamic criteria, nobody can justify or permit suicide and ter-
rorist attacks.4 He regarded these atrocities as a great blow to world peace that 
unfairly tarnished the credit of believers: 
[…] terror can never be used in the name of Islam or for the sake 
of any Islamic ends. A terrorist cannot be a Muslim and a Muslim 
cannot be a terrorist. A Muslim can only be the representative 
and symbol of peace, welfare, and prosperity. [….] If a ship is 
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carrying nine criminals and one innocent person, Islam does not 
allow for the ship to be sunk in order to punish the nine criminals; 
doing so would violate the rights of the one innocent person. 
(Gülen 2004a:62,261).
It is important to note that someone whose knowledge of Islam is limited to the 
headlines of the daily newspapers is likely to believe that Islam teaches terrorism, 
suicide attacks, oppression of women, and hatred for those outside its commu-
nity. Gülen’s alliance of civilisations, as opposed to the ‘clash of civilisations’, of-
fers a perspective from which this sustainable peaceful coexistence can be made 
possible. Gülen’s perspective shows that, through cooperativeness and dialogue, 
groups can come to see that they share common virtues and ideas, not simply 
incompatible differences (cf. Carroll 2007).
The respondents indicate that Gülen gives importance to timing. He does not pri-
oritise the matters that the sympathisers of his movement are not ready for, where 
the global conjuncture is not suitable. Thus, the currently unknown matters (prob-
ably some new projects concerning art and aesthetics) are delayed within the 
community, and the known enterprises of education, the media and dialogue are 
prioritised. Everyone can get something from a text depending on his own posi-
tion. The openness of the movement and the readiness for change reduce the 
difference between the known and the unknown. The movement is not closed. It 
interacts with different societies, and consequently develops new discourses ac-
cording to changing circumstances. In this regard, the members’ attitudes towards 
modernity and globalisation are contingent.
In order to understand the balance between the known and unknown within the 
Gülen movement, one must seek to understand the concept of ‘destiny’ and the 
way it is portrayed within Islam. What is unknown for humankind is an ‘absolute 
knowledge’ for the world beyond, therefore a sincere patience is required. How-
ever, once again, this patience is an ‘active patience’ as Gülen describes it. In 
simple words, the knowledge comes to those who seek it. In his teaching, Gülen 
also takes known elements (e.g., current problems, scientific results) and couples 
these with a deeper spiritual and religious content, which perhaps was less known 
(unknown).  
Situationality4.7 
A text also must be relevant to a situation of occurrence. This is related to the 
context and the situation the reader is in. Here I can conclude that different people 
in different situations can take away different meanings from the same text. But 
what is important here is that the text must present the knowledge to make sense 
MODERN IDEALS AND MUSLIM IDENTITY: HARMONY OR CONTRADICTION82
with a minimum use of words (maximum economy). Otherwise, it may even not be 
received at all. (Tas 2004). 
In this section I will answer the following questions related to situationality: )a) 
What is the context for the Gülen teaching and movement? (b) How they decide 
what to do for a specific situation?
As a leading faith-based movement with an educational and interfaith agenda, 
the Gülen movement aims to promote creative and positive relations between the 
West and the Muslim world and articulate a constructive position on issues such 
as democracy, multiculturalism, globalisation, and intercultural dialogue in the 
context of secular modernity (Celik and Valkenberg 2007; Hunt and Aslandoğan 
2006). The Turkish Muslims in particular, and the global community in general, is 
the context of the movement. The acclimatisation of the teaching to the specific 
cultural environment in each country is realised through sympathisers living in this 
country. It is a movement in which social cohesion and commitment, an ethical 
sense of responsibility, a free and critical mentality and a global view of aesthetics 
and culture are prerequisites. In sum, Islam, the Prophet Muhammad, the con-
temporary world, and the history of humankind, provide the context for Gülen’s 
teaching. The Gülen’s discourse and activities should be regarded in a religious 
context. What gives a sense to the actions of the followers is ‘belief’. Additionally, 
the movement produces its own role models (Gülen 2004e), which help to solve 
new problems and adapt to new environments, by comparing these models and 
by remaining loyal to the main discourse. The context of the movement is first and 
foremost the situation around secularisation and modernisation in the Republic 
of Turkey. In its context the movement is, in first instance, an alternative form of 
modernisation, opposite to the modernisation in which no space is for religion, as 
has been proposed through Kemalism.5 
The respondents stress that the Gülen movement is not based on a one-dimen-
sional process. In the movement there are different groups of people with different 
backgrounds and aims. Some people focus on the educational aspects, some 
focus on media and others work in different sectors. They are the components of 
the whole picture. Although the volunteers of the movement are in different places 
and positions, they have the same purpose: ‘Assent to God’. Because of ‘Şahş-ı 
Manevi’ (common spiritual identity), members focus on their responsibility and are 
aware of commonality of their purpose.
The sympathisers exchange ideas, and benchmark and apply best practices. The 
decision-making processes are democratic. The opinions of senior members are 
regarded. Those who have expertise, merit and talent direct the activities. Nev-
ertheless, since the events of 9/11, the terrorist bombings in Madrid and Lon-
don, and the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, the loyalty of Muslim 
citizens and the compatibility of Islam with liberal democracies have come into 
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question throughout the world (Celik and Valkenberg 2007). These incidents have 
come to symbolise the supposed threat of aggressive Islam to the peaceful West. 
Muslims have become a dangerous ‘other’ in many discourses, evoking Islamo-
phobia. As an inspiring and leading figure of the movement, Gülen’s interpretation 
and clarification related to such a specific situation are significant guidelines for 
the members about how to react to this volatile situation in which people of differ-
ent nations, cultures and civilisations now find themselves.
Finally, the context of the Gülen movement does not really show great discrep-
ancies in different parts of the world. This is due to the participants in the move-
ment referring to the same sources and the methods of interpretation which are 
accepted with unanimity. The quality of unanimity of the movement is the result 
of sincere commitment to the sources of Islam. This is due to the fact that Gülen 
himself minimises his role within the movement, and repeatedly underlines the 
achievements of the movement and how any future successes to come cannot be 
limited to the few figures within the movement but to the unanimity, brotherhood 
and faith. The movement constantly refers to the fact that ‘there are things to be 
done’ and there are ‘subcontractors’, no one of the ‘subcontracting figures’ can 
claim achievements as his or her own but rather they are the success of all.
Intertextuality4.8 
During the reading process our stored knowledge, experience, previous readings 
all affect the present reading perception. That is why the production and the recep-
tion of a given text depend on the participants’ knowledge of other texts. If a text 
is produced without making use of any particular knowledge which the reader is 
supposed to know, it may not be an appropriate text. Especially when it refers to 
well-known texts or things or people, it is much better. (Tas 2004). 
From this perspective I will search for answers to the following questions: (a) What 
are the relations of the Gülen teaching and movement with other communities? 
(b) How they produce knowledge and action regarding the current situation of the 
‘readers’? (c) What are their references?
The respondents stress that ‘positive action’ is a foremost and guiding principle of 
the movement. Members naturally eulogise their movement and formulate a posi-
tive attitude in all area, but do not disrespect or disregard others by claiming that 
theirs is the only philanthropic and constructive group. They should move away 
from all attitudes and behaviours that might lead the public to fighting, conflict, 
pessimism or tension (Ergene 2008). In his life, Gülen emphasises an apolitical, 
proactive and constructive type of activism. Members are open to cooperation 
and collaboration. They dislike criticising and insulting the other groups even if 
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they have different priorities. They recognise is also essential to realise sustain-
able dialogue and cooperation with people from other different persuasions and 
philosophies to coexist peacefully. Some of Gülen’s public initiatives to estab-
lish contacts in the field of interfaith dialogue became issues for public debate 
in the 1990s. Gülen considers dialogue necessary in order to increase mutual 
understanding. To this end, he has helped to establish, in 1994, the Journalists 
and Writers Foundation6, which organises activities to promote dialogue and toler-
ance among all strata of society, activities that have been welcomed by people 
from almost all walks of life. Other Gülen-inspired organisations include the Abant 
Platform, the Intercultural Dialogue Platform and the Dialogue Eurasia Platform, 
where Turkish intellectuals meet with political and religious leaders from various 
backgrounds. Gülen has visited and received prominent religious leaders, not only 
from Turkey, but from all over the world. Pope John Paul II at the Vatican, the 
late John O’Connor, Archbishop of New York, and Leon Levy, former president of 
the Anti-Defamation League, are among many leading representatives of world 
religions with whom Gülen has met to discuss dialogue and take initiatives in this 
respect. In Turkey, he had frequent meetings with the Vatican’s Ambassador, the 
Patriarchs of the Orthodox and  Armenian communities, the Chief Rabbi of the 
Jewish community and many other leading figures. These meetings exemplify his 
sincere commitment to dialogue between people of faith.
Some of Gülen’s ideas are similar to those of other faith-based communities or 
movements, because Islam is a religion of peace and constitutes their ideational 
framework and basis of solidarity, yet some of them oppose such issues as in-
terfaith dialogue. Those who disturb peace and brotherhood shall redefine their 
understanding of religion and the way that it is reflected on their lives. Those with 
contested minds and souls shall only seek the bits and pieces of religion that would 
‘justify’ their activities. Those who seek total understanding and endowment of re-
ligion and enrichment of spirituality shall only foster peace, not just among them-
selves, but among all humanity. This is the defining principle of Gülen’s movement 
in relation to other communities, be they Muslim or any other faith tradition.
Self and the ‘other’ separation cannot be observed in the Gülen movement. In-
stead of ignoring them, the movement prefers to accept ‘others’ in their own posi-
tion and try to find common denominators. Some excerpts from the interviews: 
The movement, in their relations with other communities, reflects 
the need for dialogue and common values that all communities 
should dedicate themselves to protect. The movement produces 
its knowledge based on teachings of the Prophet and the Qur’an 
itself. In specific cases, Gülen also refers to the Bible and other 
religious books as well as historical memories that most of the 
people are aware of.7 The knowledge and logic of action of the 
movement are not new in their nature, but the methodology and 
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the language they use is contemporary. The action plan and 
knowledge is produced from an intertwined web of information 
networks within the Gülen movement, the ‘readers’ come up with 
their local agenda and ideas that possibly could be realised with-
in a certain time period. Following this, the ways ’to achieve the 
goals’ are sought within the local segment and in close consulta-
tion with each other and with other parts of the world where simi-
lar ideas have already been realised. As far the references are 
concerned, the one and only references are the main sources of 
Islam and the community life that was pursued during the early 
days of Islam, the era of peace.
One respondent claims that ‘necessity is the mother of invention’. Physical, men-
tal, social and spiritual needs of the ‘readers’ are nurtured by the movement. Prac-
tical needs urge members to find optimal and innovative solutions. Sharing knowl-
edge and meritocracy are basic principles. Wisdom is also a very important aspect 
of the activities in the movement. Thus they attempt to develop modern science 
and religious knowledge. They try to do this via books, articles, universities, insti-
tutions, media etc. The primary references are religious. The secondary ones are 
related to the local and universal values (e.g., peace, freedom, social progress, 
equal rights, human dignity). In sum, the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad, the uni-
verse, science and their consciences are the main references and sources. They 
also refer to Gülen’s texts, speeches and actions very frequently.
Gülen’s movement summons Muslims to be aware that Islam teaches the need 
for dialogue and peace and that Muslims are called to be agents and witnesses to 
God’s mercy. As support for his views, Gülen employs his broad knowledge of the 
Islamic tradition to bring together the Qur’anic scripture, the hadith reports from 
Prophet Muhammad, and Islamic jurisprudence – the insights of Muslim schol-
ars down through the ages. Gülen (2004c:214) writes, ‘The Qur’an urges peace, 
order, and accord. It aims at global peace and order and opposes conflicts and 
dissensions. It is interesting that the Qur’an calls for actions acceptable to God 
“sound actions to bring peace and order”’. Gülen calls for humanity to begin with 
tolerance and dialogue, because in such an atmosphere, peace follows of its own 
accord. In fact, Gülen envisions a world order and a new civilisation growing to-
wards global tolerance. The ever-changing and growing structure within the move-
ment facilitates knowledge production and transfer. New information, which was 
produced in a critical and clever way, also helps to reproduce information. Change 
of priorities causes change of activities. A movement that was more closed and 
local before the 1990s is now an open and global movement.
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Conclusion4.9 
Based on extended research findings, this chapter challenges in a sociological 
and a methodological sense the linguistic analysis of a social phenomenon by 
applying seven metaphorical principles of texuality to Gülen’s teaching and his 
movement. Concretely, I have learned that this metaphorical approach to exploring 
and analysing a movement or an activity provides useful pointers and encourages 
‘out-of-the-box’ thinking. Indeed, the theoretical perspective and methodological 
approach of this chapter can be used to examine social movements emerging in 
other countries. The application of the seven textual linguistic principles (cohesion, 
coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality and intertextual-
ity) to Gülen’s teaching and movement is helpful in exploring and describing the 
impacts and implementations of his movement in different countries. My analysis 
shows that Gülen is revealing a dynamic interpretation of Islam that is both com-
patible with and critical of modernity and Muslim tradition.
I would arguethat the Gülen movement’s global vision has been shaped along 
the lines of Gülen’s teaching. His teaching is a doctrine of love, peace, dialogue 
and tolerance. It includes, in first instance, ideological lessons that seek to find 
and enact solutions for the social problems of Muslims grappling with the modern 
world, rather than containing only theological messages that aim at preserving 
‘Islamic Faith’ in the age of secular heresy. The present chapter contends that 
this growing faith-based movement constitutes a changing diasporic community 
defying clichés and common stereotypes about Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 
This chapter also notes that the Turkish community is part of the ‘emerging Islam’ 
in the context of secular modernity and has its own diversity in the expression of 
Turkish-Muslim identity throughout the world. The movement examined here is a 
social and dynamic movement that is global, human-oriented, faith-based, non-
state, non-profit, non-violent, and voluntary. The Gülen’s teaching emphasises an 
understanding that is based on science and religion, and has now spread through 
educational institutions, media outlets and dialogue centres in Europe, America, 
Australia, Asia and Africa. Although the movement’s members live in different 
countries, societies and nations, they share the same values, principles and have 
formed similar attitudes. In this chapter, I underscore Kuru’s observation (2005) 
that the Gülen movement demonstrates the contextual change and diversity in the 
Muslim world as it relates to modernity, liberalism and democracy. This chapter 
concludes that the Gülen movement represents a new expression of Islam, and 
instigates the art of living together with difference in modern democracies. Gülen 
and the members of his movement see modern ideals and Muslim identity as com-
patible and complementary instead of contradictory. Hence, the movement’s exist-
ence should be seen as an opportunity to establish a bridge between modern ide-
als and the Muslim identity. ‘Anatolian Muslimness’ as represented by the Gülen 
movement can be a source of process of dialogue and mutual understanding be-
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tween Muslims and the West. For instance, the Turkish Cultural Center, which is 
located in New York City, organised ‘The Annual Ramadan Friendship Dinner’ on 5 
October 2006 at the Waldorf Astoria.8 The dinner was dedicated to mutual under-
standing, dialogue, and tolerance among peoples of different cultures and faiths. 
This can be seen as a concrete example of this process occurring. Certainly, an 
ontological and historical examination of ‘Anatolian Muslimness’ is needed to shed 
more light on the origins and dynamics of the Gülen movement.
The Gülen movement that emerged in the late 1960s in Turkey received recogni-
tion from the international community for its bold defence of religious tolerance, 
compassionate love and mutual understanding from an Islamic perspective and 
criticism of both bigotry and zealotry in the form of religious extremism. I would 
argue that dialogical forms of understanding remain the best prospects for under-
standing the other and creating cohesion and a peaceful atmosphere in the socie-
ties. Accordingly, Gülen sees dialogue as an essential element of modern conflict 
management, and proposes multicultural education as a way to achieve feasible 
dialogue and peace. In addition, his teaching and his movement focus on intercul-
tural dialogue as an instrument for alternative dispute resolution, social mediation 
and peaceful coexistence within the context of cultural, ethnic and religious divi-
sions, hierarchies, rivalries and conflicts that are grounded in socio-economic and 
political realities.
The Gülen movement, now spread all over the world, is illustrative of the fact that a 
majority of the Muslim population in European and other countries do not perceive 
a contradiction between modern ideals (e.g., democracy, equality, justice, human 
rights, and freedom of thought and expression) and their attachment to Muslim 
identity. The sociological result of this dialectic is a European-Islamic synthesis, a 
new identity uniting a Muslim identity with modernity into one subject position, a 
merging of Islamic values and western ideals. The concepts of dialogue, love, for-
giveness and tolerance are important values in Gülen’s teaching and movement 
and are elementary in nature. Gülen also links dialogue to diversity and exchange 
to achieve coexistence and ultimately, peace, among the world’s people. Thus, the 
movement associated with him can be characterised as a civic movement using 
educational projects, media initiatives and dialogue activities to promote peaceful 
coexistence for the sake of a new, ‘golden generation’.
notes
1. The Hudaybiyah Pact (Treaty) was signed between the Muslims and Meccan polytheists 
agreeing to a period of peace. Almost a year after the Battle of Trench in 627 C.E. [5 A.H.], the 
Prophet Muhammed left for Mecca for a minor pilgrimage with 1400 or so Companions. However, 
the Quraysh did not let them complete the pilgrimage. After negotiations, a treaty was signed at 
al-Hudaybiyah, 12 miles away from Mecca (Ünal 2006a:1338).
2. The readership of Gülen’s works among Turkish people is estimated at several million. His im-
pact outside Turkish communities is growing as his vision and ideas are realised as civic projects, 
and additionally as his works are translated into many languages, including Albanian, Arabic, 
Bosnian, Dutch, English, German, Indonesian, Malay, Russian, Spanish and Urdu  (see also 
www.gulen.com; www.guleninstitute.org).
3. Gülen (1997a) describes and defines the Qur’an in his book, Fatiha Üzerine Mülahazalar [Con-
siderations on the Chapter Fatiha], as follows: ‘The Qur’an is an eternal translation of the great 
book of the universe. Yes, the universe is a book. It is needed for a reader to read this book, which 
is well-organised with all of its verses and pages. The reader is human and the interpretation of 
this book is the Qur’an. God has sent the Qur’an as a translation of the universe to the human 
beings who cannot grasp the universe’s immense, deep meaning and its huge vision. This mean-
ing that we cannot easily understand by looking at the big pages and phrases of the universe, we 
can see at a first glance in the Qur’an, the Miraculous. This is a favour for the human beings. God 
is the one to make the universe book speak. As the others’ thoughts upon the universe would be 
wrong, it is also the same with humans. The Universe is the universe of Allah, the Qur’an is the 
speech of Allah and humans are the slaves of God. God is the one to establish the interrelation 
between these three.’
4. Gülen used the following Qur’anic verse emphasising that terrorism cannot be a means for 
any Islamic goal: ‘He who kills a soul unless it be [in legal punishment] for murder or for causing 
disorder and corruption on the earth will be as if he had killed all humankind; and he who saves a 
life will be as if he had saved the lives of all humankind.’ (Qur’an 5:32).
5. Kemalism is the general rubric that comprises the ideology of reform promote by the founding 
fathers of the Turkish Republic. See B. Lewis (1968). The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. 
(pp.239-293). London: Oxford University Press.
6. See the website of the Journalists and Writers Foundation: www.gyv.org.tr 
7. Gülen’s appreciation of western philosophies, history, literature and science is evident from 
the references he draws from these disciplines and interpretations he makes of contemporary 
issues. In an interview with E. Can (1997), Gülen lists Kant, Descartes, Sir James Jeans, Shake-
speare, Balzac, Victor Hugo, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky and Pushkin as some of the western intellec-
tuals whose works he has read. It can be concluded from his memoirs that Gülen studied Kant, 
Rousseau, Voltaire, Schiller and the works of existentialist philosophers such as Camus, Sartre 
and Marcuse during his military service in 1961 (see Erdoğan 1997).
8. The Turkish Cultural Center is an institution committed to community involvement. The or-
ganisation hopes to be a forum of international cultural exchange while promoting Turkish cultural 
heritage. The theme of the night was ‘Respect for Sacred Values’. The speakers were; Sena-
tor Hillary Rodham Clinton; Hon. Omer Onhon, Consul-General of Turkey; Assistant Director of 
FBI, Mark Mershon; Rabbi Arthur Scheiner; Father Thomas Michel; Dr Gazi Erdem; Senator Liz 
Krueger; and Senator Carl Kruger. More than 800 guests enjoyed observing the Ramadan dinner 
with the performance of Ercan Dereyayla’s Turkish music group and Whirling Dervishes (http://
turkishculturalcenter.com).
chaPter 5
Gülen’s Approach to Dialogue and Peace: 
Its theoretical background and some practical perspectives
introduction5.1 
In this high-speed age, the ‘old’ world is shrinking and communication is becom-
ing increasingly more global. Thanks to the news media and enhanced mobility, 
changes in all spheres of life are occurring faster, and with more depth. In increas-
ingly diverse societies, people of different faiths, cultures, nations and civilisa-
tions interact with one another. Boundaries become blurred, different cultures are 
confronted with each other more frequently and more intensively, and – whether 
intentionally or unintentionally – there is increasing interaction between peoples 
and societies. This succession of changes offers new opportunities, but there are 
challenges and disadvantages as well. For instance, the events of 11 September 
2001, the bomb attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and in London on 7 and 21 
July 2005, as well as the cartoon crisis that originated in Denmark in February 
2006, have changed the world dramatically. With respect to the Netherlands, the 
murder of Dutch filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh on 2 November 20041 
intensified the severe tensions between the ethnic and religious groups in Dutch 
society. All these incidents have once more drawn attention to the possibility of a 
‘clash of civilisations’ (Borgman and Valkenberg 2005; Huntington 1998; Soeters 
2005;) and to the discussion of global religious conflict, past and present (Bacık 
and Aras 2004). 
This chapter aims to analyse the foundations and criteria of Gülen’s approach 
to dialogue and peace in order to establish a framework, using some practical 
perspectives. I have opted to compare Gülen’s approach with that of Pope John 
Paul II (1920-2005) because of the exemplary role of both in establishing dialogue 
and building peace between Muslims and Christians. I attempt to bring together 
the thinking of these scholars and religious teachers into a kind of dialogue on the 
theme: ‘the ethics of peace and dialogue’. I will do this by summarising John Paul 
II’s position as a point of reference for my comparison. I begin with the detailed 
and analytical exploration of Gülen’s theological foundations for dialogue. Then, I 
examine Gülen’s dialogical approach in three successive stages (respecting, ac-
cepting and sharing), and from two diametrically opposed viewpoints. 
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Gülen’s term of reference for dialogue5.2 
Gülen is convinced that establishing dialogue and building peace and security are 
part and parcel of the proper expression of an Islamic way of life; it is prescribed 
by the Qur’an (4:128) as ‘the better way’. Gülen sees this as an inspiration to start 
a dialogue. It is also his term of reference to serve both society and humanity at 
large. His conviction is that peaceful settlement is better, and Islam must func-
tion as a bridge and a road between people as well as a factor that bridges the 
abysses (Gülen 2004a:78). As he also stated:
If we start our efforts for dialogue with the belief that ‘peace is 
better’ (Qur’an 4:128), then we must demonstrate that we are on 
the side of peace at home and abroad. Indeed, peace is of the 
utmost importance to Islam; fighting and war are only secondary 
occurrences which are bound to specific reasons and conditions. 
In that respect, we can say that if an environment of peace where 
all can live in peace and security cannot be achieved in this land, 
then it would be impossible for us to do any good service for so-
ciety or for humanity. (Gülen 2004a:50).
Gülen (2004a) frequently refers in his writings and teachings to prophetic tradition, 
and says: ‘Fulfillment of the prophetic tradition can be achieved only through love 
and dialogue with followers of other religions’. In addition, Gülen frames his idea 
of dialogue around the following Qur’anic verse pertaining to ethnic and cultural 
diversity: ‘O humankind! We have created you from a single [pair of] male and 
female, and made you into nations and tribes so that you may know one another’ 
(Qur’an 49:13). In other words, humankind should build mutuality and coopera-
tive relationships, not so that they may take pride in their differences of race or 
social rank, and also breed enmities (Ünal 2006a:1054). Indeed, the importance of 
eradicating hate and racism and stimulating respect for diversity is also expressed 
in the New Testament: ‘You have heard that it was said, you shall love your neigh-
bour and hate your enemy. But I say to you, love your enemies, bless those who 
curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who spitefully use 
and persecute you’ (Matthew 5:43-44).
It is clear in the light of these verses that the pluralistic society is a reality in the 
contemporary world and that dialogue is among the duties and social responsibili-
ties of Christians, Muslims, Jews (Saritoprak and Griffith 2005:336), Hindus, Bud-
dhists and Zoroastrians (Gülen 2004b) on earth to make the aging world a more 
peaceful and safer place. In the hadith there are examples of how the Prophet 
Muhammad led his life in an orbit of forgiveness and forbearance. He even be-
haved in such a manner towards Abu Sufyan, who persecuted him throughout his 
lifetime. During the conquest of Mecca, even though Abu Sufyan said he still was 
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not sure about Islam, the Prophet said: ‘Those who take refuge in Abu Sufyan’s 
house are safe, just as those who take refuge in the Ka’ba are safe.’ (Ibn Hisham, 
402-5). Such tolerance, respect and reverence of Prophet Muhammad led to an 
uproar in the crowd. This is a remarkable example for Gülen (2004c:136) to sup-
port dialogue and engagement with the others of various faiths and cultures (Ay-
düz 2005; Kurucan 2006). 
In addition to being recommended to practise tolerance and to use dialogue as 
his basis while performing his duties, the Prophet Muhammad pointed to those 
aspects in which he had things in common with the People of the Book, saying: ‘O 
People of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you: that we wor-
ship none but God; that we speculate no partners with Him; that we take not some 
from among ourselves for Lords other than God’ (Qur’an 3:64). In another verse, 
the faithful are prescribed to behave with forgiveness and tolerance, even to those 
who do not believe in the afterlife: ‘Tell those who believe to forgive those who do 
not look forward to the Days of God: It is for Him to recompense each people ac-
cording to what they have earned’ (Qur’an 45:14).
At a time of political turmoil and violence, the dialogue of civilisations offers an 
alliance of the great worldwide faith traditions against the violent abuse of religion 
on the ground that ‘Peace is better and is the name of God’. More importantly, 
it is a call for a dialogical intellectual encounter among all the great cultural and 
religious traditions to design a common path for a new humanism (Petito 2007), 
consisting of a doctrine of love, humanity, tolerance, forgiveness and compassion 
(Gülen 2004a).
Gülen’s dialogue concept in three stages5.3 
Gülen proposes that human beings have more in common than they have differ-
ences, and believes that through dialogue the adherents of different civilisations, 
religions and cultures can live together instead of ‘clashing’ (Canan 1993:1-24; 
Gülen 2004a,b,c). He urges people engaging in dialogue to forget or at least ig-
nore past polemical issues and instead concentrate on common points (Celik and 
Valkenberg 2006; Gülen 2004b). Generally, dialogue is defined as a reciprocal 
conversation between two or more people coming together to discuss certain is-
sues and thus to form a bond (Smock, 2002), but Gülen (2004c:94) goes a step 
further to base dialogue on mutual acceptance and respect of each other’s iden-
tity. His understanding of dialogue is a framework for accepting and respecting 
the position of those with ‘different’ perceptions, beliefs and thoughts. According 
to Swidler (1998a,b), this style of dialogue is a powerful tool when used to con-
tribute to peace because it works to heal humanity, build trust, and mend relation-
ships. Gülen considers the interaction between people as a critical factor, and 
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sees the human person as a vital element and key actor in dialogue and mutual 
understanding. His approach to dialogue is connected with his views on love, 
compassion, forgiveness, tolerance and unity in such a way that he argues in 
favour of a dialogue that only deals with the common points while neglecting or 
respecting the differences (Celik and Valkenberg 2006). This approach character-
ises Gülen’s explanation of the Qur’anic verse on not taking Christians and Jews 
as allies (Valkenberg 2006). The verse reads as follows: ‘You who believe, do not 
take Jews and Christians as allies: they are allies only to each other. Anyone who 
takes them as an ally becomes one of them – God does not guide such wrongdo-
ers’ (Qur’an 5:51). In saying that it holds true only under certain circumstances, 
while the summons to peace with Jews and Christians is a general rule, Gülen 
bases his thought concerning this point on the interpretation of his influential men-
tor Said Nursi (1876-1960), stating: 
[…] Bediüzzaman (Said Nursi) in one place says that it is possi-
ble to establish dialogue and friendship with Jews and Christians 
and do every kind of work with them in social life. He indicates 
that the Qur’an’s prohibition regarding not taking them for friends 
pertains only to those matters of belief in Judaism and Christian-
ity that do not conform to Islam. Otherwise, generalising on rules 
that pertain to specific conditions, specific people and specific 
subjects, would mean accepting the Qur’an differently than it re-
ally means. So, we should not sacrifice anything from our style. 
(Gülen 2004c).
For Gülen (2004a,b,c), dialogue is a method to achieve coexistence with others, a 
tool for people to get closer, to know and learn from each other, which will prevent 
misconceptions of the other. Healthy and hearty dialogue among members of dif-
ferent cultures, races and religions is not possible without mutual understanding 
and practising tolerance. He denies that tolerance would mean being influenced 
by others and joining them; for him it means accepting others as they are and 
knowing how to get along with them. According to Gülen, dialogue is only possible 
when we respect each other’s individuality. Thus, knowledge of others in their 
cultural setting is essential. His conviction is that humanity ultimately will be led 
to unity by recognising and accepting social, cultural, and religious diversity, an 
exchange of mutual values and union in collaboration.
Based on my analysis, I can briefly typify Gülen’s dialogue concept in three suc-
cessive stages, based on a framework of mutual respect for each other’s identity. 
This is the first stage of Gülen’s dialogue concept: respecting the other in his or 
her own position. The second stage involves accepting the others in their position, 
and the third stage is the concept of sharing values in the context of other(s). The 
last mentioned stage implies that people should learn about each other’s cultural 
identity, religious beliefs and spiritual values. This knowledge should subsequently 
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be used to learn more about their own moral and cultural values. These three 
stages seem to be essential and characterise Gülen’s formula to realise sustain-
able dialogue and cooperation with people of other religious persuasions and life 
philosophies. In addition, one conspicuous characteristic of Gülen’s dialogue ap-
proach is that he begins by addressing closed circles and subsequently seeks 
ways to approach the broader society.
Criticisms of Gülen’s dialogue5.4 
Gülen’s dialogical approach has been criticised from two diametrically opposite 
points of view (Ünal and Williams, 2000). On the one hand, those who are op-
posed to dialogue argue that it will lead to assimilating Muslim identity and that 
Muslims’ differences must not be compromised even to the degree of giving prec-
edence to matters and grounds of common concern and belief. Gülen’s response 
to this is: ‘Islam is clear, cogent and coherent and is in no doubt about its values 
and therefore does not fear integration’ (Yildirim 1998). In particular, Gülen’s meet-
ing with Pope John Paul II at the Vatican on 8 February 1998 was an issue for 
public debate in his native Turkey. It was seen as a courageous act, but also as a 
dubious act that was criticised by radical Islamic groups and nationalistic circles 
(Yildirim 1998) which considered his visit to the Pope a humiliation (Saritoprak and 
Griffith 2005). A Muslim should not go and visit non-Muslims. They were also of 
the opinion that the visit of a leading Muslim religious figure to a Catholic religious 
leader would open the hearts of the Turkish youth to foreign and Christian influ-
ence and would cause some Muslims to convert to Christianity (The Fountain, 
1998:14-34). In an interview he gave after the visit, Gülen defended his daring 
act in terms of seeking world peace and affirmed that he was acting in line with 
the behaviour of the Prophet Muhammad in the treaty of Hudaybiyya, when he 
accepted terms of peace that some of his companions felt were disadvantageous. 
In the interview, Gülen said: 
Our age is a time of addressing intellects and hearts, an under-
taking that requires a peaceful atmosphere with mutual trust 
and respect […] In the peaceful atmosphere engendered by this 
treaty [Hudaybiyya], the doors of hearts were opened to Islamic 
truths. We have no intention of conquering lands or peoples, but 
we are resolved to contribute to world peace and a peaceful or-
der and harmony by which our old world will find a last happiness 
before its final destruction. (Aksiyon 1998; also quoted in Ünal 
and Williams 2000:296; The Fountain, 1998:14-34).
Not only the radical Islamic groups and nationalistic circles in Turkey opposed 
Gülen’s visit to Pope John Paul II in 1998 at the Vatican. The adherents of the 
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Kemalist state ideology in Turkey also see the Gülen movement as a threat to the 
secular and laicised nature of the Republic of Turkey and its political and societal 
institutions (Saritoprak and Griffith 2005:336; Yilmaz 2005b). Dialogue, in Gülen’s 
perspective, is not about enchanting or affecting others, nor is it about being as-
similated or making compromises. It is about accepting people as they are and 
about being able to coexist peacefully on each other’s terms. In a similar way, 
Gülen argues that the cultural integration of Turkey in the European Union will only 
bear positive results and the fear of assimilation is merely scaremongering. 
At the other end of the spectrum, those in favour of celebrating pluralism and 
cultural diversity have also criticised Gülen for placing far too much emphasis in 
meeting on common ground issues. According to interviews with Gülen’s followers 
and experts, this common ground approach is not targeted at those in favour of 
engagement and dialogue but at those who are not. By emphasising matters of 
common belief and interest, Gülen is trying to persuade people that human beings 
have sufficient commonality to build a peaceful future. A quick survey of dialogue 
events organised by the Gülen movement reveals that differences and idiosyn-
cracies are celebrated, proving that this initial challenge to persuading people to 
believe in dialogue has in many cases been met (Gülen 2004). Gülen’s efforts in 
this respect have not only had a profound and far-reaching effect in the Muslim 
world, but have also influenced other faiths, especially the Christian community. 
Dialogue is now a mainstream form of engagement in Turkey adopted by most 
Muslim movements and the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). 
Moreover, religious and cultural organisations across the world are seeking to de-
velop their own groups of dialogue to reciprocate the efforts they have seen from 
the young volunteers in the Gülen movement. 
Gülen’s argument may be seen as a political strategy, but there is a clear theoreti-
cal background to it as well. In this respect, it is remarkable that the former leader 
of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope John Paul II, a few years ago gave a similar 
analysis. 
The twin pillars of peace of justice and forgiveness5.5 
In 2002, Pope John Paul II stated that forgiveness implies a short-term loss aimed 
at a long-term gain; the repair of damaged human relations, whereas violence 
is an apparent short-term gain, which entails a long-term loss. In his approach 
to peace, the Pope (2002) remarked that ‘Peace stands on two pillars: justice 
and forgiveness’, and he believed that both elements are necessary to achieve 
a genuine and sustainable peace (Michel 2005d). The Pope was convinced that 
focussing on one without the other cannot produce real peace, and that peace ef-
forts and negotiations that do not put these elements at the centre of the matters 
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to be addressed will not succeed. The first element, justice, seeks to redress the 
wrong done, unfair treatment corrected, material property restored, and false judg-
ments rectified, whereas the second, pardon, seeks to repair the human relations 
damaged and destroyed in conflict. The Pope saw justice in two ways: firstly, as 
a human quality which a person can acquire and develop with God’s powerful as-
sistance, and secondly as a ‘legal guarantee,’ that is, part of the functioning of the 
national and international rule of law. The aim of justice, both as a personal quality 
and as an element of the international system of relations among peoples, is to 
insure ‘full respect for rights and responsibilities’ and to carry out a ‘just distribution 
of benefits and burdens’ (John Paul II, 2002). Justice is thus a first, indispensable 
condition for peace. Unless one person treats another justly, that is, with respect 
for the other’s rights and duties and by giving them their due attention, there will 
be no peace between them. The same holds true between social groups, ethnic 
groups, peoples and nations. Where there is aggression, oppression, occupa-
tion, transgression, there can be no peace. Justice has to be established before 
peace can be built. However, for true peace, justice alone is not enough. Focusing 
solely on justice will not bring back lost years, lost relatives, lost trust, lost hopes. 
Something more is needed, on all sides of the conflict. This is where pardon, the 
second pillar of peace, comes into play. Pardon may seem like a ‘soft’ element 
in the peace-building process, something more suited to do-gooders, bleeding 
hearts, and idealistic religious types than to hard-headed politicians and negotia-
tors (Michel 2006). However, forgiveness and reconciliation are just as essential 
to peace as is the focus on justice, and in fact much more difficult to achieve. This 
is where many religious and secular NGO programmes are providing a critical 
component of the peace-building process. By bringing together those who have 
lost family and neighbours in shooting and bombing incidents with those from the 
other side who have similar histories of loss, by facilitating and favouring sharing 
experiences of past suffering and discovering common hopes for the future, by 
enabling people on both sides to see ‘the enemy’ as individuals who are not very 
different from themselves, these organisations of reconciliation are playing a key 
role in the long-term effort to build peace. The Pope stated: 
Forgiveness is a personal choice, a decision to go against the 
natural instinct to pay back evil with evil. In doing so, it always in-
volves an apparent short-term loss, but brings about the possibil-
ity of achieving a real long-term gain. Violence works exactly the 
opposite: opting for an apparent short-term gain, but involving a 
real and permanent loss. Forgiveness may seem like weakness, 
but it demands great spiritual strength and moral courage. (Pope 
John Paul II, 2002).
Here I find a strong convergence with Gülen’s approach to peace resulting from 
dialogue, tolerance and love. So important is the element of forgiveness in hu-
man relations that Gülen recommends that his followers and sympathisers pardon 
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each other’s faults and mistakes immediately. Similarly, the Pope believed that 
forgiveness and justice will heal most of our wounds in social life, and are the 
divine instruments to coexist peacefully. Gülen (2005a:75) expresses the core of 
his message regarding love, tolerance, dialogue and peace in his book Pearls of 
Wisdom: ‘Be so tolerant that your heart becomes wide like the ocean. Become 
inspired with faith and love for others. Offer a hand to those in trouble, and be 
concerned about everyone.’ According to Gülen (2004a), without tolerance and 
forgiveness grounded in love and compassion, we cannot be moral creatures. He 
indicates also that the heart (qalb) is the locus of love and is immediately related to 
human beings’ spirituality. Religion is the quest for the heart of reality. True religion 
is therefore how people move from being merely human to in fact becoming hu-
mane. Of course, nice words alone are never enough. Therefore, some guidelines 
for attaining real peace are in place as well.
Respecting differences to avoid mutual destruction5.6 
I have already noticed how Gülen encouraged Muslims to pursue dialogue and tol-
erance in words that are very similar to those of Pope John Paul II, stating (Gülen 
2004a): ‘I would like to stress the fact that Muslims will lose nothing by employing 
dialogue, love, and tolerance. Muslims continuously seek the approval of God. 
This is the greatest gain of all. In that respect, things that may appear as losses to 
some people are seen as gains by Muslims, while certain other events may actu-
ally be detrimental even when they appear to be lucrative.’ Gülen goes so far as to 
say that: ‘Peace, love, forgiveness, and tolerance are fundamental to Islam. Other 
things are accidental.’ Although, according to specific circumstances, recourse 
to war might sometimes be justified, this ‘lesser jihad’ of the sword is secondary 
to the essence of Islam, summed up in the terms ‘peace, love, forgiveness, and 
tolerance’. 
Gülen accuses those who advocate war and violence of having been misled by a 
grossly literalist reading of the Qur’an. As a consequence, they misunderstand the 
nature of Islam. He states: 
It is necessary to give priority to basic Muslim issues according to 
their degree of importance. Unfortunately, those who ignore the 
essence and do so without taking into consideration the reasons 
for secondary rules and regulations, those who (by reading the 
Qur’an in the manner of a crude kind of superficial literalism) em-
phasise violence – these people have not understood the rules, 
the reasons for them, nor their source, nor have they understood 
Islam. (Gülen 2004a).
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Ultimately, for Gülen, peace as a result of dialogue comes down to respecting the 
legitimate differences between peoples. Anything less means self-destruction. He 
powerfully states: 
The peace of this (global) village lies in respecting all these differ-
ences, considering these differences to be part of our nature and 
in ensuring that people appreciate these differences. Otherwise, 
it is unavoidable that the world will devour itself in a web of con-
flicts, disputes, fights, and the bloodiest of wars, thus preparing 
the way for its own end. (Gülen 2004a).
Human societies, whether they be religious or not, on a global scale, may have 
much to gain from the insights on peace and dialogue offered by these two leaders. 
Their teachings are complimentary. I find evidence that Christians and Muslims 
have much to learn from one another and that their respective faiths, when deeply 
reflected upon, can lead to truly surprising coincidences of thought. It should not 
be surprising to discover that both Christianity and Islam attach great importance 
to the notions of justice and forgiveness as indispensable pre-conditions of peace. 
As mentioned earlier, in the Gospels (Matthew 5:44), Jesus taught his disciples 
to love their enemies and to pray for those who persecute them. In a similar vein, 
the Qur’an permits vengeance up to the limits of strict justice but no further, and 
then always adds: ‘But it is better to forgive’ (Qur’an 42:40).2 Religion, according to 
Gülen, commends fundamental values such as love, compassion, tolerance, and 
forgiveness, which are the pillars of dialogue (Gülen 2004a; Ünal and Williams 
2000:253). The following quotation of Küng (1993), a Catholic theologian, may be 
taken to summarise the understanding of these two dialogue activists and forerun-
ners for peace: ‘There will be no world peace among the nations without peace 
among the religions. No peace among the religions without dialogue among the 
religions.’  And it can be argued that no longer can dialogue be realised without 
mutual knowledge.
Four dimensions of peace5.7 
Gülen distinguishes four main aspects of peace, not from a theoretical perspec-
tive, but as a practical guideline for those who seek to pursue peace as a result 
of dialogue. These four dimensions of peace are grounded and discussed pro-
foundly in the following chapter (section 6.4). 
Firstly, Gülen envisages  ● eternal peace as the ultimate goal of human life, 
almost synonymous with salvation. Specifically, it is the final destination of 
the collective personality of those who serve humanity. Gülen sees followers’ 
efforts, carried out in solidarity and sincerity, as contributing in diverse activi-
ties to the building of an eternal realm of peace and dialogue.
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A second dimension of peace might be called  ● inner peace; tranquillity and 
peace of mind, an inner confidence born of faith that enables the religious 
believer to face adversity without anxiety or despair (Celik et al. 2005:12-16; 
Michel 2005d:65-72). Particularly when facing the approach of death, the 
believer can attain a peace of mind which will enable them to overcome 
spiritual turmoil and fear (Nursi 1996a:203). 
A third aspect of peace refers to  ● interpersonal and intercommunal peace. 
Gülen sees the interior peace, not only of individuals but of environs and 
whole societies, as a precondition for dialogue among peoples, and as one 
of the marks of Islamic civilisation. Along with justice, harmony, brotherhood, 
neighbourhood, solidarity, human progress and spiritual advancement, 
peace should characterise the Islamic community. It is peace and dialogue 
as the basis of societal relations which should be the force that attracts oth-
ers to Islamic values. 
A fourth dimension of peace distinguished by Gülen is  ● global or universal 
peace. Particularly, Gülen (2004a) reflects the widespread conviction of the 
time that humankind can sink no lower in criminality towards its own kind 
and expresses the longing for a time of peace and prosperity for all. He em-
phasised the importance of the indispensability of religion and intercultural 
dialogue for world peace through his efforts to meet with other religious and 
community leaders. 
It is in his analyses of peace, based on a middle way, truth, dialogue and forgive-
ness as the only viable alternative to the use of brute force, that the thought of 
Gülen is analogous to that of Pope John Paul II. Gülen and the late Pope note 
that wars and violence can never resolve ethnic and religious conflicts concern-
ing who is in the right. All that wars and violent actions can accomplish is to show 
which party has access to reserves of force, which it can use to coerce others to 
obey and to punish the recalcitrant. Gülen’s idea of a middle way does not depend 
on compromise, but on his understanding of Muslim tradition. He argues, ‘Islam, 
being the middle way of absolute balance between all temporal and spiritual ex-
tremes and containing the ways of all previous, makes a choice according to the 
situation’ (Gülen 2005e:145). Truth, on the other hand, is characterised by jus-
tice and harmony and seeks goodness and virtue instead of egoistic, selfish gain 
(Nursi 1996b:548). Gülen ontologically accepts that there is an absolute truth. 
Therefore he opposes extreme social constructivism. He argues that truth is not 
something the human mind produces. Truth exists independently of human and 
human’s task is to seek it (Gülen 2005c:221-253). To maintain harmony, peace, 
and happiness in human life requires the realisation of both intellectual (rational) 
and spiritual (heart-based) enlightenment (Gülen 2005e:76). In the writings of 
Gülen I find also that he wanted release from the attacks of aggressors, but not by 
using the same methods and ways which the attackers were employing. In other 
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words, he rejected the practice of opposing force by force. Gülen has strongly 
stated that in the modern world the only way and method to get others to accept 
your ideas and practices is by persuasion (Gülen 2004a:199). Dialogue and toler-
ance are the magic words and practices. 
Conclusion5.8 
At the global level there is today an urgent need for a new sense of peaceful co-
existence. Fethullah Gülen, mentor of a dynamic faith-based movement, is one 
of the most persuasive and influential voices in the Muslim community calling 
for dialogue as a step to peace. He proposes dialogue as a method to be used 
in establishing a culture of peace among people of different ethnic, religious and 
cultural backgrounds. In this chapter, I discussed Gülen as a pluralist, a dialogue 
activist and peace maker,3 especially by his inspirations for worldwide educational 
efforts and his contributions to peace and dialogue among societies of the twenty-
first century. He sees dialogue as a framework for mutual acceptance and respect 
for each other’s identity. For Gülen, dialogue is at first a major stepping stone to 
a union, in collaboration between the world religions transcending doctrinal differ-
ences. At the same time, it would be an important stepping stone to a new world 
order of peace and justice for all. Gülen’s conviction is that respecting differences 
is necessary to avoid mutual destruction, which means avoiding the earth becom-
ing a kind of living hell. Real dialogue and the four dimensions of peace men-
tioned above are possible only when accompanied by moral values and mutual 
knowledge and acceptance of cultural and religious identity. He professes that the 
alternative to dialogue and tolerance is, in the end, devastation. Gülen’s discourse 
of a ‘dialogue of civilisations’ is not to create a paradise on earth, but, rather and 
in the first instance, to come to a common vision for an alternative world order in 
the international agenda.
The Gülen movement is offering Muslims a way to practise Muslim values amidst 
the complex demands of modern societies and to engage in ongoing dialogue and 
cooperation with people of other faiths and cultures. Gülen makes a convincing 
argument that tolerance, love, and compassion are genuinely Islamic values that 
Muslims have a duty to bring to the modern world. Through his movement, Gülen 
invites non-Muslims to move beyond prejudice, suspicion, and half-truths so that 
they might arrive at an understanding of what Islam is really about. However, the 
movement seeks to apply an interpretation of Islamic teaching that leads the be-
liever to truly spiritual values like forgiveness, compassion, love, liberality, inner 
peace, social harmony, honesty, and trust in God. In expressing the Muslim values 
derived from his vast knowledge of the Islamic sources and prophetic traditions, 
Gülen not only calls Muslims to engage in dialogue and to work for peace, but he 
engages the non-Muslim in a discussion of commonly held ideals.
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In short, Gülen advocates an ideal world in which ‘cosmics’, ‘world citizens’, peo-
ple of different cultural, ethnical, religious and racial descent, will be able to inter-
act in a harmonious and dialogical way to sustain and endure a culture of peace 
resulting from dialogue. Certainly, an exhaustive analysis of Gülen’s thoughts and 
initiatives on dialogue and peace and related practices is needed to provide guide-
lines on how people with different backgrounds can get along with each other in 
the more plural societies.
notes
1. The murders of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and Theo van Gogh in 2004, who both overtly criticised 
Islamic religion, intensified the severe tensions between ethnic end religious groups in the Neth-
erlands. The latter murder brought about two weeks of total disorder, in which mosques, Islamic 
schools and churches were the objects of violence and were set on fire (Soeters 2005). 
2. The Qur’an includes the following passages which draw attention to the importance of forgive-
ness, exhorting individuals to forgive any wrongdoing inflicted on them. And forgiveness is also 
recommended in the Qur’an as a moral trait. ‘[Even so, O Messenger] adopt the way of forbe-
arance and tolerance, and enjoin what is good and right, and withdraw from the ignorant ones [do 
not care what they say and do]’ (Qur’an 7:199). ‘[…] Rather let them pardon and forbear. Do you 
not wish that God should forgive you? God is All-Forgiving, All-Compassionate.’ (Qur’an 24:22). 
‘The recompense of an evil deed can only be an evil equal to it; but whoever pardons and makes 
reconciliation, his reward is due from God. Surely He does not love the wrongdoers.’ (Qur’an 
42:40). ‘But indeed whoever shows patience and forgives [the wrong done to him], surely that 
is a very meritorious thing, a matter of great resolution’. (Qur’an 42:43). ‘[…] Yet, if you pardon, 
forbear, and forgive [their faults toward you and in worldly matters], then [know that] God is All-
Forgiving, All-Compassionate.’ (Qur’an 64:14). ‘They spend [out of what God has provided for 
them] both in ease and hardship, ever-restraining their rage, [even when provoked and able to 
retaliate], and pardoning people [their offences].’ (Qur’an 3:134). (see Ünal 2006a).
3. A series of symposia, entitled ‘Frontrunners for Peace’, held in 2004 and 2005 at four Dutch 
universities, discussed Gülen among contemporary heroes of peace. See the booklet edited by 
G. Celik et al. Voorlopers in de Vrede [Forerunners for peace]. Damon: Budel, The Netherlands. 
Gülen’s efforts for worldwide peace have also been discussed at ‘The Peaceful Heroes Sympo-
sium’, 11-13 April 2003, at the University of Texas, Austin TX.
chaPter 6
Gülen’s paradigm on peaceful coexistence: 
Theoretical insights and some practical perspectives
introduction6.1 
Cultural diversity and social plurality are inevitable both in western and eastern 
democracies. Over the past few decades, the passive but accepting approach 
towards multiculturalism in European societies has been replaced with concerned 
pleas for integration and even assimilation. This ideological and policy transition 
started with a number of intellectual contributions (Bolkestein 1997; Scheffer 2000; 
Schnabel 2000; Shadid and Van Koningsveld 2002), and was brought into full 
swing by a number of developments such as the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent 
atmosphere of unrest and mutual distrust between Muslims and non-Muslims 
around the world. European countries, in which a large number of Muslims are 
now living, have prided themselves on their open attitude and assumed a smooth 
accommodation of immigrants. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, European 
countries experienced some violence on their own soil, convincing people that 
social, cultural and religious boundaries are deeper than previously thought. Par-
ticularly, in the Netherlands, Pim Fortuyn, a charismatic politician with a number 
of anti-immigrant arguments on his agenda, gained tremendous popularity. His 
legacy – he was murdered in 2002 by a native Dutch environmentalist – consists 
of a disregard for leftist multiculturalist politicians and of the belief that adjustment 
on the side of ethnic minorities was urgently needed (Ter Wal 2004). In November 
2004 interethnic and interreligious tension was stirred up again, when a young 
Dutch-Moroccan Muslim murdered another critic of Islamic culture, filmmaker 
Theo van Gogh. This incident provoked a wave of vandalism directed at mosques 
and Islamic schools, extremely prejudiced utterances, and an almost tangible dis-
comfort among the Dutch of all descents. The Dutch have long been renowned for 
their tolerance, an image they seem to attribute to their tradition of pillarisation, in 
which Catholics, Protestants, socialists, and liberals lived separately in harmony 
(Vermeij 2006:19). The need to live in peace has been underscored by all these 
events of the past few years.
Through the writings and speeches of Gülen I find an interpretation of Islamic 
teaching that leads to spiritual values like forgiveness, social justice, inner peace, 
social harmony, honesty, and trust in God. This chapter contains an exposition of 
his understanding of peaceful coexistence. In particular, it highlights his idea of 
education and dialogue as practical concepts of peace, and as tools of building a 
GÜLEN’S PARADIGM ON PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE102
culture of peace.
After a quick survey of the index of words in Gülen’s works, I found that ‘peace’ 
is one of the most used terms, among other words like love, tolerance, affection, 
reason, faith, and humanity. Based on my analysis of his writings, conversations, 
sermons and public speeches, I distinguish and debate here some theoretical and 
practical aspects of peace. In addition to a systematic review of Gülen’s works I 
used a number of semi-structured interviews with the movement’s participants 
and the Gülen experts to give some ontological explanations concerning the fol-
lowing four dimensions of peace and to demonstrate its social implementations 
and implications in human life’s and societies; eternal peace, inner peace, inter-
personal and intercommunal peace, and universal peace. 
I will begin with an examination of Gülen’s understanding of moderate Islam and 
a peaceful West, and then I will explore his theological and sociological point 
of views on peace. Next, I will discuss his dialogue method as an alternative to 
dispute resolution between and within societies. The chapter will end with some 
concluding remarks.
Moderate Islam and a peaceful West6.2 
Gülen’s views are dictated primarily by his religious beliefs and interpretation of 
Islam. Therefore, in order to understand what Gülen thinks about the West, it is 
important first to explore how Gülen understands Islam and the level of resonance 
between Islam and the West.
For Gülen, Islam is by its very nature moderate and therefore the recently popular 
phrase ‘moderate Islam’ is incorrect as it implies that Islam can be anything but 
moderate or that there are some versions that are not moderate. Gülen espouses 
the conviction that moderation is such a central characteristic of Islam that any 
understanding of it that does not embody this cannot be Islamic. Moderation, for 
Gülen (2005c:145), means making a choice according to the situation and a bal-
ance between temporal and spiritual extremes.
Gülen holds the conviction that while there are certain fundamental tenets of Islam 
that are uniform and not open to interpretation, there are other realms of Islam 
that are. This provides Islam with a degree of flexibility and allows for various 
practices of Islam to develop that can manifest differences in terms of nuances 
and points of emphasis. Historical conditions, disparate settings, socio-cultural 
characteristics, language, and so forth are all factors that can help develop and 
produce a particular idiosyncratic practice of Islam unique to that region. Thus in 
Morocco, the Islamic conception of life came to mean activism, moralism, and in-
tense individuality, while in Indonesia the same concept emphasised aestheticism, 
inwardness, and the radical dissolution of personality (Geertz 1971). Gülen firmly 
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argues that ‘Anatolian Islam’ resulted from the willing conversion of the Anatolian 
Turks. A number of influential Sufi orders originated in Central Asia and Anatolia, 
emphasising Islam’s value of love, tolerance and inclusiveness and the adoption 
of the Hanafi madhab (school of law) by the Turks in their practice of Islam. The 
experience of Islam under the Ottoman state meant that the Turkish people had 
greater opportunity to explore and experience Islam in various ways and thereby 
develop a better understanding of this religion. According to Gülen this all contrib-
uted to a broader, deeper, more tolerant, inclusive, pluralistic, spiritual and loving 
practice of Islam. 
 
Inspired by Said Nursi and Fahreddin Razi, Gülen states that the word ‘Islam’ 
has three meanings, one within the other, like three concentric circles. The nar-
row meaning at the very core of the three circles is that Islam is the name of the 
religion which stipulates how a human being should conduct his or her life. The 
second meaning is that Islam refers to the attributes and actions of people in the 
abstract, completely independent of the person himself. According to this mean-
ing, therefore, being honest is an Islamic attribute and may be found within a non-
Muslim. Thus, a person’s attribute(s) and action(s) may be Muslim while she or 
he by social or religious classification is not. Likewise, the act that manifests itself 
from this attribute is categorised according to this meaning as either Islamic or 
non-Islamic. For example, stealing is a non-Islamic act and may be committed by 
a Muslim. Therefore, a Muslim who subscribes to the religion of Islam may, none-
theless, commit non-Muslim actions and attributes. The third concentric circle and 
the most wide and encapsulating meaning of Islam, as emphasised by Gülen 
(2001:136-137), is that it means the ‘laws of creation’ (şeriat-ı fıtriye) according to 
which the universe conducts itself. These laws, just as the rules of religion, were 
ordained by God. The only difference between the two is that while human beings 
have the free will to follow the laws of religion or not, they have no such choice 
when it comes to the ‘laws of creation’. He states that Islam is an inclusive religion 
and the religion of the entire universe, which is manifested from behind the veil 
of causes and laws. Therefore, according to this view, everything in the universe, 
whether animate or otherwise, is ‘Muslim’ because, unavoidably, it continues its 
existence in accordance with the ‘laws of creation’. 
Important to note here is that the above analysis of the meaning of Islam does 
not include any reference to the notion of Iman, that is belief in God. Gülen em-
phasises the importance of the difference between the two. Islam is the laws and 
rules of God, Iman on the other hand is belief in God. Thus, ‘din’ (‘religion’ in Islam) 
includes the laws of creation (Sunnetullah) and the rules ordering human worldly 
life. In other words, Islam is “the religion of both the universe and the human be-
ing.” (Ünal 2008b). The phrase ‘La ilaha illa-llah’ (There is no deity but God) is the 
declaration of faith (iman) in Islam. Therefore, in drawing this distinction, Gülen 
states being a Mu’min (believer, one with faith) does not necessarily mean that 
one is a Muslim (one who follows Islam) and vice versa. In other words, a person 
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may have faith and belief in God and as a result be a Mu’min, but may not con-
duct his or her life according to the rules and laws of Islam and thereby fail to be 
a Muslim. The opposite is also possible, according to Gülen. A person may be a 
Muslim by attribute in the second concentric meaning of the word Islam, but not 
have any belief in God. The following metaphor illustrates the different meaning of 
Muslim and Mu’min: A Mu’min (believer) is enrolled in the school (Islam); a Muslim 
(surrender) follows the lessons. One who does not follow lessons (i.e., who does 
not pray each day) is still a Mu’min. On the other hand, a non-Muslim who fasts 
in the month of Ramadan is not a believer of Islam, he or she follows the lessons 
from outside, without being enrolled.
The following figure visualises the three concentric meanings of Islam with its 
relation to Iman.
Having looked at how Gülen understands the ethos, semantics and practice of 
Islam, I will now attempt to evaluate how he views western civilisation. It is clear 
from Gülen’s views about Islam in general, and ‘Anatolian Islam’ in particular, 
that Gülen adopts an inclusive, embracing and moderate approach. Therefore, 
Gülen’s views of the West are primarily based on these dynamics. Furthermore, 
Gülen considers his belief in God to be his greatest asset. So, in the light of recent 
misrepresentations of Islam in the West, Gülen argues that a Muslim’s primary ob-
ligation is to make sure that this is rectified through showing Islam’s true character 
to the world. This can only be done by engaging with that world.  
On a practical level, Gülen states that the world has become a global village and 
that it is no longer either desirable nor possible, if it ever was, to close borders and 
not engage with the rest of the world. His view that Turkey and all other Muslim-
populated countries should engage with the West rests on a moderate Islam as 
well as practical considerations of the time. In this regard, Gülen does not agree 
with those who are against the idea of interaction with the West on the basis that 
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this will lead to the assimilation of the Muslim identity. He argues that Muslims 
should have no such fear if they are sincere in their belief. 
In addition to this, Gülen rejects the notion of the old binary formulation of geo-
graphical boundaries as dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) and dar al-harb (the 
abode of war). On this topic, Gülen uses the integrationist concept of dar al-hizmet 
(the abode of service to humanity) which refers to ‘an intention to serve Islam by 
presenting a good example, then he or she has to obey the lex loci, to respect 
others’ rights and to be just, and has to disregard discussions of dar al-harb and 
dar al-Islam’ (Yilmaz 2003:208-237). His formulation on these issues is relevant 
to understanding how Gülen applies Islamic knowledge to modern, theological, 
social and cultural issues. Tariq Ramadan suggests that Muslims could be said 
to live in dar al-dawa (the abode of testimony), where they are forced to consider 
the fundamental Islamic principles and take responsibility for their faith. In Ram-
adan’s vision, western societies have a crucial role and a specific space which 
leads Muslims to express their faith and Islamic message. In this space Muslims 
strive ‘to avoid reactive and overcautious attitudes and to develop a feeling of 
self-confidence, based on a deep sense of responsibility’ (Ramadan 1999:150). In 
contrast to some ulama (plural of alim), who claim that the old distinction between 
dar al-Islam and dar al-harb is still relevant and exists – like the Hizb ut-Tahrir and 
Tabligh movements in Europe, who defend the literal application of this classifica-
tion – Gülen and Ramadan are in favour of reformulation, at least they are calling 
for  further debate on these concepts owing to the growing Muslim presence in 
western countries.
On the basis of the three concentric meanings of Islam, Gülen states that the West 
is a dar al-hizmet and is more Muslim than the geographical Muslim countries 
because: (a) it has more Muslim attributes than the Muslim countries in being 
just, progressive, democratic etc., and (b) it has inevitably explored, discovered 
and engaged nature and cause in order to succeed in scientific and technological 
advancement. In discovering steam power, smelting steel, developing rocket sci-
ence and reaching the moon, the West has learnt the laws of creation and used 
them to its advantage. Whether western civilisation has done good or bad with this 
scientific knowledge and experience is another matter. The point here is that, in 
attaining such an understanding of science and in engaging the laws of creation, 
western civilisation has become Muslim in the second and third sense of the word. 
As a result of this perspective, Gülen states that he cannot understand how a de-
vout Muslim would be against the West, as the West has attained its supremacy 
through inevitably following and obeying the universally applicable laws of crea-
tion ordained and created by God. Related to this point, Gülen stressed that:
Islam flourishes in America and Europe much better than in 
many Muslim countries. This means freedom and the rule of law 
are necessary for personal Islam. Moreover, Islam does not need 
the state to survive but rather needs educated and financially 
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rich communities to flourish. In a way, not the state but rather 
community is needed under a full democratic system. (Yavuz 
2003b:307). 
Having noted that, Gülen stresses that the scientific advancement in the West and 
its notion of modernity have also lead to materialism and the exclusion of belief, 
spirituality and morals. This, Gülen argues, has resulted in crude fanaticism. In 
contrast, the plight of Muslim countries is one of ignorance and bigotry. Thus, 
while Gülen finds that western civilisation embodies certain commendable at-
tributes and a beneficial collective knowledge and experience of positive science, 
he also criticises its exclusively materialistic approach which, at present, provides 
no space for belief in God or spirituality within its realm of modernity. This sense of 
belief and spirituality remains and can be found in the eastern world. Thus, Gülen 
strongly believes that East and West have a lot to learn from each other and that a 
balanced and prosperous civilisation with a correct understanding of life can only 
be achieved through the fusion of the two. Therefore, engaging with the West is a 
two-way process for Gülen, which involves taking and giving.
The middle way and the nature of human beings6.3 
In his comprehensive study, Pannenberg (1985) considers human beings to be 
part of nature and discusses the human person in his or her social world; its cul-
ture, history and institutions. Hence, it could be said that the human being is the 
essence and the vital element of being, the index and core element of the universe 
and societies. Democritus described the human being as ‘a world in miniature’, a 
microcosm (Diels, Frag. 34, as cited in Pannenberg 1985:27). A human being is 
an image of the macrocosm by virtue of containing all the strata of reality (body, 
mind and spirit). The Stoic approach understood humanity in the framework of 
the cosmic order as a microcosm that reflects on the macrocosm of the physical 
universe (Pannenberg 1985:27). In a similar respect, Gülen considers the human 
person as a sample or a model of the universe. Gülen (2000:7-8) symbolises hu-
man beings as mirrors for God’s names and attributes, and confidently argues that 
human beings are distinguished from the rest of creation with the honour of being 
responsible for making the Earth prosperous in God’s name. He argues that indi-
vidual and collective happiness lies in disciplining three innate faculties (reason, 
anger, and lust) to produce a young ‘golden generation’ that will learn theoretical 
aspects of the middle way between materialism and metaphysics, between mo-
dernity and tradition, and will put it into practice. This generation is supposed to 
absorb and represent both modern realities and Muslim morality and identities 
through its mind, its behaviours and its spirituality.
The middle way is an important concept in Gülen’s understanding, which is, to 
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a great extent, similar to Aristotle’s (Kuru 2003). Aristotle criticised the Platonic 
‘virtue versus vice’ categorisation and classified phenomena in three groups, two 
of which are vices (excess and deficiency) and one of which is virtue (the mean 
or the middle way). In his series of sermons entitled Ahlaki Mülahazalar, Gülen 
(1998d) interprets and repeats the important Islamic concept of sırat-ı müstakim 
(the straight path), which is recited in a Muslim’s prayers forty times a day, as the 
middle way between ifrat (excess) and tefrit (deficiency). From this perspective, 
and since the time of Ibn Mis ka wayh (c.930-1037), hu man fac ul ties or ‘drives’ 
have been dealt with in three cat e go ries; intellect, zeal, and lust (Ünal 2006b:30). 
Intellect or rea son enables the human person to make the right decision, and en-
com pass es all human pow ers such as con cep tion, im ag i na tion, cal cu la tion, mem-
o ry, learn ing, and so on. Zeal or anger cov ers the pow er of self-defence, which 
according to Is lam ic jurisprudence is de fined as that need ed to de fend the faith 
and rel i gion, san i ty, pos ses sions, life and fam i ly, and oth er sa cred val ues. Men 
and women desire or lust after the opposite sex and love their children and worldly 
possessions. In other words, lust or desire is the name for the driv ing force of 
one’s ani mal ap pe tites. These three main drives or faculties are presented in the 
following figure (Celik and Alan 2003:25-26):
In sum, a most important characteristic of the ideal human is that he or she finds 
a balance in the middle way and practises it in all abilities and qualities in human 
life.
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Four dimensions of peace from Gülen’s perspective6.4 
As mentioned in the previous chapter (section 5.7), I elaborate here on how the 
concept of peace fits into Gülen’s ethical thoughts. In his writings and speeches, 
I find that he treats various aspects and elements of peace. Using some practical 
consequences of his thoughts and teachings, I have identified four main dimen-
sions of peace (Celik and Valkenberg 2007), which will allow me to conceptualise 
Gülen’s ethic of peace within a theoretical framework.
Eternal peaceA. 
First, Gülen envisages eternal peace as the ultimate goal of human life, almost 
synonymous with salvation. Specifically, it is the final destination of the collective 
personality of those who serve humanity (hizmet). In the eschatological sense, 
when one manages to direct oneself toward the path of eternal life and happiness, 
however miserable and troublesome one’s life may be, as one considers this 
world to be the waiting room for heaven, one accepts everything gladly and gives 
thanks. He sees the members of his hizmet (service) movement, through their ef-
forts carried out in solidarity and sincerity, as contributing in their diverse activities 
to the building of an eternal realm of peace and happiness. This concept not only 
gives meaning and direction to individual acts, but in this way the believer also 
achieves a kind of conquest over death. Gülen (2004a:78) indicates that people 
have a great need for religion, and for the peace and security provided by religion. 
In his writings, Gülen relates a hadith including ‘deeds are judged by intentions’1, 
and he emphasised that the intention of the believers is more important than the 
act itself. Human beings should try to live with a greatness of intention that will 
be great enough to enable them to appreciate eternity and thus imbue them with 
an inner peace that comes from being connected to eternity. For Gülen, eternal 
peace means achieving God’s approval, walking in the greatest spiritual ecstasy, 
overstepping the boundaries of existence and reaching Eden, with contemplation 
of the eternal togetherness in the hereafter. On the contrary, a believing soul, 
giving expression to the chilling nature of the denial of truth and any attempt to 
conceal it, yet at the same time, expressing the eternal peace that faith promises, 
calls out in the following ode of Akif:2 ‘A rusted (rotten or morally corrupt spiritual) 
heart which has no faith is a burden for the breast.’ (Gülen 2004a:137).
Islam literally means ‘surrender’. Epistemologically, the word ‘Islam’ is derived 
from the root words silm (security) and salamah (safety), and means surrender-
ing, guiding to peace and contentment, and establishing security, safety and ac-
cord. Etymologically speaking, the word Muslim and the verb sa-li-ma, both come 
from the root silm. Muslims greet Muslims with salaam, thereby placing love for 
themselves in everyone’s heart.3 They end their prayers with salaam. According 
to Gülen (2004a:54), these principles are essential to and permeate the lives of 
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Muslims. When Muslims stand to pray, they cut their connection with this world, 
turning to their Lord in faith and obedience, and standing to attention in His pres-
ence. Completing the prayer, as if they were returning back to life, they greet those 
on their right and left by wishing them peace: ‘Remain safe and in peace’. With a 
wish for safety and security, peace and contentment, they return to the ordinary 
world once again. Gülen (2004a:58) considers this peaceful attitude of greeting 
and wishing safety and security for others as one of the most beneficial acts in Is-
lam. Gülen (2004a:218) describes those who dedicate themselves to doing good 
for humanity as altruistic in that they can even sacrifice their lives for others, and 
in doing so they have found peace in their conscience.
Inner peaceB. 
A second dimension of peace might be called inner peace: tranquillity and peace 
of mind, an inner confidence born of faith that enables the religious believer to face 
adversity without anxiety or despair. In the psychological sense, peace of mind has 
been seen as being in the possession of new technological equipments and the 
achievements of physical comfort. At times it has been connected with tranquillity, 
hard work, financial wealth, the satisfaction of carnal desires, and boundless free-
dom. However, for Gülen (2004a:159), it is only possible as the peace of mind pur-
sued is the fruit of virtue within faith and can only be attained through perfect faith. 
Particularly when facing the approach of death, the believer can attain a peace of 
mind which will enable them to overcome spiritual turmoil and fear. He describes 
the people of faith as peaceful with themselves: ‘Worldly people who are enslaved 
by their egos live only to fulfil their carnal desires. Never content, they feel no tran-
quillity. But ideal people are always at peace with themselves (interior peace) and 
always feel secure. They are content and, furthermore, they place their knowledge 
and understanding at the service of humanity’ (Gülen 2004a:129,159). As a result, 
people of faith feel themselves to be in an expansive atmosphere of peace and 
their society becomes a society of conscience and peace.
‘Jihad’ is an element of Islam which is primarily defined as the inner struggle of a 
believer against all that stands between the believer and God. Gülen (1998a:191-
199;1998b; 2004a:171-172) describes jihad as occurring on two fronts; the inter-
nal and the external. The internal struggle (the greater jihad) is the effort to attain 
one’s essence; the external struggle (the lesser jihad) is the process of enabling 
someone else to attain his or her essence. The first is conducted on the spiritual 
front, for it is one’s struggle with their own inner world and carnal soul (nefs). In 
other words, the greater jihad is based on overcoming obstacles between oneself 
and one’s essence, and the soul’s reaching knowledge, eventually divine knowl-
edge, divine love, and spiritual bliss. The second is material and based on remov-
ing obstacles between people and faith so that people can choose freely between 
belief and disbelief. When both of these types of jihad have been carried out suc-
GÜLEN’S PARADIGM ON PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE110
cessfully, the desired is established. If one is missing, the balance is destroyed. 
Gülen argues that believers find peace and vitality in such a balanced jihad. 
Further, Gülen (2004a:1-2) states that love is the most essential element of every 
being, it is a magic elixir to overcome every obstacle, a powerful key to open every 
door, and a source of altruism, stating: ‘Those who possess such an elixir will 
sooner or later open the gates to all parts of the world and spread the fragrance 
of peace everywhere, using the “censers” of love in their hands’. Moreover, Gülen 
(2004a:6) stresses that ‘a human is a mirror of another human’. He emphasises 
that the level of one’s understanding and appreciation of one another depends 
on how well one recognises the qualities and riches that each person possesses. 
Also, he has the conviction that peace, happiness and security at home is found 
in the mutual accord between the spouses in thought, morals, and belief, which 
can result in a healthy family life and a good education for their children (Ünal and 
Williams 2000:311).
Interpersonal and intercommunal peaceC. 
A third aspect of peace refers to interpersonal, and broadly formulated, intercom-
munal peace. Gülen sees interior peace, not only of individuals but of environs, 
communities and whole societies, as a precondition for healthy and hearty dia-
logue among peoples, and as one of the marks of Islamic civilisation. He has 
the conviction that, along with justice, harmony, brotherhood, solidarity, human 
progress and spiritual advancement, peace should characterise the Muslim’s daily 
life. It is peace as the basis of societal relations which should be the force that 
attracts others to Islam. So important is the element of forgiveness and pardon 
in human relations that Gülen constantly recommends his students and followers 
to pardon each other’s faults immediately. Gülen (2005a:75) expresses the core 
of his message regarding tolerance, dialogue and peace in his book, Pearls of 
Wisdom: ‘Be so tolerant that your heart becomes wide like the ocean. Become 
inspired with faith and love for others. Offer a hand to those in trouble, and be 
concerned about everyone.’ He defines tolerance as the most essential element 
of moral systems, a very important source of spiritual discipline and a celestial 
virtue of perfected people (Gülen 2004a:33-34). To him, tolerance does not mean 
being influenced by others or joining them; it means accepting others as they are 
and knowing how to get along with them and to become protectors of the general 
peace and contentment (ibid:42). At the same time, Gülen claims that Muslim citi-
zens in European countries can only live in harmony in those countries by means 
of a vast atmosphere of tolerance (ibid:43). 
In addition, Gülen frequently refers to the Qur’an accepting forgiveness and toler-
ance as basic principles. He suggests that to expend effort for dialogue with the 
belief that ‘peace is better’ (Qur’an 4:128), and continuously advocates peace and 
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reconciliation (sulh), nationally and internationally. The term ‘peace’ is also used 
in the Qur’an to denote salam, which includes the notion of safety and security 
from all kinds of deviations and sufferings. The Qur’anic verses that introduce ‘the 
servants of God’ are as follows: 
[…] And the servants of (God) the All-Merciful are those who 
move on the Earth in humility, and when the ignorant address 
them, they say: ‘Peace’ (Qur’an 25:63). […] When they meet hol-
low words or unseemly behaviour, they pass them by with dignity 
(Qur’an 25:72). […] And when they hear vain talk, they turn away 
there from and say: ‘To us our deeds, and to you yours’.(Qur’an 
28:55). 
The general gist of these verses is that when those who have been favoured with 
true servitude to God encounter meaningless and ugly words or behaviour they 
say nothing unbecoming, but rather pass by in a dignified manner. In short: ‘Eve-
ryone acts according to his or her own disposition’ (Qur’an 17:84) and thus dis-
plays his or her own character. The character of heroes of dialogue is gentleness, 
consideration, and tolerance. This mildness is presented in the Qur’an as ‘gentle 
words’. When God sent Moses and Aaron to a man who claimed to possess divin-
ity, as the Pharaoh had done, he commanded them ‘to behave tolerantly and to 
speak softly’ (Qur’an 20:44). 
Without exception and regardless of differences in faith, ethnicity and culture, one 
meets everyone and this generally breaks the tension of people toward probable 
opponents. For Gülen, it is an Islamic principle to love those things or people who 
must be loved in the way of God and to dislike those things or people who must 
be disliked in the way of God. Disliking in the way of God applies only to feelings, 
thoughts and attributes. He claims that people should dislike such things as im-
morality, disbelief and polytheism, not the people who engage in such activities. 
Gülen (2004a:60) recalls that the Prophet Muhammad once stood up out of re-
spect for humanity as the funeral procession of a Jew passed by. When reminded 
that the deceased was a Jew, the Prophet replied: ‘but he is a human,’, thereby 
showing the value Islam gives to human beings in general. This action demon-
strates how people of different faiths and cultures should respect every person 
and coexist peacefully. 
Besides this, Gülen (2004a:61) gives another example of how the Prophet was 
inordinately sensitive with regard to respecting others. The Prophet one day ad-
monished a Companion who had been heard insulting Abu Jahl, in an assembly 
of Companions where Abu Jahl’s son Ikrimah was present, saying: ‘Do not hurt 
others by criticising their fathers’.4 Gülen (2004a:74-75) also significantly views 
the form and style of debate inherited from Nursi: ‘Anyone who is happy about 
defeating an opponent in debate is without mercy’. He explains the reason for this 
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further: ‘You gain nothing by such a defeat. If you were defeated and the other was 
victorious, you would have corrected one of your mistakes’. Debate should not be 
for the sake of one’s ego, but rather to enable the truth to come out. He suggests 
that debate can only take place in an environment that is conducive to dialogue. 
The Qur’an prescribes: 
Do not argue with those who were given the Book save in the 
best way, unless it be those of them who are given to wrongdoing 
(and therefore not accessible to courteous argument). Say (to 
them): ‘We believe in what has been sent down to us and what 
was sent down to you, and your God and our God is one and the 
same’.  […] (29:46).  
The verse teaches Muslims how they should behave towards the People of the 
Book, and suggests that they do not discuss with the followers of other faiths, 
except with better means (than mere disputation). This verse thus describes the 
method, approach, and manner that should be used to communicate and interact 
with the other(s).Those who consider themselves addressed by these aforemen-
tioned verses, all devotees of love who dream of becoming true servants of God 
merely because they are human beings, those who have declared their faith and 
thereby become Muslims and performed the mandated social and religious duties, 
must behave with tolerance and forbearance and expect nothing from other peo-
ple. Gülen (2004a:61) suggests the approach of Yunus Emre:5 not to strike those 
who hit them, not to respond harshly to those who curse them, and not to hold 
any secret grudge against those who abuse them. In addition, one conspicuous 
characteristic of Gülen’s understanding of peaceful coexistence is that he begins 
by addressing closed circles and subsequently seeks ways to approach broader 
and more open societies (Celik and Valkenberg 2007). 
Universal peaceD. 
A fourth dimension of peace distinguished by Gülen is universal or global peace. 
He emphasises the importance of the indispensability of religion and intercultural 
dialogue for world peace through his efforts to meet with other religious and com-
munity leaders within his native country and abroad. In addition to rules that guar-
antee peace and security, there are also verses in the Qur’an related to attitudes 
that should be taken against criminals and people who cause anarchy and terror; 
for such people there are legal sanctions, punishments, and retaliations. Indeed, 
the Qur’an (4:128) states ‘peace is better’ as a general rule. Gülen (2004a:72) 
stresses that peace, justice and stability are of the utmost importance to Islam; 
fighting and war are only secondary occurrences which are bound to specific rea-
sons and conditions. He opposes the use of violence to attain political ends, and 
teaches his followers that the days of getting things done by brute force are over. 
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‘In today’s enlightened world the only way to get others to accept your ideas and 
ways is by persuasion and the use of convincing argument’ (Ünal and Williams 
2000:319). Only through cooperative understanding, interfaith and intercultural 
dialogue, and a process of mutual respect, can communities coexist in harmony.
He expresses the longing for a time of peace and prosperity for all. Even though 
the idea of the world as a village becomes firmer and more prevalent over the 
course of time, different beliefs, races, customs, and traditions will continue to 
cohabit in this village. Gülen (2004a:250) powerfully argues that the peace of this 
global village lies in respecting all these differences, considering these differences 
to be part of nature and in ensuring that people appreciate and share these differ-
ences. A major concept related to Gülen’s teaching on peace is his understading 
of ‘nation’. Although this concept refers particularly to the Muslim world and the 
Turkish nation in the context of their roles in shaping human history, as major 
players and representatives of global peace, there is certainly more to it than just 
the concept of one particular nation, especially when one looks with Gülen’s vi-
sion and his idealism of dialogue and tolerance. In his teaching, Gülen’s discourse 
solutions for freedom and an honourable stand can be used by any suppressed 
community. The motivating ethos behind Gülen’s career, as clearly manifested 
in numerous dialogue activities and education initiatives, is one of a worldwide 
peace, which will be accomplished by the participation of all nations. His definition 
of nation does not comprise one race or ethnic group (Gülen 2005b:87). Anatolia 
has always been a land of diverse ethnic groups throughout human history, which 
form one united nation today. Exempt from any chauvinist characteristic, he ad-
dresses the colourful mosaic of Anatolia as a crucible for peoples that have come 
from Central Asia, the Balkans, and Mesopotamia. 
Gülen (2004a:261-262; see also Çapan 2005) defines a Muslim as a person of 
love and affection who avoids every kind of terrorist activity and who has no mal-
ice or hatred for anyone or anything. To him, true Muslims can only be the most 
trustworthy representatives of universal peace.
Dispute resolution through dialogical approach6.5 
In this section, I set out to highlight insights on dispute resolution through dialogue 
and tolerance, using some paradigms contained in Gülen’s and others’ teaching. 
From tolerance and dialogue, Gülen (2004a:45) understands embracing people 
regardless of differences of opinion, world-view, ideology, ethnicity, or belief. There 
is a need to recognise that differences do exist and the objective is not to ‘correct’ 
but to hear and listen to the other side. From another approach, for Gülen it means 
– in the words of the Turkish poet Yunus Emre – loving the created simply because 
of the Creator. On the basis of this current study, I propose here that Gülen’s tol-
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erance and intercultural dialogue method can be seen as an alternative method 
for dispute resolution in and between societies. So important is the element of 
forgiveness in human relations that Gülen (2004a:27-29,34) recommends that his 
followers and sympathisers pardon each other’s faults and mistakes immediately. 
Comparably, Pope John Paul II (2002) believed that forgiveness and justice will 
heal most of our wounds in social life, and are the divine instruments to coexist 
peacefully. Similarly, Gopin (2001) presents forgiveness as an element of conflict 
resolution in religious cultures to walk the tightrope of reconciliation and justice.
Religion is usually cited as the cause of or at least a factor in conflict around 
the world (Abu-Nimer 2001; Coward and Smith 2003; Gopin 1997, 2002; Smock 
2002). Schneier (2002:105-114) points out that religion is never the real cause of 
conflict within or between societies, but it is often identified as an excuse for other 
causes such as ethnicity, economic disparities, and regional differences. Corre-
spondingly, Gülen (2005d) argues that
[…] in terms of the differences and the disputes and wars that re-
sult from the differences between members of various religions, 
these do not originate in the essence of revealed religion, but in 
human motivations such as wrong interpretations, hate and rage, 
self-interest and greed; these conflicts were and are initiated by 
those who have abandoned that essential message. 
Based on his experience and studies on conflict resolution, Abu-Nimer (2003) 
identifies four phases of development in an effective experiment of interfaith dia-
logue. He suggests that the earlier encounters should focus on individual and 
group similarities in theologies and scriptures. One example could be to join 
together in studying the sacred texts of each religion. It must be remembered 
that the goal for these studies is not debate or conversion. These shared studies 
should yield deeper bonds through invitations to homes and meetings with fami-
lies. The second phase is to deepen the relationship through joint prayers that are 
not contradictory to the other faith and by participating in the other faith’s rituals. 
Having established trust and an understanding of the other faith, the third phase 
is to discover and confirm differences in religious values and faith practices. The 
final step should be exploring the ways in which messages of different faiths can 
benefit people from other religious traditions in the same community. 
The core of Huntington’s (1993) ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis is based on the ob-
servation of a shift of paradigm. A paradigm is the product of the interaction of the 
cultural medium and of the thinking minds, and provides a basis for understand-
ing. A shift in paradigm means that we start to understand, or interpret the same 
realities in a different way. Huntington claimed that the ‘clash of civilisations’ is 
inevitable because the modern paradigm was a paradigm of clash and conflict. 
Huntington has been harshly criticised by advocates of dialogue for his remarks 
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on the inevitability of this clash, but one has to give some credibility to Hunting-
ton on the observation he made about the shift of paradigm. Indeed, the world is 
more and more exposed to a possible ‘clash of civilisations’. It can be said that 
the twentieth century produced more prejudices than the totality of the twenty 
preceding centuries: now humanity needs a strategy to heal these wounds. In 
medical terminology curing an illness is something, preventing its symptoms is 
another. Conflict resolution strategies usually do not ‘cure’, they only suppress the 
symptoms. Prejudices and paradigmatic thinking patterns are learnt behaviours; a 
person does not forget them easily, and needs to replace them with other habits, 
patterns, bits of knowledge. 
In practical terms, I can say that one who promotes dialogue needs to create a 
new, local or global paradigm so as to facilitate a peaceful interpretation of the 
actual reality. Individuals, as different ontologisms, or as adherents of different 
faiths, ideologies, religions, need to speak to each other, in a way apt to heal the 
paradigm, to reverse the vicious circles of misunderstandings, prejudices, libels. 
And the end product of this healing of the paradigm is not only peace, but exist-
ence. An interviewee identified this as follows: ‘You are not really you, because 
you define yourself according to your definition of me and of others. And since you 
define me wrong, you define yourself wrong. Epistemologically you have com-
mitted suicide. Give me my life back, and be resurrected.’ This is the promise of 
dialogical philosophy.
Conclusion6.6 
In today’s global village, borders have blurred, several cultures come into contact 
more often and more intensively with each other, and people and societies con-
sciously or unconsciously interact more and more with each other. The interethnic 
and interreligious climate throughout the world, in particular in the Netherlands, 
has undergone a dramatic change in recent years. Social mediation and peaceful 
coexistence within the context of cultural, ethnic and religious divisions, hierar-
chies, rivalries and conflicts that are grounded in socio-economic and political 
realities, have become vital necessities of our time in order to maintain social co-
hesion where an appreciation of diversity must stand as a main point of reference, 
paving the way for intercultural dialogue vis-à-vis processes of globalisation, mi-
gration and the transnationalisation of social relations. In order to achieve this and 
to build bridges between different cultures, socially innovative projects should be 
implemented to tackle the problems stemming from migration, the emergence of 
transnational and diaspora communities and their role in (inter)national conflicts, 
as well as the re-emergence of religious groups and identities, the politicisation 
of religion and the rise of religious fundamentalisms, and hence new conflicts 
and wars. Both compassionate love as a way for inner peace and intercultural 
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dialogue as a preventive strategy for dispute resolution and social mediation are 
important, socially innovative methods in our age of globalisation, which refers to 
the intensification of worldwide social relations and the multiplicity of linkages and 
interconnections between the states, societies and peoples, which make up the 
modern world system.
This analysis of Gülen’s ideas is helpful in challenging the thesis of clash of civili-
sation, and provides a healing of this paradigm in two ways. First, to live in peace 
as a result of dialogue and education is vital in today’s world, where globalisa-
tion, mass communication, and technology have pushed individuals and groups 
together in ways never before seen in human history. In today’s world of global 
connectedness, peoples must develop the capacity to enter into dialogue and cre-
ate relatedness with people coming from vastly different worldviews. Developing 
strategies and capacities for peaceful coexistence amidst radical difference and 
shrinking natural resources is the central challenge of our era. Second, Gülen 
pursues an inclusive middle way between fundamental futures of modernity and 
the Muslim tradition – science and Islamic knowledge, reason and revelation, 
progress and conservation, and free will and destiny – accepting them as two 
faces of the same reality.
Furthermore, this chapter presents two seemingly contrary views on the world. 
From one perspective, it is becoming the potential site for new wars and conflicts 
due to greedy appetites, but from another perspective, it is becoming the cradle of 
brotherhood, love, forgiveness, and unity due to the efforts of people who are am-
bassadors of peace and dialogue. This chapter asserts that dialogue and the four 
aforementioned dimensions of peace are possible only when accompanied by 
moral values, mutual knowledge and acceptance of cultural and religious identity. 
I would argue that the movement that has evolved around the ideas of Gülen pro-
vides, initially and primarily, an example of a renewal with a potential to influence 
individuals, both Muslim and non-Muslim. A number of positive NGOs and peace-
ful institutions (e.g., schools, and dialogue centres) led by volunteers, social in-
novators and peaceful, servant leaders can form ‘islands of peace’ throughout the 
globe. This depends on deep and large-scale systems change, involving work with 
idealistic people from all faiths, multi-national corporations, government agencies, 
and civil society organisations all over the world. The Gülen movement provides a 
unique case in this regard.
The movement is a growing approach to the reunification of faith and reason with 
hopes for a peaceful coexistence between liberal democracies and the religiously 
diverse. Gülen has developed a peaceful approach to religion and science as two 
aspects of the same reality complementing one another. The civic movement he 
insprired challenges us to build a peaceful world based on dialogue, tolerance, 
respect and compassion, and to raise individuals who use their intellect, zeal and 
lust lawfully and in moderation.
Conclusion 117
notes
1. See Bukhari, Bad’ul-Vahy 1, Itk 6; Muslim, Imarat, 155; Abu Dawud, Talak, 11. 
2. Mehmed Akif Ersoy (1873–1936) is the renowned Turkish poet who also wrote the Turkish 
National Anthem.
3. See Buhhari, Iman, 20; Muslim, Iman, 63.
4. Hakim, al-Mustadrak, 3:241; Muttaqi al-Hindi, Kanz al-‘Ummal, 13: 540.
5. Yunus Emre (1238–1320) was a poet and Sufi who had a powerful influence on Turkish litera-
ture. He was well versed in Sufi philosophy, especially that of al-Rumi, and, like al-Rumi, became 
a leading representative of Sufism in Anatolia on a more popular level.

chaPter 7
Opening the road to dialogue:
An amalgamation of Gülen’s and Spinoza’s ideas on tolerance ap-
plied to the situation of Muslims in the Netherlands
introduction7.1 
Throughout its history the Netherlands has been known as one of the most toler-
ant countries in Europe. Oppressed groups, such a Portuguese Jews and French 
Huguenots, came to the Netherlands during the sixteenth century because there 
they were able to practise their religion without persecution. Similarly philosophers 
like Descartes came to the Netherlands because they could enjoy greater freedom 
of speech than in their native France. Dutch tolerance took on it most indurate 
institutional form during the era of pillarisation when Catholics, Protestants, so-
cialists, and liberals lived harmoniously ‘apart-together’ (Vermeij 2006:19). Cur-
rently, homosexuals come the Netherlands to enjoy the freedom to express their 
sexuality openly and even marry if they wish to.1 Similarly, post-colonial and labour 
immigrants who arrived in the Netherlands during the 1960s and ‘70s and the sub-
sequent generation of allochtonen (those born in a foreign country or with parents 
born in a foreign country) were also treated with ‘tolerance’ under multicultural pol-
icies. However, during  the last few years the Dutch tradition of tolerance seems 
to many to have encountered Popper’s ‘paradox of tolerance’. Popper argued that 
tolerance of the intolerant is ultimately self-defeating because it eventually leads 
to the abolition of tolerance by the intolerant (Popper 1966, as cited in Rosenfeld 
2003:11).   
The interethnic and interreligious climate in the Netherlands has undergone dra-
matic changes over recent years. During the 1990s criticism of multiculturalism 
and its ‘tolerance’ of Muslim immigrants, primarily of Moroccan and Turkish ori-
gin, began to surface. Exclusionist opinions and social distance towards ethnic 
minorities have increased (Dagevos, Gijsberts and Van Praag 2003). Both the 
structural and political-cultural integration of these groups was said to have failed. 
I will argue that this failure is due not to excessive ‘tolerance’ but to indifference 
masked by a ‘tolerant’ façade. Furthermore, current claims to the Dutch tradi-
tion of ‘tolerance’ have become part of a nationalistic identity building project that 
has shaped current integration policies. As both a form of  indifference and of 
nationalism, ‘tolerance’ loses its power to build a plural liberal democratic society 
because it closes the ‘road to dialogue’ (Gülen 2004a:140). Thus, I will contend 
that it is not the ‘paradox of tolerance’ that has strained relations between Muslims 
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and non-Muslims in the Netherlands but the misuse and misunderstanding of the 
principle. 
Dutch politics and society is renowned for its political culture of dialogue. In the 
‘polder model’ all parties have to be heard before a decision can be made. How-
ever, dialogues between non-Muslim and Muslim citizens on the role of religion 
in Dutch society and on integration will be empty and counterproductive without a 
re-conceptualisation of what it means to be tolerant in a plural society and how a 
meaningful dialogue should be conducted. By using the ideas of Fethullah Gülen 
in comparison with those of Benedictus (Baruch) de Spinoza, I will attempt to 
make such a re-conceptualisation. Fethullah Gülen, is an internationally-renowned 
scholar of Islam and a prominent teacher of peace and practitioner of dialogue. 
Benedictus (Baruch) de Spinoza (1632–1677) was the son of Portuguese Jews 
who sought refuge in Amsterdam during the seventeenth century and became the 
leader of a ‘radical’ philosophical current which divorced philosophy from theol-
ogy. The purpose of this amalgamation of philosophic perspectives on tolerance 
and dialogue is twofold. First, Gülen and Spinoza, respectively, argue that dia-
logue and tolerance complement each other and together make liberal democratic 
peaceful coexistence possible. Second, the merging of these two men’s ideas, 
emerging from very different perspectives, the former religious and the latter secu-
lar, demonstrates in itself that a dialogue between ‘civilisations’ is possible and 
thus defies those who believe that Islam and the Judaeo-Christian secular West 
are predestined to clash. 
The chapter will begin with an outline of the historical developments of Dutch 
integration policies in order to provide the background information needed to un-
derstand the position and participation of Muslims in the Netherlands. Thereafter, 
I will discuss the Dutch discourse on Islam and Muslims. I will then outline Spino-
za’s and Gülen’s thoughts on discourse and tolerance and conclude by discussing 
how they can be applied to the Dutch situation.
Becoming Dutch: Muslim citizens and Dutch integration 7.2 
policies 
The Netherlands has had a long history of contact with the Muslim world thanks 
to its trading activities. In fact the Ottoman Turks gave the Dutch their first tulips, 
the famous national flower, in the 1500s (Ireland 2004). However, little of this com-
mercial or cultural contact occurred on Dutch soil until after the Second World War. 
The Netherlands was, and remains, a very hesitant land in receiving immigrants. 
Nevertheless, at present, approximately 11 per cent of the Dutch population is 
foreign born, and, if the second generation is included, that increases to 20 per 
cent (Entzinger 2007:2). Approximately 850,000 of the 16 million people living in 
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the Netherlands are considered to be Muslims (CBS 2007), the majority of whom 
are of Turkish or Moroccan origin.2 The most ‘visible minorities’ are Turks, Suri-
namese and Moroccans.3 The Surinamese immigrants arrived during the 1970s, 
as a result of increasing apprehension over the country’s independence from the 
Netherlands. Their Dutch passports and knowledge of the Dutch language greatly 
facilitated their integration. Conversely, the Turkish and Moroccan communities 
– the legacy of ‘guest worker’ policies of the late 1960s and 1970s that were 
followed by generous programmes of settlement and family reunification – have 
come to be seen as problematic due to a lack of integration (Entzinger 2007:2). 
Before the 1980s the national government had not devised any clearly articu-
lated policies towards immigrants. Prior to that period it was believed that most of 
the post-war immigrants would eventually leave the country (Van Houtum, Rossi 
and Uitermark 2005:626). There was a powerful conviction that the Netherlands 
should not be an immigration country: immigrant residence was to be temporary 
because the Netherlands regarded itself as overpopulated (Entzinger 1975). How-
ever, after acts of violence committed by young Moluccan immigrants, the Neth-
erlands began to recognise and accept the presence of  immigrant communities.4 
After the parliament published the Minderhedennota (the Minority Memorandum) 
in 1983, the ‘guest workers’ and post-colonial migrants became known as ‘ethnic 
minorities’ (Van Houtum, Rossi and Uitermark 2005:626). The policy that followed 
reflected the belief that if the newly discovered ‘ethnic minorities’ were allowed to 
‘retain their own culture and manage their own affairs they would be better placed 
to emancipate in Dutch society’ (ibid.). The institutional and political structure for 
these new policies had already been constructed. 
Dutch multiculturalism was the descendent of earlier forms of political accom-
modation that had served the country well in the past. The Netherlands was re-
markably politically stable during the twentieth century, despite the constant threat 
posed by the division of society into four separate ‘pillars’; Catholic, Protestant, 
liberal, and socialist (Andeweg and Irwin 2005:19). Lijphart (1975) explained this 
extraordinary stability with his concept of ‘consociational democracy’. This theory 
seeks to demonstrate how stable and effective democracy is possible despite 
social heterogeneity when there is elite cooperation. In the pillarised Netherlands 
there was a decentralisation of policy making to the ‘corporate’ minorities, whose 
institutions were subsidised by the central government. 
Although the pillars collapsed under the pressure of social mobility and seculari-
sation during the 1960s, ‘subsidised autonomy’ was granted to new immigrant 
groups and formed the backbone of Dutch multiculturalism. The ‘Ethnic Minorities 
Policy’ focused on ethnic minorities as collectives. It promoted socio-economic 
participation, combated discrimination, and supported group emancipation of mi-
nority groups through coordination with ethnic elites. These policies had an espe-
cially profound impact on the experience of Turkish and Moroccan ‘guest-workers’ 
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and their families (Entzinger 2007:3). These Islamic immigrants were allowed to 
establish separate facilities based on their community and religious identity. For 
example, subsidies were allocated for ‘mother language’ teaching programmes for 
immigrant children, and welfare benefits were granted to their non-Dutch speaking 
parents (ibid.).5 
During the 1990s high unemployment and under-achievement among first- and 
second-generation allochtonen opened the flood gates to progressive claims that 
multiculturalism promoted racial stereotypes and ethnic marginalisation (Uitermark 
and Steenbergen 2006:267). Furthermore, criminality and Islamic fundamental-
ism provoked more conservative critiques – echoing Samuel Huntington (1998, 
2004) – against the ‘tribalisation’ of the Netherlands and the assaults on western 
democratic ideals by foreigners, particularly Muslims (Bolkestein 1997; Philipse 
2005). The political debate over the compatibility between Islam and democratic 
liberalism, which would mark much of the later political debate over integration, 
was started in 1991 by the former Liberal Party (VVD)6 leader, Frits Bolkestein 
(Maas 1997). Bolkestein claimed that Islam was a threat to liberal freedom and 
democracy. 
After the 1994 elections, the newly elected ‘purple’ coalition, composed of the 
three main non-religious parties, replaced ‘minority policies’ with ‘integration poli-
cies’; shifting the focus from respecting cultural difference to promoting immigrants’ 
social and economic participation (Entzinger 2007:5; Ministerie van BZK 1994).
The approach taken by the ‘integration policy’ was a more citizenship-oriented (or 
republican) approach than the group-oriented policies of the 1980s. Nevertheless, 
the 1997 parliamentary report on the multicultural society still stressed the impor-
tance of strong group identity as a means to facilitate self-confident societal par-
ticipation (Gemeente Utrecht 2004:17).7 Thus, the integration of individuals was 
also combined with the idea of distinct group identity.
The Inburgering of new immigrants became the spearhead of Dutch integration 
policies (Fermin 1999:96). In colloquial Dutch, the word integratie (integration) is 
used interchangeably with the word inburgering, normally translated as naturalis-
ing. However, the root of the term burger (citizen) suggests it can literally be trans-
lated as ‘to become a citizen’. This concept arose in 1989 when the WRR argued 
that basic civic and language education be made a requirement for immigrants. In 
1994 the government began to express interest in developing an inburgering pol-
icy, the purpose of which would be to facilitate the independent functioning of im-
migrants in Dutch society. Finally, in 1996, non-European Union immigrants, with 
a right to welfare benefits, were obliged to participate in a twelve-month integration 
course, consisting of 600 hours of Dutch language instruction, civic education 
and preparation for the labour market (Joppke 2007:13). Then, in 1998, through 
the enactment of the Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers (WIN) (Newcomer Integration 
Law), non-EU immigrants without a temporary reason for residence (such as stu-
Becoming Dutch: Muslim citizens and Dutch integration policies 123
dents), were required to inburgeren regardless of welfare rights (Fermin 1999:96). 
Furthermore, the relics of multiculturalism, such as ‘mother tongue’ teaching, were 
removed from the school curriculum (Entzinger 2007:5).
During the 2002 parliamentary elections campaign, Pim Fortuyn, a flamboyant 
homosexual professor of sociology, challenged the political elite with his populist 
claims that there was no more room in the Netherlands for foreigners. Further-
more, in his book, Against the Islamicisation of Our Culture, he warned that Dutch 
society was under attack by authoritarian Muslims who, if given the opportunity, 
would destroy the Dutch tradition of tolerance, and rob homosexuals and women 
of their rights (Fortuyn 2001). Although assassinated shortly before the elections 
by a Dutch animal rights activist, his party (List Pim Fortuyn, LPF) was included 
in the ruling coalition. However, the party’s inability to function as part of the gov-
ernment led to the collapse of the coalition, and after new elections were called 
the LPF lost most of its votes (Andeweg and Irwin 2005:16). In the end it was 
Fortuyn’s critique of the prevalent political correctness towards immigrants – es-
pecially Islamic immigrants – that had the most impact on Dutch political culture. 
One of Fortuyn’s most enthusiastic supporters, who dubbed him the ‘divine baldy’ 
because of his shaved head, was Theo van Gogh. Van Gogh, a film maker, col-
umnist and television personality, was known for his outrageous and politically 
incorrect antics. When he was approached by Ayaan Hirsi Ali – a liberal party 
(VVD) parliamentarian of Somalian origin – to direct a film she had written called 
Submission Part I, he agreed.8 In the film the story of the abuse suffered by Is-
lamic women at the hands of male relatives was told by a woman dressed in a 
transparent ‘burka’, her naked body tattooed with texts from the Qur’an. The film 
alienated and enraged many Muslims, and in revenge a young Dutch Islamic fun-
damentalist, Muhammad Bouyeri, killed van Gogh. Bouyeri left a note on the body 
threatening Hirsi Ali. 
The lives and deaths of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, the media spectacle that 
was Hirsi Ali, along with international events like 9/11 and the Madrid bombings, 
set the stage for the formulation of ‘Integration Policy New Style’. Furthermore, a 
2004 parliamentary investigation into the state of integration in the Netherlands, 
known as the Blok Commission, concluded that integration in the Netherlands 
had failed, especially in regard to education (Commissie Blok 2004). Steered by 
a heavy-handed Minister of Integration, Rita Verdonk, the Netherlands enacted 
increasingly restrictive migration and more rigorous integration policies, including 
the requirement of ‘civic integration’ or inburgering classes for religious leaders 
like imams.9 
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Anti-muslimism in the Netherlands 7.3 
Dutch Islamophobia is marked by what Halliday (1995) calls ‘anti-Muslimism’ be-
cause it encompassed racist, xenophobic and, stereotypical elements, and it is 
part of a larger anti-immigrant sentiment (as cited in Van Koningsveld 2002:175). 
‘Muslim’ is an ethnic political identity, which along with socio-economic deprivation 
and spatial segregation, is used to draw clear lines between Dutch and Islamic 
culture, the native Dutch and Muslims. This kind of differentiation does not allow 
for engagement and cooperation but instead fear and a feeling of moral superiority 
born of ignorance.      
Initially the legacy of pillarisation provided for a conception of ethnic minorities 
that was based on social, economic, cultural and religious characteristics. The 
end goal was a cohesive yet pluralistic society made up of ethnically distinct yet 
settled groups (Ireland 2004:122). Muslim movements were just part of the mix: 
the problematic history of Catholic emancipation and the eventual acquiescence 
of humanist beliefs and Jewish practices helped to clear the way for Islam (Ire-
land 2004:122). Although the so called ‘silver cord’ between the Dutch state and 
churches was cut in 1983, local governments still had the authority to disperse 
subsidies for social and cultural work, including those performed by mosque as-
sociations (De Bruijn and Clemens 1998:246; Ireland 2004:122). Thus, although 
most of the Dutch were leaving their pillars, the state helped to construct a new 
Muslim pillar. It introduced subsidies for prayer rooms and eventually mosques, 
sanctioned and regulated the ritual slaughtering of animals, initiated the Islamic 
Broadcasting Foundation, and made imams legally equal to other spiritual leaders 
(Shadid and Van Koningsveld 1996a,b). It was believed that Muslim organisa-
tions could help to implement the minority policies and emancipate their members. 
However, efforts to create a unified Dutch Islam failed, the organisations remained 
nationality-based and most mosques had an ethnic affiliation (Ireland 2004:123). 
Thus references to ‘Islam’ or ‘the Muslims’ are misleading generalisations, for 
there are many different interpretations of the Qur’an and differences in religious 
cultural practices.
This focus on political-cultural integration based on ethnic identities and the lack 
of structural integration in the labour market, housing, schools and vocational 
training polices eventually blew up in the faces of Dutch policy makers. As Cad-
wel writes: ‘The Dutch talked themselves into believing that valuelessness was a 
perennial feature of their society. So they could build a Muslim pillar and then let 
it collapse into post-modern individualism, following the same historic route that 
Protestantism and Catholicism had taken, as if that route were the product of an 
iron historical law’ (Cadwell 2004, cited in Carle 2006). The economic stagnation 
and restructuring of the late 1980s hit immigrant groups very hard. In 1987 unem-
ployment rates had soared to 42 per cent among Moroccans, 44 per cent among 
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Turks and 27 per cent among Surinamese, compared with just 13 per cent among 
the native population (Penninx and Groenendijk, as cited in Ireland 2004:123). 
Drop-out rates among allochthonous students were very high and many of the 
first-generation immigrants who had lived in the Netherlands for decades did not 
speak any Dutch (Engbersen, Hemerijck and Bakker 1994, as cited in Ireland 
2004:123 ). 
In January 2000, Paul Scheffer, a historian and prominent Dutch Labour Party 
(PVdA) member, wrote an article that appeared in the NRC Handelsblad, a Dutch 
daily newspaper, entitled ‘The Multicultural Drama’. Herein Scheffer argued that 
an ‘ethnic underclass’ consisted of people who do not feel attached to Dutch cul-
ture and society and who are unwilling and unable to integrate, had been formed 
as the result of cultural relativism. From his viewpoint, the illiberal ideas of Muslims 
could undermine the social cohesion and the functioning of  liberal democracy 
(Scheffer 2000). The solution he suggested was a ‘civilisation offensive’ which 
would force immigrants to adhere to the principles on which the Dutch state had 
been created and that they should have a comprehensive knowledge of Dutch 
history and culture. Tolerance, he claimed, ‘can only survive within clear limits: 
without shared norms and values about the rule of law, we cannot productively 
have differences of opinion’ (Scheffer 2000). The success of Scheffer’s critique of 
the indifference of Dutch multicultural ‘tolerance’ was that it sparked the expres-
sion of classical nationalist sentiments, such as the defence of Dutch language 
and culture and the need for a shared understanding of history. Thus criticism from 
the left that ‘the very idea of a multicultural society was too conservative because it 
denies the fact that migration changes people’ (Scheffer 2000) started to ricochet 
across the political spectrum.  
These anti-multiculturalism sentiments were most clearly articulated by the right-
ist populist politicians like Pim Fortuyn and later Geert Wilders, and Liberal Party 
(VVD) members like former leader, Frits Bolkestein, ex-parliamentarian Ayaan 
Hirsi Ali, and the former Minister of Integration, Rita Verdonk. What all these politi-
cians have in common is the idea that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with 
democracy and that western values are superior. Beck (2004:17) views the purport 
of the statement, ‘Islam and modernity are incompatible’, as a political statement 
that attempts in a period of uncertainty about Dutch identity – resulting partially 
from the large Muslim minority group in the Netherlands – to create certainty by 
making this identity distinct from Islam. He also argues that Muslims are denied by 
their religion the capacity to endorse modernity and to effectuate it. Thus, they are 
excluded from Dutch society and are even seen as a threat to that society.
Fortuyn, in particular, expressed the importance of protecting the rights of homo-
sexuals from radical Islamic groups, although he openly boasted about sleeping 
with many Moroccan men (Buruma 2006:24). During a recent political controversy 
sparked after Prime Minister Balkenende told a group of students at the Islamic 
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Indonesian State University that he had voted against gay marriage as a parlia-
mentarian, Boris van der Ham (D66, the Dutch social-liberal party Democraten 
66) stated ‘as prime minister representing all the Dutch he must explain that gay 
marriage is based on deeply rooted norms and values’ (NRC Handelsblad, 2007, 
April 12). However, what Van der Ham and Fortuyn before him have failed to ex-
plicate is that the right to gay marriage is not a fundamental Dutch value but the 
result of a democratic decision that many, including native Dutch Christians like 
Balkenende, opposed.   
The supposed suppression and abuse of Islamic women has been repeatedly 
used as an example of the threat of Muslims to Dutch society and the ‘back-
wardness’ of Islam. Islamic women and their own definitions of  themselves are 
often excluded from this discourse, based on presumption and not on dialogue. 
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who has mistakenly been called the heiress of Spinoza10, made 
it her mission to free women from the edicts of Islam that had decreed her own 
circumcision, and an arranged marriage from which she had fled. Through the 
language of the European Enlightenment, and with the justification of her own 
Islamic African past, she has declared war on Islam from inside liberal Dutch po-
litical circles. However it is not skin colour or background that matter here but the 
nature of the arguments. Hirsi Ali’s position clearly comes from an elite, secular, 
western perspective. Feminist scholar Ghorashi captures the anomaly of Hirsi Ali’s 
politics in her assessment that: ‘Hirsi Ali is sincere but also dogmatic, she is brave 
but also one-sided, she is black but thinks white’ (Ghorashi 2005:2). Although her 
intentions are good, by allying herself with an ideology that objectifies the Islamic 
woman as part of a postcolonial nationalistic discourse instead of engaging in 
dialogue, she has failed in her emancipatory mission. 
Just as in France and the United Kingdom, women clad in the hijab in the Neth-
erlands have become walking symbols of an Islamic threat. In December 2005, 
Geert Wilders, the leader of the populist anti-immigrant ‘Party for Freedom’, pro-
posed a motion to ban the burka, a garment worn by orthodox Muslim woman 
with only a screened opening around the eyes. In regard to the motion, Wilders 
stated:
The Burka is unfriendly to women and actually medieval. It is an 
insult to everyone who believes in equal rights to have completely 
unrecognizable women on the streets. Thus, in the Netherlands 
there is no place for a burka. The motion also gives support to 
moderate Muslims in the Netherlands. The burka ban contributes 
to integration in the Netherlands. Furthermore, in light of security 
issues it is unacceptable that people are unrecognizable. It is for 
this reason that the burka was earlier forbidden in certain Belgian 
cities.11,12
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Although such a ban was found to be unconstitutional on the grounds of religious 
freedom, the motion may still be passed in light of security issues surrounding 
unidentifiable people. Wilders was given wide support by the Christian Democrats 
(CDA), the Liberal Party (VVD) and the party founded by the late Pim Fortuyn 
(LPF). The parliamentary fuss over the issue puzzled many because only about 
one hundred women, out of a population 16 million, actually wear the burka. How-
ever, within the context of Dutch anti-Muslimism it is entirely understandable be-
cause the burka is a glaring example of the Islamic other violating perceived pillars 
of the Dutch state.         
During an interview in July 2007 the Minister of Housing, Neighbourhoods and 
Integration, Ella Vogelaar, made the prediction that in several decades the Dutch 
would have a ‘Jewish-Christian-Islamic tradition’. Furthermore she stated that she 
‘would like to help Muslims to feel at home. Islam and Muslims must be able to root 
themselves here, specifically because Muslims are also citizens of this country’ 
(Van der Laan 2007). These statements were immediately meet with disapproval 
by the party leaders of the PVV, VVD and members of one of the government 
coalition parties the Christen Union (CU). Wilders was quoted as saying: ‘I fell off 
my chair when I read it [the interview with Vogelaar]… Islam is opposed to very 
important norms and values in our culture. We must not just throw these away’ 
(NRC Handelsblad, 2007, July 19). VVD leader Mark Rutte echoed Wilders, say-
ing: ‘the Netherlands doesn’t have an Islamic tradition. Of course not, we have 
to be clear over that. People who come to our country have to accept our core 
values like the equality between men and women and the democratic state’ (ibid.). 
CU parliamentarian Ed Anker stated that the minister’s remarks misrepresented 
‘fundamental differences between two religions’, and expressed worries that the 
minister’s opinions on the compatibility between different religious cultures would 
find its way into the cabinet’s integration policy (ibid.).  
Vogelaar stressed that in her role as minister she would like to put an end to the 
negative image and fear of Islam precisely because they are Dutch citizens and 
stay in the country (Van der Laan 2007). Not only does she fight against the fear 
that Muslims will override so-called ‘deeply rooted Dutch norms and values’ but 
also the fear of terrorism and anarchism. Around the world the difference between 
Islam in general and jihadism is often confused, and Muslim has become synony-
mous with terrorist. For the last decade or so, terms like Muslim terrorists, Islamic 
violence, jihadists, and Muslim suicide bombers rank among the most frequently 
used jargon in the press and TV broadcasts. Regardless of how one defines global 
Islamic revival, theological and political debate makes its presence felt on a global 
scale. Contrarily, Gülen (2004a:261; Çapan 2005:), as mentioned in chapter 4, 
strongly argues: ‘There is no such thing as a Muslim terrorist; a terrorist cannot be 
Muslim; a Muslim cannot be a terrorist’. He declares that from the point of view of 
Islamic criteria nobody can justify or permit suicide attacks.
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According to Carle (2006:68), approximately 80 per cent of the Dutch popula-
tion believes that the state has been too tolerant towards Muslims, who do not 
respect the rights of homosexuals and women and are willing to use violence 
to further their assault against the democratic state. Until recently, students of 
Dutch interethnic attitudes have agreed that a strong norm against blatant racism 
prevailed among native Dutch people, but that more subtle forms of racism were 
as prevalent in the Netherlands as in other countries (Essed 1991; Pettigrew and 
Meertens 1996). However, it is important to note that this ‘tolerance’ first leads to 
indifference to the economic and social problems in an Islamic pillar tucked away 
in crumbling inner-cities, and then to a tit-for-tat tolerance: ‘we are only tolerant 
if you are tolerant’, based on nationalistic cries for the protection of Dutch ‘core’ 
norms and values. True tolerance and the dialogue it can promote are needed 
because there are a million Muslims in the Netherlands, there are mosques and 
even halal meat in the supermarkets. Muslims have nested in the Netherlands and 
are there to stay. 
Dialogue and tolerance: Spinoza and Gülen 7.4 
Islamaphobia and anti-Muslimism in the Netherlands are often buttressed on the 
national claims to a tradition that is not Judaeo-Christian but Enlightened. What 
Jonathan Israel calls the ‘radical’ or early enlightenment, which began in the Neth-
erlands during its ‘golden’ seventeenth century (Israel 2001), is often used as 
terms of reference by the likes of Hirsi Ali and Bolkestein. This nostalgic reminis-
cence is what Vamik Volkan calls a ‘chosen glory’: a historical story of greatness 
woven into nationalist narratives and used to rally people around an imagined 
collective identity (Volkan 1994). What made the radical enlightenment so radical, 
a movement in which Spinoza played a key role, is that it was the first time that 
philosophy was divorced from theology (Israel 2001). Israel claims that Spinoza 
was the first to see all the key elements that made up the modern, progressive 
values that mark the secular Dutch society today (Hartmans 2007:24). Spinoza’s 
philosophy, instead of being the brawn behind nationalist anti-Muslimism, can be 
used to advocate religious tolerance from a secular position. 
In his writings and speeches, Gülen highlights the tension between Islamopho-
bia and the reality of Muslims in the West that needs to be addressed in order 
to make sustainable peaceful coexistence possible. Gülen’s ‘alliance of civilisa-
tions’ – as opposed to the ‘clash of civilisations’ – offers a perspective from which 
this peaceful coexistence is possible. Gülen’s perspective shows that, through 
dialogue, groups can come to see that they share common virtues and ideas not 
simply incompatible differences (Carroll 2007; Ünal and Williams 2000). Gülen, a 
contemporary theologian, clearly comes from an Islamic perspective; the Qur’an, 
the Sunnah, ijtihad13 (independent reasoning), and Islamic piety are his reference 
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points, just as reason was the basis of Spinoza’s philosophy. Like Spinoza, he 
tries to conceptualise modern peaceful coexistence by conjoining tolerance and 
dialogue. 
Spinoza, a vehement critic of religious superstition, called for religious tolerance in 
the name of reason, and Gülen, a devote Muslim, calls for tolerance in the name 
of God. This is not to say that either Spinoza or Gülen is a relativist, however, 
both do believe that differences are inevitable in society and we must thus learn 
ways of living together in harmony. Gülen states, ‘Tolerance does not mean being 
influenced by others and joining them; it means accepting others as they are and 
knowing how to get along with them (Gülen 2004a:157). Spinoza insisted that 
a philosophy of reason was necessary to unmask the evils produced by theol-
ogy, but if it was believed that a philosophy could do away with faith and religion, 
it would ultimately become yet another dangerous dogma (Rosenfeld 2003:34). 
Thus, adherents to both a philosophy of reason and to Islam do not have to let 
their own belief falter when they tolerate others and accept that there are other 
‘conceptions of the good’.
For Spinoza, virtue can be created by acting in accordance with reason, and for 
Gülen virtue comes from acting in accordance with a love of God.  However, both 
men come to the conclusion that it is both a public and a private virtue to be 
tolerant; tolerance is necessary for dialogue, which in turn leads to a understand-
ing that can facilitate peaceful coexistence. It is noteworthy to mention that both 
Spinoza and Gülen reject the Cartesian divide between faith and reason, both find 
that faith and true religion can be part of the realm of reason.  
These men, coming from very different time periods, assert that a plurality of ideas 
of ‘the good’ exist and thus must be dealt with. Spinoza lived in a diverse and 
thus fragile Dutch republic when democracy was trying to establish a firm footing 
amidst vehement religious and political conflict (Rosenfeld 2003:3). Both thinkers 
oppose government efforts to stamp out what is considered ‘false belief’. Spinoza 
insisted that the state is tyrannical if it attempts to force a person to abandon his 
or her beliefs (Rosenfeld 2003:42). Similarly, Gülen (2004b:35) observes that ‘in 
countries programmed for corruption, intolerance and mercilessness, such things 
as freedom of thought, polite criticism, and the exchange of ideas according to 
norms of equity and fair-minded debate are absent, it would be meaningless to 
speak of products of logic and inspiration’. 
Spinoza held that democracy was the best form of government because he be-
lieved that it promoted decisions based on reason (Rosenfeld 2003:65).14 Cor-
respondingly, Gülen considers democracy to be a necessary requirement for the 
continuation of Islamic thought and belief. According to Gülen, human rights, free-
dom of thought and the rule of law provide the ideal circumstance in which Islam 
is best understood and can flourish. That is why, Gülen states, Islam is better prac-
tised and appreciated in Europe and the United States than it is in some Muslim 
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countries. Likewise, Gülen argues that Islam necessitates support for human rights 
and freedom (Saritoprak and Ünal 2005:447-456). In terms of democracy vis-à-vis 
Islam, Gülen claims that Islam does not propose a specific form of governance but 
that it sets some certain underlying fundamental principles that should be adhered 
to, such as justice, tolerance, equality, freedom from oppression and persecu-
tion; freedom from despotism, freedom of worship (Yilmaz 2003:208-237). Thus, 
according to him, there is no such thing as an ‘Islamic state’ or ‘Islamic regime’. 
Every form of governance can be ‘Islamic’ if the aforementioned principles are 
followed. Hence, according to Gülen, western states that protect and promote hu-
man rights, democracy, equality and justice are more ‘Islamic’ than some so-called 
‘Islamic states’ that do not uphold such principles and values. Therefore, Islam 
leaves the choice of governance to the people which will inevitably be dictated and 
affected by the prevailing circumstances of the time. Gülen calls the determination 
of this choice a ‘social contract’ between the people and the governors. He does 
not see a contradiction between ‘Islamic administration’ and democracy (Yilmaz 
2005b:396) and strongly states that a democratic state ruled by law depends on 
the idea of a social contract.
As Islam holds individuals and societies responsible for their 
own fate, people must be responsible for governing themselves. 
The Qur’an addresses society with such phrases as: ‘O people!’ 
and ‘O believers!’ The duties entrusted to modern democratic 
systems are those that Islam refers to society and classifies, in 
order of importance, as ‘absolutely necessary, relatively neces-
sary, and commendable to carry out’. People cooperate with one 
another in sharing these duties and establishing the essential 
foundations necessary to perform them. The government is com-
posed of all of these foundations. Thus, Islam recommends a 
government based on a social contract. People elect the admin-
istrators, and establish a council to debate common issues. Also, 
the society as a whole participates in auditing the administration. 
(Gülen 2001:135-136).
Tolerance as both a public and private virtue opens the door to dialogue. Spino-
za’s thoughts on tolerance can best be understood from a dialectical approach15 
(Rosenfeld 2003:14). Thus, his ideas on tolerance are based on a dialogue, for 
he used a method of reasoning and to reach a conclusion by considering theories 
and ideas together with ones that contradict them. Thus in his quest for reason he 
considered religious doctrines that he considered superstitious. Dialogue is part 
and parcel of democracy, which Spinoza found to be the best form of government 
because it promoted reason. Gülen is very explicit over the inter-relationship be-
tween dialogue and tolerance (de Bolt 2005:38-52). Spinoza conceptualised toler-
ance as a combination of self-constraint with greater openness towards others, 
under these conditions dialogue is then possible. Gülen (2004a:171) understands 
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dialogue as the encounter between two or more individuals in order to discuss 
specific issues. For him, dialogue helps form strong bonds between the dialogue 
partners. For both men, consent is not the ultimate goal of dialogue but instead a 
means to deal with the contradictory viewpoints in pluralistic society. Both believe 
that the discourse is a logical process that can lead to a reasonable outcome be-
cause there is a commonly shared core of identity that permeates through differ-
ence, and that is reason. Gülen (2004b:52) constantly speaks of dialogue in com-
bination with tolerance, forgiveness, love, and opening one’s heart to everyone.
Celik and Valkenberg (2007) explain that Gülen proposes dialogue as a method 
used in building and establishing a culture of peace among co-religionists, people 
of different ethnic, racial and cultural backgrounds. He sees dialogue as a frame-
work of mutual acceptance and respect of each other’s identity. They describe 
this as the first stage of Gülen’s dialogue concept; accepting the others in their 
own position. The second stage involves respecting the position of the other(s), 
and the third stage is the concept of sharing values in the context of the other(s). 
Gülen’s conviction is that humanity ultimately will be led to peace and unity by 
recognising and accepting social, cultural, and religious diversity, an exchange 
of mutual values and union in collaboration. Gülen sees diversity and pluralism 
as a natural fact. He wants those differences to be admitted and to be explicitly 
professed. Accepting everyone as they are, which is broader and deeper than 
tolerance, is his normal practice (Ünal and Williams 2000:256-8).
The Prophet (Muhammad) says that all people are as equal as 
the teeth of a comb. Islam does not discriminate based on race, 
colour, age, nationality, or physical traits. The Prophet declared 
‘You are all from Adam, and Adam is from earth. O servants of 
God, be brothers (and sisters)’. (Gülen, 2001a:134). 
Those who close the road of tolerance are beasts who have lost 
their humanity […] forgiveness and tolerance will heal most of 
our wounds, but only if this divine instrument is in the hands of 
those who understand its language. Otherwise, the incorrect 
treatment we have used until now will create many complications 
and continue to confuse us. (Gülen 2000:4-5).
Gülen (2000:4-5) believes that ‘interfaith dialogue is a must today, and that the 
first step in establishing it is forgetting the past, ignoring polemical arguments, and 
giving precedence to common points, which far outnumber polemical ones’. In his 
opinion, a believer does not hesitate to communicate with any kind of thought and 
system. Islam does not reject interaction with diverse cultures and change as long 
as what is to be appropriated does not contradict the main pillars of Islam.
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[…] different beliefs, races, customs and traditions will continue to 
cohabit in this village. Each individual is like a unique realm unto 
themselves; therefore the desire for all humanity to be similar to 
one another is nothing more than wishing for the impossible. For 
this reason, the peace of this (global) village lies in respecting all 
these differences, considering these differences to be part of our 
nature and in ensuring that people appreciate these differences. 
Otherwise, it is unavoidable that the world will devour itself in a 
web of conflicts, disputes, fights, and the bloodiest of wars, thus 
preparing the way for its own end. (Gülen 2004b:249-250). 
If one were to seek the true face of Islam in its own sources, 
history, and true representatives, then one would discover that 
it contains no harshness, cruelty, or fanaticism. It is a religion of 
forgiveness, pardon, and tolerance as such saints and princes 
of love and tolerance as al-Rumi, Yunus Emre, Ahmed Yesevi, 
Bediüzzaman and many others have so beautifully expressed. 
(Gülen 2004a:58-59).
Gülen envisions a twenty-first century in which human beings shall witness the 
birth of a spiritual dynamic that will revitalise long-dormant moral values; an age 
of tolerance, understanding, and international cooperation that will ultimately lead, 
through intercultural dialogue and a sharing of values, to greater understanding 
and peace. Gülen believes the road to justice for all is dependent on the provision 
of an adequate and appropriate multicultural education. Only then will there be 
sufficient understanding and tolerance to secure respect for the rights of others.
Conclusion7.5 
Initial Dutch ‘tolerance’ of Muslims was not true tolerance because, instead of 
leading the way to dialogue, it led to the division of society through pillarisation. 
Current claims to ‘tolerance’ by rightist politicians close off the way to dialogue by 
pinning one extreme inflexible ‘core’ of beliefs against another. The fear of losing 
Dutch traditions to Muslims is based on a fear and a lack of insight into histori-
cal and democratic processes; homosexual and women’s rights were created as 
a result of a socio-economic change and dialogue. Gülen’s interpretation of the 
Qur’an shows that Islam does not require its followers to destroy beliefs they do 
not agree with but instead to tolerate and engage in dialogue with those who have 
seemingly contradictory values. Similarly, Spinoza insists that the state should not 
try to force people to desert their beliefs. Thus Scheffers’ ‘civilisation defensive’ is 
not conducive to true democracy and lasting peace.   
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A re-evaluation of the Dutch tolerance is necessary. Before he was killed, Theo 
van Gogh said to Muhammad Bouyeri, ‘Can we discuss this’ (Spruyt 2007), but no 
discussion was possible because Bouyeri was not tolerant of Van Gogh’s ideas, 
and Van Gogh himself had also not been tolerant of Muslims. The situation is a 
microcosm for what has been happening in Dutch society as a whole. Those afraid 
of losing their ideals fail to tolerate positions they see as threatening and thus do 
not engage in dialogue. The problem with this fear is that it breeds intolerance 
in a society that is and will inevitably remain diverse. Gülen writes: ‘People with 
different ideals and thoughts are either going to seek ways of getting along by 
means of reconciliation or they will constantly fight with one another. There have 
always been people who thought differently to one another and there always will 
be’ (Gülen 2004b:52). In the post-9/11 world of real and perceived ‘clashes’, the 
people participating in the Gülen movement continue to provide humanity with 
both spiritual and practical guidance towards peace and tolerance of others.
This chapter is a demonstration of how perspectives from different times, loca-
tions, and worldviews can still find deep resonance and yield points on which to 
engage in dialogue and tolerance. By amalgamating the perspectives on toler-
ance and dialogue, one Islamic, the other enlightenment secular, it shows that 
although different they can together arrive at one truth. This is only possible when 
political and social positions are developed in dialectic, and not a fundamental-
ist, context. Respecting others, listening to others in dialogue, and considering 
their perspectives when drawing conclusions can lead to peaceful coexistence 
between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands.
notes
1. Dutch tolerance has also lead to the integration of liberal attitudes and policies towards pros-
titution and gay marriage. The use of soft drugs also suggests that the Dutch still take an open 
and accepting stand towards behaviours that may be condemned as deviant by others (Vermeij 
2006:19).
2. Other Islamic groups in the Netherlands include Hindustani Surinamese, Indonesians, Paki-
stanis, Tunisians and Moluccans (Shadid and Van Koningsveld 1996a,b) as well as newer im-
migrants/asylum seekers such as Iranians and Iraqis. 
3. ‘Visible minorities’ is a Canadian term used to indicate ethnic communities that stand out as a 
result of their size (Entzinger 2006:2).  
4. After Indonesian independence was granted in 1949, approximately 300,000 colonists and 
colonised fled to the Netherlands, of whom approximately 13,000 were former soldiers from the 
island of Ambon (Moluccans) (Köbben 1979:147). Both the Moluccans and the government con-
sidered their residence to be temporary because they had been promised independence by the 
Dutch. After being housed in a former Nazi concentration camp, and having been considered 
‘temporary’ for more than 25 years, unrest led to several terrorist attacks by young Moluccans. 
Finally a kidnapping and two train hijackings sparked the political and social debates that eventu-
ally led to the WRR report on the status of minorities (Köbben 1979).
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5. It is interesting to note that although well meaning, these policies often led to mistaken un-
derstandings of ethnic group composition. For instance, all Moroccans were supposed to have 
Arabic as their mother language and thus the children of Berber-speaking immigrants were also 
provided with Arabic classes. 
6. The People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) is 
a political party founded on the liberal philosophy widely held in the Netherlands.
7. In this same report the government wrote that the effort of the entire society, both foreign and 
native-Dutch, was needed for the integration of minorities. 
8. Hirsi Ali made it her political mission to emancipate women from Islam. She herself came to the 
Netherlands as a refugee after escaping an arranged marriage. In 2006 a controversy over her 
citizenship arose after the Minister of Integration, a fellow liberal party member, made an issue 
of lies Hirsi Ali had told on her original asylum request. In the end she was allowed to keep her 
citizenship but she voluntarily resigned from the parliament and moved to the United States.
9. In December 2006 integration was removed from Verdonk’s portfolio after a struggle between 
the cabinet and the parliament over the pardoning of 2600 asylum seekers who asked for asylum 
longer than five years before and who had asylum applications turned down under the previous 
cabinet and in the justice system (Kalse and Valk 2006, December 14). In February 2007 Verdonk 
stood down as minister when the new cabinet was installed. She is currently a member of parlia-
ment and is the leader of her own political party, Trots op Nederland.
10. See Buruma (2006). This was a statement made by Jonathan Israel, quoted by Yoram Stein 
in Trouw, 6 May 2005.
11. Groep Wilders (2005, December 20). ‘Burka verboden in Nederland—Kamer stemt voor motie 
van Wilders’. Retrieved 8 October 2006, from http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=364&Itemid=71.
12. This is the author’s own translation from Dutch to English.
13. Ijtihad (Islamic interpretation) is a very important aspect of Islam with regard to its dynamism 
and universality. Within practical life, thanks to ijtihad, Islam dynamically develops itself in accord-
ance with changing conditions in different contexts (see Yilmaz 2003:212).
14. Spinoza envisaged elite democracy instead of mass democracy, which, as the democratic 
election of Adolf Hitler shows, can lead an end to reason and tolerance. 
15. The dialectical approach (Mason and Mitroff 1981) uses creative conflict to help identify and 
challenge assumptions to create new perceptions. Firstly the devil’s advocate approach may 
be useful in exposing underlying assumptions, but has a tendency to emphasise the negative, 
whereas dialectical inquiry has a more balanced approach.
This thesis has addressed social conflict and its possible solutions from the per-
spective of a transnational movement’s activism. The movement examined here 
is a dynamic civil society movement that is global, human-oriented, faith-based, 
non-state, non-profit, non-violent, and voluntary. Although known as the Gülen 
movement, this movement has remained faith-based at an individual level, it is 
considered to be an apolitical movement since it is not related to any political 
group. In general the movement has a Muslim worldview, however it is charac-
terised as a secular movement due to its secular-oriented educational projects 
(cf. Ahmad 2008; Kalyoncu 2008a:7; Sevindi 2008; Zürcher 2007:291). So far, 
there is little scholarly work on the Gülen movement’s message regarding so-
cial conflict and reconciliation. This thesis therefore makes a contribution to the 
study of peace – the main theme addressed here – by providing insights into the 
management of diversity and the practice of multiculturalism and cohesiveness. 
This thesis provides an overview of Fethullah Gülen’s thoughts and practices, 
especially in the field of dialogue and education. My personal research interest on 
the subject of social conflicts and social cohesion is a result of enduring curiosity 
about his ideas and his movement’s educational and intercultural activism both in 
Turkey and abroad. 
The Gülen movement emerged in the late 1960s as a local group around Izmir, an 
Aegean city in Turkey. In the mid-1980s, it began to open private educational insti-
tutions promoting a modern, Islamic-based ethical framework, and spread to other 
parts of Turkey. As it spread geographically, it transformed from a local group into 
a nationwide civic movement. In the 1990s, the Gülen movement experienced its 
second transformation. It changed from a national movement into a transnational 
one by opening institutions internationally and gaining followers and sympathisers 
from several nationalities (cf. Kuru 2005). Gülen mobilised resources allowing him 
to realise media outlets and various civil society groups as centres of excellence. 
From the 1990s, the movement’s emphasis has also been on dialogue between 
the adherents of different religions, cultures and civilisations. Gülen has shown 
distinction in his particular field as well as an ability to influence wider debate in 
the society, often far beyond the borders of his own country. 
Come, let's know each other 
Let's make things easy 
Let's love, Let's be loved 
This world will remain to no one” 




In addition, it is important to note that the prevalent trend, in reaction to globali-
sation, towards cultural and political developments exerts pressures on social 
groups, both inside and outside the western world. These pressures often have 
two extreme outcomes; either the acceptance of a ‘western life-style’ or anti-west-
ern radicalisation. The process is particularly evident within the realm of Islamic 
activism. As a result, particularly after 9/11, western states attempt to contain and 
control the process of radicalisation and view Islam as an ‘enemy’ and threat to 
their cultural values and political systems (cf. Parekh 2008). Simultaneously, with-
in Islam, several currents have emerged that are attempting to formulate an ad-
equate response to both the reactions of the western states and radical groups.
 
Approaches of Islamic movements to conflict resolution can be divided into two 
main categories; radical approaches (such as al-Qaeda, Hizb-ut Tahrir, Hizbullah, 
Kaplancılar), and moderate or liberal approaches (such as Tariq Ramadan and 
Fethullah Gülen). These extremes within Islam have become part of Muslim life in 
both western countries and the Islamic world. Furthermore, cultural and religious 
pluralism have inevitably been confronted with both the private and public life of 
the Muslims everywhere. This tension and variety means that civil society move-
ments, like the Gülen movement, must respond to religious, ethnic and cultural 
divisions within a given society. It is important not to view the Gülen movement 
as a rejectionist and revolutionary movement, because its activists are not simply 
responding to the initiatives of others. This movement primarily proposes dialogue 
and education as two means to build social cohesion and mend the social cleav-
ages dividing Muslims and non-Muslims.
This concluding chapter provides a recapitulation of the five main lessons learned 
from the Gülen movement, along with reflections on the aforementioned central 
research question. I will then discuss the specificities of the Gülen movement. This 
chapter ends with some closing thoughts.
Lessons from the Gülen movement
Gülen and his intellectual activism are likely to have a lasting impact on the 
renewal (tajdid)1 and the modernisation of Islam and its opening to engagement 
with western ideals. His ideas with respect to the notions of education, dialogue 
and pluralism have applications on a global scale, through his civil society move-
ment. Based on my analyses throughout this thesis, I have drawn some lessons 
that illustrate the general points discussed in the previous chapters.
A global and interdependent world1. 
The world has become increasingly globalised and interdependent. Generally, the 
most certain prediction we can make about almost any modern society is that it will 
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become more diverse and complex. Thus, increasing connections, complexities 
and interdependencies among institutions and groups around the world are the 
result of globalisation and thus multiculturalism. Globalisation and multiculturalism 
challenge previous loyalties and affinities; questions of belonging and citizenship 
assume new meanings in an era of accelerated flows of people and capital across 
national borders and cultural boundaries. All societies are now part of a global 
system that is stitched together by migration flows, far-reaching trade protocols, 
governance covenants, communication and transportation networks. The world 
has become for many one global entity. Although this process of integration en-
genders new opportunities for cooperation and development, it is also character-
ised by confrontations and inequities that breed new tensions and conflicts. Today 
the need for peaceful conflicts resolution is greater than ever. 
In the post-9/11 world of real and perceived ‘clashes’, the people participating in 
the Gülen movement continue to provide both spiritual and practical guidance 
towards peace and tolerance. This thesis is a testament to the potential for a civic 
movement to have deep societal resonance and yield points on which to engage 
in dialogue and education. By analysing the movement’s perspectives on these 
issues, it shows that both dialogue and education are viable tools to build social 
cohesion. This is only possible when political and social positions are developed 
in dialectic, and not a fundamentalist, context. Accepting and respecting the other, 
listening to and learning from others in dialogue, and considering their perspec-
tives when drawing conclusions, can lead to social cohesiveness between Mus-
lims and non-Muslims in the globalised and interdeptendent world.
Islam and the West are complementary 2. 
According to the Gülen movement, Islam and the West are complementary. It has 
helped to establish a connection between East and West longed for by many Mus-
lim youths and intellectuals. The movement harmonises Islamic and western per-
spectives in many educational projects and dialogue activities in which the human 
person is central. Gülen argues that both western and Islamic views are needed 
to develop a new generation consisting of ‘ideal humans’. He posits that ‘the West 
symbolises the mind of the human, while the East postulates the heart of the hu-
man’ (Gülen in Ünal and Williams 2000:188). The former is based on science, 
while the latter primarily refers to spirituality, metaphysical and internal values. 
Gülen brings the wisdom of both together in dialogue and education, which are 
in turn used as tools to achieve a cohesive society. He holds the conviction that 
education will enlighten people’s minds, and relation and dialogue will adorn their 
hearts with moral values, love of humanity and nature, respect for others in their 
own position, and observance of basic human rights. These efforts must be led 
by servant leaders, capable of solving humanity’s problems of ignorance, poverty 
and discord to build social cohesion. 
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His dynamic interpretation of Islam is both compatible with and critical of moder-
nity and Muslim tradition. The movement’s global vision has been shaped along 
with the lines of his teachings containing a doctrine of love, peace, dialogue and 
tolerance. He provides ideological lessons that seek to find and enact solutions for 
social problems among Muslims and their confusion regarding modernity, rather 
than theological messages aimed at preserving ‘Islamic Faith’ in the age of secu-
lar heresy. His civic movement represents a new expression of ‘Turkish Civil Is-
lam’ based on peace, tolerance, love and forgiveness. The movement constitutes 
a diasporic community defying clichés and common stereotypes about Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike: Turkish immigrants are part of the ‘emerging Islam’ in the 
context of secular modernity. 
The movement’s message represents a new expression of Islam, and cultivates an 
art of living together despite differences in societies. Gülen sees modern, western 
ideals (e.g., democracy, equality, justice, human rights, and freedom of thought 
and expression) and Muslim identity as compatible and complementary instead 
of contradictory. The movement’s participants prioritise individual achievement 
in the private sphere and expansion of the freedom of expression, democratic 
participation and self-government in the public domain. The sociological result of 
this dialectic can be seen as a renewed Islamic identity, merging religious values 
and western ideals. Concepts like dialogue, love, forgiveness and tolerance are 
important values found in his message and the movement’s practices. Gülen links 
dialogue to diversity and exchange in order to achieve coexistence and ultimately, 
peace, among the world’s people. Hence, the movement’s existence can be seen 
as an opportunity to establish a bridge between modern ideals and a Muslim iden-
tity in the contemporary world.
However, it is not clear whether the Gülen movement will, like Opus Dei,2 outlive 
its initiator. Gülen is alive; the movement is loosely constructed, both vertically and 
horizontally, around his intellectual and spiritual leadership. One can claim that 
after Gülen’s death, due to varying educational and media activities at different 
segments of the society, his movement, like the Nurcu movement, will fragment 
into several sub-groups with different focuses and positions on socio-political is-
sues. Nevertheless, the movement is seen as a manifestation of flexible, modern 
Islam in a globalised setting by leveraging the power of dialogue and education 
to build bridges across ethnic, religious, and cultural divides throughout the world 
(cf. Turam 2007; Yavuz 2003a,b; Yilmaz 2007a,b). The movement offers a mes-
sage of hope and the possibility of reconciliation between the West and Islam, 
and it seems to have a lasting impact on the opening of Islam to engagement with 
modern ideas.
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Dialogue is the key method to social cohesion3. 
Dialogue is the key approach used by the movement to facilitate social cohesion. 
Gülen sees dialogue as a framework for mutual acceptance and respect for iden-
tity. Dialogue is the first major stepping stone to collaboration between the world’s 
major religions that transcends doctrinal differences. He preaches that respecting 
differences is necessary to avoid mutual destruction. Real dialogue and the four 
dimensions of peace – eternal peace, inner peace, interpersonal or intercommu-
nal peace, and global peace – are possible only when accompanied by moral 
values, mutual knowledge and acceptance of cultural and religious identity. He 
holds that the alternative to dialogue and tolerance will in the end be devastation. 
His discourse of a ‘dialogue of civilisations’ is not aimed at creating a paradise on 
earth, but, rather to come to a common vision and shared responsibilities in an 
alternative world order.
The movement has received recognition from the international community for its 
bold defence of religious tolerance, compassionate love and mutual understand-
ing from an Islamic perspective, and for its criticism of both bigotry and fanaticism 
in the form of religious extremism. Dialogical forms of understanding indeed re-
main the best prospects for understanding the other and creating cohesion and 
peace. Gülen’s teaching and movement focus on intercultural dialogue as an in-
strument for alternative dispute resolution, social mediation and peaceful coexist-
ence within the context of different divisions, hierarchies, rivalries and conflicts 
that are grounded in socio-economic and political realities. 
In addition, ‘Anatolian Muslimness’ as represented by the Gülen movement, can 
open the way to dialogue and mutual understanding between Muslims and the 
West. The movement is a unique manifestation that implemented ‘Anatolian Mus-
limness’ or ‘Turkish Muslimness’ which was interpreted as a way of distancing 
the Anatolian people’s interpretations and experiences of Islam from other forms, 
especially the radical Wahhabi (Saudi) or Shiite interpretations. Gülen writes of a 
‘Turkish Muslimness’, based on love, tolerance, dialogue, forgiveness, Sufism and 
excluding harsh restrictions or fanaticism, demonstrating that this Islam is not in 
contradiction with the modern world.
Education is the effective way to cohesive society4. 
Education is the most effective long-term investment in social cohesion that a so-
ciety can make. For lasting social cohesion and peaceful coexistence, Gülen has 
encouraged his followers and sympathisers to establish educational institutions 
inside and outside of Turkey. These people are active participants in society and 
perform public service by establishing schools, charities and hos pitals. As Yilmaz 
(2007b:40) and Michel (2003:69) stress, the movement’s enthusiasm for estab-
lishing secular and modern schools in both Muslim and non-Muslim societies, 
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specifically schools serving people of all faiths and nationalities, is unprecedented, 
not only among Sufis, but all faith-based groups and movements and thus, it is 
socially innovative. 
Regardless of their location, these schools are symbols of interfaith and intercul-
tural relationships, and successful unification of faith and reason (cf. Tavernise 
2008, May 4; Borne 2008, January 22). Instead of being isolated from society 
Gülen’s followers reconcile their spiritual life with their worldly one. These schools 
aim to instil through the good example of teachers and staff values such as hon-
esty, cooperation, freedom, happiness, humility, love, respect, responsibility, and 
acceptance of the other. In this respect, the movement’s schools do not differ to 
a large extent from the contemporary modern schools in the western countries. 
Furthermore, the movement uses dialogue as an intervention of informal educa-
tion in the wider society.
Notable examples of the movement’s educational institutions are deliberately lo-
cated in Turkey, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Far East, Africa and Eastern 
Europe, especially in areas where ethnic and religious conflicts are escalating, 
such as Albania, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Macedonia, the Philippines, Banda Aceh, 
Northern Iraq, Georgia, Darfur, and southeastern Turkey. These schools play 
a role in decreasing conflict levels (cf. Ateş, Karakaş and Ortaylı 2005; Michel 
2003). What makes these schools so remarkable in the context of Muslim so-
cieties is their engagement with secular modern learning open the pupils of all 
backgrounds. These schools, regardless of the country in which they operate and 
the legislation that pertains to religious instruction in schools, adhere consistently 
to a secular curriculum. Where the state mandates an hour per week of religious 
instruction, as is in the case of Turkey, the movement schools comply, but other-
wise the schools are at least as secular in their teaching programme and formal 
orientation as contemporary mainstream schools. They are very much like mod-
ern Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodist and Catholic schools, and do not have the 
overtly religious character of many independent Christian or Jewish schools (cf. 
Barton 2007:657). The schools of the movement are not about reviving the past 
but entering the future.
With the help of the schools in about one hundred countries throughout the world, 
many people, not only Muslims, are generally receiving a good quality education 
in their neighbourhoods, districts and country. It is hoped that in the future pupils 
will continue to be open to dialogue and that they will be capable of improving 
their socio-economic status. This follows from Gülen’s firm belief that the road to 
justice is dependent on provision of an adequate education. In addition to the for-
mal education carried out in schools, the movement has also pursued non-formal 
education through television and radio channels, newspapers and magazines, 
and cultural and professional foundations. Given that his discourse and practice 
are deeply rooted in Islam, it could be said that he is renewing Islam (tajdid); yet 
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another dimension of his social innovation in the contemporary world. An Arabic 
proverb, ‘el-merru aduvvu ma jahila’, states that one is the enemy of whom she 
or he does not know: when people knows each other, it is probable that tensions 
will ease or will not emerge at all. With its projects, schools, activities and aid pro-
grammes, the movement is becoming a bridge between cultures, countries, na-
tions and faiths. Students at the movement’s schools do not feel that they are lost 
between cultures. On the contrary, they are, to borrow Ballard’s phrase (1982:190) 
‘skilfully navigating between cultures.’ 
Contradictory forces  5. 
The future looks contradictory, but hopeful. In the light of the preceding sections, 
two seemingly contrary views on the world can be supported. From one perspec-
tive, it is becoming the site of conflicts, but from another perspective, it is full of 
synergy, love, forgiveness, and unity due to the efforts of people who are ambas-
sadors of peace and dialogue. In order to cope with this anomaly adequately and 
effectively, social commitment; cultural sensitivity; an ethical sense of responsibil-
ity; a free and critical mentality; and a worldview of aesthetics and culture are nec-
essary. If the majority adheres to such values, a ideal world is possible. This can 
be realised only by people who are equipped with the necessary competencies 
enabling them to approach their environment with confidence, love, awareness, 
tolerance and respect. 
The Gülen movement provides hope for a tolerant world, due to educational 
projects, and dialogue initiatives started among the adherents of the Abrahamic 
faiths (Muslims, Christians, and Jews), who, despite having competed with each 
other and opposed each other for centuries, are rooted in and nourished by the 
same source and share the same principles. In fact, dialogue projects among 
the three major world religions have grown to include Hinduism, Buddhism, Con-
fucianism and other faith groups, as well as atheists. Dialogue and the four di-
mensions of peace are possible only when accompanied by moral values, mutual 
knowledge and acceptance of cultural and religious identity. The movement that 
has evolved around Gülen’s ideas has the potential to influence positively both 
Muslim and non-Muslim individuals.
The first step in interfaith and intercultural dialogue is to leave aside the polemical 
issues differentiating religions and bring to the fore their commonalities. Gülen is 
thus revitalising al-Rumi’s message (1969; also cited in Beytur 1965:103): ‘One 
of my feet is in the centre, the other rotating among all seventy-two nations’. Fol-
lowing this teaching allows people to draw a circle wide enough to include not 
only religious people, but all of humanity. It is important not to forget that relations 
between civilised people are always facilitated through dialogue and reconcilia-
tion. Gülen argues that tolerance, love, and compassion are Islamic values that 
Muslims have a duty to bring to the modern world. Furthermore, Gülen invites non-
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Muslims to move beyond prejudice, suspicion, and half-truths so that they might 
arrive at an understanding of what Islam is really about. The movement seeks to 
apply an interpretation of Islamic teaching that leads the believer to truly spiritual 
values like forgiveness, compassion, love, liberality, inner peace, social harmony, 
and honesty. In expressing the Muslim values derived from his vast knowledge 
of the Islamic sources and prophetic traditions, Gülen not only calls Muslims to 
engage in dialogue and to work for peace, but he engages non-Muslims in a dis-
cussion of commonly held ideals.
This analysis of Gülen’s message of reconciliation is helpful in challenging the 
‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. It offers alternatives to such civilisational conflicts. In 
today’s world of global connectedness, people may develop the capacity to en-
ter into dialogue and build relationships with people coming from vastly different 
worldviews. Developing strategies and capacities for peaceful coexistence amidst 
radical difference and shrinking natural resources is the greatest challenge of this 
era. Gülen pursues an inclusive middle way between fundamental futures of mo-
dernity and the Muslim tradition, accepting them as two faces of the same reality.
The specificities of the Gülen movement
Here, I will briefly discuss the specificities of the Gülen movement, in such a 
treatment that also other scholars both in Islamic and western culture function as 
sources of inspiration for people, especially for the younger generation, who are 
active in western and secular societies to contribute to solutions that better the 
world. So, the additional question arising here is: to what extent is Gülen’s con-
ception of dialogue and education specific? After all, the ideas of education and 
dialogue were introduced long before the Gülen movement.  
Education and dialogue have been proposed by many philosophers and think-
ers as effective solutions to the social problems that plague developing societies. 
From a variety of standpoints, they have given special attention to these subjects. 
For example, Paulo Freire (1972) developed dialogue as an educational interven-
tion which allows students and teachers to learn from one another in an environ-
ment characterised by respect and equality. He says that dialogue is the encoun-
ter between people, mediated by the world, in order to name the world. Martin 
Buber (1970) is another philosopher who places dialogue in a central position in 
his understanding of values and reality. He sees dialogue as an effective means 
of ongoing communication which helps people resolve long-standing conflicts and 
builds deeper understanding of contentious issues. Further, David Bohm (1997) 
introduced a related form of dialogue where a group of people talk together in 
order to explore their perceptions, their assumptions of thinking, meaning, com-
munication, and social effects. He proposed that a form of free dialogue may well 
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be one of the most effective ways of investigating the crisis which faces society, 
and indeed the whole of human nature and consciousness today. Moreover, it may 
turn out that such a form of free exchange of ideas and information is of funda-
mental relevance for transforming culture and freeing it of destructive misinforma-
tion, so that creativity can be liberated. In addition, Mikhail Bakhtin (1982; 1986) 
developed a theory of dialogue that emphasised the power of discourse to in-
crease understanding of multiple perspectives and create a myriad of possibilities. 
Bakhtin held that relationships and connections exist among all living beings, and 
that dialogue creates a new understanding of a situation that demands change. 
Hans Küng (1993) proposed dialogue as a means to peace from a theological 
perspective. He says that ‘there can be no peace in the world until there is peace 
among religions’, and that ‘there can be no peace among religions until there is 
dialogue among them’. They all consider dialogue and education as a useful tool 
for the development of the public sphere and peaceful coexistence between and 
within groups in a multicultural context.
The Gülen movement sees education as the primary solution to the three main 
problems of societies, namely ignorance, poverty and division (Ünal and Wil-
liams 2000:319-320). In order to combat these common problems he asserts that 
knowledge (through education), work-capital (through labour), and unity (through 
dialogue) are necessary. The movement’s participants organise interfaith and in-
tercultural dialogue activities to avoid religious and cultural conflicts, educational 
institutions to fight ignorance, and charity organisations and business associations 
to defeat poverty. Gülen has articulated a message in which he conjoins the no-
tions of tolerance and dialogue as a step to social cohesion and peaceful coexist-
ence. Accordingly, Yilmaz (2003) and Saritoprak (2005:325) state that the move-
ment developed an enlightenment project to combat social ills through a variety of 
educational, dialogue and media initiatives. Weller (2006:76) affirms that Gülen’s 
teaching has been particularly aimed at encouraging the younger generation to 
merge intellectual engagement with spiritual wisdom and to give expression to this 
through a commitment to addressing global challenges and to serving the whole 
of humanity. As a result of this approach, the movement has invested heavily in 
the development of cultural centres as well as media outlets and educational in-
stitutions in Turkey, the Caucasus and in the Central Asian regions after the fall of 
the Soviet Union, but also in Africa and North and South America (Agai 2003a,b; 
Michel 2003).  
Toguslu (2007:285) argues that Gülen encourages his followers and sympathis-
ers to achieve the exemplarity of a good Muslim, being devout and ascetic in their 
daily life. In his teaching, Gülen (2004:174) frequently calls people to carry mes-
sages of love, tolerance and dialogue with everyone. In this respect, education 
– also as a means of dialogue – is the essential element of integration being used 
by the Gülen movement. Although the Gülen-inspired schools do not give reli-
gious education, their essential orientation is based on the teaching of ethics (Agai 
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2003a:49). Gülen’s emphasis on education is inspired by an ‘ethical vision rooted 
in Islam but not limited in its expression to sympathisers of the umma (community)’ 
(Michel 2003:82). The Gülen schools’ model of education aims to respond to the 
question of how to generate an ethical human with common values. The choice 
of secular education rather than religious Qur’anic schools is adopted in Gülen’s 
schools mainly to find common spaces with the host society.
In addition, a comparison of Gülen’s conception of dialogue and pluralism with 
that of Tariq Ramadan, a prominent contemporary Islamic scholar of philosophy, 
shows similarities in their call for a better understanding of civilisational and reli-
gious pluralism, a moderate way of practising Islam, and the peaceful coexistence 
of different ethnic and religious affiliations in secular western societies. Both Gülen 
and Ramadan push their faith-oriented views in host societies and Muslims’ daily 
lives. This intellectual activism testifies to their social and academic vantages in 
the modern society, where secular orientation is dominant in cultural, political and 
scientific fields. Toguslu (2007) contends that among the secular elites and intel-
lectuals, modern Islamic figures who feel at home in the modern world are on 
rise, and a new style of Muslim intellectual has emerged in the last few decades. 
Gülen’s discourse, in contrast to that of Ramadan, outlines Muslim moral values 
through the formation of ethical principles and his main aim is to develop the inner 
life of all Muslims in harmony with their environment. Based on a heuristic review 
of Gülen’s works, speeches and practices, I define him as representing the trio 
of arif-alim-aksiyoner, namely a devout, Sufi-oriented spiritual Muslim, an alim 
or intellectual Islamic scholar, and an activist for peace, education and dialogue 
(Celik and Alan 2007:262; Keles 2007:499). Gülen plays this triangular role and 
possesses the aspects of arif, alim and aksiyoner; spiritual, rational and active, or 
the sacred, the profane and the praxis. 
The leading and distinguishing aspect of Gülen’s understanding of dialogue is 
that he has linked dialogue and tolerance in a manner that provides an important 
message within a global context that offers an alternative to conflict. Each person, 
community, and nation is faced with a moral dilemma between dialogue and toler-
ance and their alternatives. In this regard, Gülen states that ‘People with different 
ideas and thoughts are either going to seek ways of getting along by means of 
reconciliation or they will constantly fight with one another’ (Gülen 2004c:157).
Gülen calls for peoples and societies to commence tolerance and dialogue be-
cause in such an atmosphere peace follows of its own accord. In fact, he envisions 
a world and a new civilisation growing towards global tolerance. Initially, his mes-
sage of tolerance and dialogue started as a response to certain specific tensions 
within Turkish society. This reminds me also the fact that John Locke’s first Letter 
Concerning Toleration arose in a not too dissimilar situation. Locke was all too 
familiar with the terrible conflicts that had beset the Christian West after the Refor-
mation and also found that toleration was an alternative to those conflicts. He too 
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grounds his notion in his own religion. He states, ‘I esteem that toleration to be the 
chief characteristic mark of the true church’ (Locke 1955:13).
In conclusion, I can arguably state that both dialogue and education are not 
Gülen’s invention or innovation, but a revival of a neglected aspect of Islam, and 
of principles proposed by western and Islamic intellectuals. What makes Gülen 
different from similar contemporary scholars is that he uses these interventions 
systematically, with a sincere dedication, and implements them through his civil 
society movement as a means to achieve social harmony and peaceful coexist-
ence. 
Closing thoughts
Although the chapters included in this dissertation were written within the same 
framework, and based on the same research object, the Gülen movement, they 
present a relatively varied collection of ideas. This study is one of the first to ana-
lyse the perspectives of the Gülen movement in regard to social cohesion and 
issues related to this subject. Each chapter in this study, in its respective theoreti-
cal and practical approach, discusses his teaching and movement from different 
perspectives. The different subjects addressed in the separate chapters are all 
interesting in their own right and can be read independently. In other words, prior-
ity was given to making each chapter complete and informative as well as making 
the thesis as a whole consistent and coherent.
The choice of a single case study limits the broader relevance of this study. Al-
though not representative of all civil-society faith-based initiatives, this study of 
the Gülen movement can be used as the basis of comparative studies. The Gülen 
movement could be better understood if contrasted and compared with an op-
posite or similar civic faith-based movement, but also when it is studied in the 
form of the hermeneutic imperative (understanding social action from within). A 
SWOT analysis would also be helpful to identify the internal and external factors 
of the Gülen movement, with a focus on the movement’s Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats in a given society. This would all help to clarify the re-
search findings. Further, the metaphorical approach of textual linguistic principles 
to analysing a movement’s social activism is innovative and provides practical 
pointers and encourages a useful form of ‘out-of-the-box’ thinking (see chapter 
4). Language is a prime candidate for the key to the peculiarity of social life. In-
deed, one line of thought holds that all social actions and interactions should be 
regarded as a ‘text’ and construed as if they were utterances or signals. 
The dissertation has paid little attention to the impact of this faith-based movement 
on social integration and identity construction among Muslims and its relationship 
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to enhancing or destroying social cohesion. Political, ethnic or faith-based move-
ments often reconstitute traditional and historical signs and values, and adjust 
them to contemporary needs and identities. Actions have meaning. They embody 
intentions, express emotions, are done for reasons and are influenced by ideas 
of value. Today, Muslims, particularly in the diaspora, juggle different, often di-
vided identities. Future empirical and theoretical studies can exclusively focus on 
analysing the role of this transnational movement in inhibiting and stimulating the 
social integration of Muslim citizens and the formation of their ethnic and religious 
identity. Many people combine aspects of their identities, creating unique hybrid 
lives which the Gülen movement facilitates. 
A problematising factor in any analysis of the Muslim world is the realisation that 
new ideas are emerging from Muslim societies that have long been overlooked by 
both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars. Turkey and Europe have emerged more 
slowly as centres of Islamic engagement with modernity, perhaps because Turkey 
has long been a secular society by law, and Islam in Europe is usually seen in 
terms of poor migrant workers. Given the longstanding interplay between ‘Turkish 
Islam’ and Europe’s growing Turkish minority, however, this should perhaps be 
reconsidered. In addition, scholars who are both charting and seeking to guide 
the shape of contemporary Islam are emerging within both the Islamic world and 
the European and American context. In this regard, certainly, an ontological and 
historical examination of ‘Anatolian Muslimness’ or ‘Turkish Islam’ suggested by 
Gülen is needed to shed more light on the origins and dynamics of his movement 
and its impacts and implications on social, cultural and political change in Turkey 
and abroad. A research programme on the movement’s initiatives is helpful in pro-
viding more guidelines on how people with different backgrounds can get along 
with each other in plural societies.
Ever-increasing ethnic, religious and cultural diversity – the effect of increasing 
mobility, migration flows and the blurring of boundaries – challenges societies 
around the world to adapt their human relation practices. This globalising proc-
ess means that transnationalism, multiculturalism, ethnicity and religiosity shape 
intergroup relations. This diversity within countries, along with age-old frictions 
between nations such as disputes over territory, resources and the terms of trade, 
has the potential to create conflict and tension. Globalisation is a multivalent 
phenomenon with political, ideological, cultural and economic dimensions. It has 
paved the way for the dissemination of new markets, wealth, technology, produc-
tion, consumption, and democratic pluralism. Yet it has also caused widespread 
suffering, poverty, ecological pollution, weapons of mass destruction, terror, and 
communal violence. As a result, it becomes a lived reality that people from differ-
ent groups both at home and abroad often come into contact with one another. 
Thus, intergroup relations have become part of many people’s everyday reality. 
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Whether individuals are peaceful or violent towards each other depends in large 
part on whether they can understand and appreciate each others’ identities and 
differences. In this new period of accentuation on pietism and ethics, especially af-
ter the 9/11 terrorists attacks, the new Islamic interpretations face a challenge with 
ancient discourses. The main philosophical, theological and sociological issue at-
tached to the idea of pluralism, dialogue and tolerance is how that principle can 
be reconciled with religious and political convictions that are significantly different. 
This will remain the key quest of the world societies in the following decades.
In closing, education, as a way for cohesive society, and dialogue, as a preventive 
strategy for dispute resolution, are important interventions in this age of globali-
sation that refers to the intensification of worldwide social and intergroup rela-
tions. As a result of the movement’s projects, a new generation has been raised 
with a good education, ethical values, empathic acceptance of others, well-versed 
in several languages and with prospects for good jobs and high socio-economic 
status. Three main global problems – terror, anarchy and conflict (caused by ig-
norance, poverty and disunity) – can be overcome in the long run if the projects 
of the Gülen movement succeed. The movement is a good start to counter radi-
calism and radicalisation. Without such an educational and intercultural activism, 
society’s increasing problems cannot be solved. A new self-confident generation 
studying in pluralist environments will not be inclined to radicalism.
notes
1. Tajdid is an important element of renewal in Islamic history and tradition, through which the 
ulema (plural of alim), the Muslim clerical establishment, play a crucial role to determine the 
needs in modern times (see Voll 1983:32-47).
2. Opus Dei, formally known as The Prelature of the Holy Cross and Opus Dei, is an organisation 
of the Roman Catholic Church that teaches the Catholic belief that everyone is called to holiness 
and that ordinary life is a path to sanctity. Opus Dei is Latin for ‘Work of God’. Opus Dei was 
founded by a Catholic priest, Josemaría Escrivá, on 2 October 1928 in Madrid, Spain.

references
Abbas, T. (ed.) (2007). Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Perspective. Ed-
inburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
ABC Radio National (2007). Fethullah Gülen on ABC Radio National’s Encoun-
ter. Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 7 October 2007. Retrieved 1 February 
2008, from http://en.fgulen.com/content/view/2412/22.
Abu-Nimer, M. (2001). Conflict Resolution, Culture, and Religion: Toward a 
Training Model of Interreligious Peacebuilding. Journal of Peace Research, 
38(6):685-704.
_________. (2003). Non-violence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Prac-
tice. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
Abu-Rabi, I.M. (ed.) (2003). Islam at the Crossroads. On the Life and Thought of 
Bediüzzaman Said Nursi. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Agai, B. (2002). The Gülen Movement’s Islamic Ethic of Education. Critique, 
11(1):27-47.  
_________. (2003a). The Gülen Movement’s Islamic Ethic of Education, in M.H. 
Yavuz and J.L. Esposito (eds). Turkish Islam and the Secular State. The Gülen 
Movement. (pp.48-68). New York: Syracuse University Press.
_________. (2003b). The education-network of Fethullah Gülen: the flexible im-
plementation of modern Islamic thought. A comparison of three countries. Ham-
burg: Ruhr-Universität Bochum.
_________. (2004). Zwischen Diskurs und Netzwerk – Das Bildungsnetzwerk 
um Fethullah Gülen (geb. 1938). Dieflexible Umsetzung modernen Islamischen 
Gedankenguts [The education-network of Fethullah Gülen: the flexible imple-
mentation of modern Islamic thought]. Bochum: Ruhr-Universität Bochum. Ham-
burg: EB-Verlag.
Ahmed, A.S. (1997). Ethnic Cleansing: A Metaphor for Our Time, Ethnic and Ra-
cial Studies, 18(1):1-25. 
Ahmed, A.S. (2008). Journey into Islam: The Crisis of Globalization. Trans. by 
Ufuk Kitap. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. [originally published as 
İslâm’a Yolculuk. Küreselleşme Krizi].
Akman, N. (1995). I feel extremely uncomfortable. I don’t have such a principle. 
Sabah Daily, 23–30 January 1995, Turkey.
 150
Akman, N. (2004a). Gurbette Fethullah Gülen. Istanbul: Zaman Books.
_________. (2004b, March 25) I will not deny that a religious reactionary exists 




Aksiyon (1998). Fethullah Gülen on his meeting with the Pope. 14 February 
1998. Istanbul. 
Aktay, Y. (2003). Diaspora and Stability: Constitutive elements in a body of knowl-
edge. Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement. (pp.131-155), in 
M.H. Yavuz and J.L. Esposito (eds). Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press.
Alan, Y. (2005). Lisan ve İnsan [Language and Human]. Istanbul: Kaynak. 
Allievi, S. and Nielsen, J. (2003) (eds). Muslim Networks and Transnational Com-
munities in and across Europe. Leiden: Brill.
Anderson, B. (2006). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism. London and New York: Verso.
Andeweg, R.B. and Irwin, G.A (2005). Governance and Politics of the Nether-
lands. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Appignanesi, L. and Maitland, S. (1989). The Rushdie File. London: Fourth Es-
tate. 
Aras, B. (1998). Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face. Middle East Quarterly, 
5(3):23-30.
_________. (2000). Turkey’s Policy in the former Soviet South: Assets and Op-
tions. Turkish Studies, 1(1):36-58.
Aras, B. and Çaha, O. (2000). Fethullah Gülen and his Liberal ‘Turkish Islam’ 
Movement. MERIA, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 4(4):31-42.
Aras, B. and Çaha, O. (2003). Fethullah Gülen and his Liberal ‘Turkish Islam’ 
Movement. In B. Rubin (ed.). Revolutionaries and Reformers: Contemporary Is-
lamist Movements in the Middle East. Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press.
Arends-Tóth, J. and Van de Vijver, F.J. R. (2003). Multiculturalism and accultura-
tion: Views of Dutch and Turkish-Dutch. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
33, 249-266.
Armağan, M. and Ünal, A. (1999) (compiled by). Medya Aynasinda Fethullah 
 151
Gülen. Kozaden Kelebeğe. Istanbul: Journalist and Writers Foundation.
Aslandoğan, Y. A. (2006). Defamation as a smoke screen: A case study in mod-
ern Turkey. A discussion paper prepared for the Second Annual Conference on 
Islam in the Contemporary World: The Fethullah Gülen movement in thought and 
practice. 3–5 November 2006. Norman, OK: The University of Oklahoma.
Aslandoğan, Y. A. and Çetin, M. (2006). The Educational Philosophy of Gülen in 
Thought and Practice, in R.A. Hunt and Y.A. Aslandoğan (eds). Muslim Citizens 
of the Globalized World. Contributions of the Gülen Movement. (pp.31-54). Som-
erset, NJ: The Light & IID Press.
Ateş, T., Karakaş, E. and Ortaylı, I. (2005) (eds). Bariş Köprüleri. Dunyaya Acilan 
Türk Okulları – I [Bridges for Peace: Turkish Schools Opening Turkish Schools – 
I]. Istanbul: Ufuk Books, Da Publishing. 
Aydüz, D. (2005). Tarih Boyunca Dinler Arasi Diyalog [Interreligious Dialogue 
throughout History]. Istanbul: Isik. 
Bacık, G. (2003) The Transformation of Muslim Self and the Development of a 
New Discourse on Europe: The Turkish Case. International Review of Sociology, 
13(1):21-38.
Bacık, G. and Aras, B. (2004) (eds). September 11 and World Politics. Fatih 
University: Istanbul
Bakar, O. (2005). Gülen on Religion and Science: A Theological Perspective. The 
Muslim World, 95(3):359-372.
Bakhtin, M.M. (1982). The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Ed. by M. Holquist; 
trans. by C. Emerson and M. Holquist. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. 
_________. (1986). Speech Genres and Other Late Essays. Trans. by V.W. Mc-
Gee. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Balcı, B. (2003). Fethullah Gülen’s Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their role 
in spreading Turkism and Islam, Religion, State and Society, 31(2):151-177. 
Ballard, R. (1982). South Asian Families. In R.N. Rapoport, M.P. Fogarty and 
R. Rapoport, R. (eds). Families in Britain (pp.179-204). London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul.
Barton, G. (2005). Progressive Islamic thought, civil society, and the Gülen 
movement in national context: Parallel with Indonesia. Islam in the contemporary 
world: The Fethullah Gülen movement in thought and practice. (pp.263-316). 
Houston, TX: Rice University. Proceedings of a conference of the same title, held 
on 12-13 November 2005 at Rice University, Houston, TX.
 152
Barton, G. (2007). Fethullah Gülen: Contributions to Global Peace and the Inter-
religious Dialogue. Speech delivered on Friday 23 November 2007 for the launch 
of the Fethullah Gülen Chair in the Study of Islam and Muslim-Catholic Rela-
tions at the Australian Catholic University. Retrieved 1 March 2008, from http://
en.fgulen.com/content/view/2492/55. 
Başkan, F. (2004). The Political Economy of Islamic Finance in Turkey. In C.M. 
Henry and R. Wilson (eds). The Politics of Islamic Finance. Edinburgh: Edin-
burgh University Press.
_________. (2005). The Fethullah Gülen Community: Contributions or bar-
rier to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. Middle Eastern Studies, 
41(6):849-861.
Baym, N.K. (2000). Tune in, log on: Soaps, fandom, and online community. Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Bayramoğlu, A. (1995). Fethullah Hodja and His Community, Yeni Yuzyil Daily, 
Turkey, 26 August 1995.
Beaugrande, R. de, and Dressler, W. (1981). Introduction to Text Linguistics. 
London: Longman. 
Beck, H.L. (2002). A pillar of social harmony. The study of comparative religion in 
contemporary Indonesia during the New Order. In J.D. Gort, H. Jansen, and H.M. 
Vroom (eds) Religion, conflict and reconciliation. Multifaith ideals and realities 
(pp. 216-230), Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi.
_________. (2004). Moslims en moderniteit [Muslims and Modernity]. Tilburg: 
Tilburg University Press.
Beekun, R.I. and Badawi, J. (1999). Leadership: An Islamic Perspective. Belts-
ville, MD: Amana Publications.
Berger, P.L. (ed.) (1998). The Limits of Social Cohesion. Conflicts & Mediation in 
Pluralist Societies. Boulder, CO, and Oxford: Westview Press.
Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T. (1967). The Social Construction of Reality. A Trea-
tise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Berry, J.W. (1997). Immigration, acculturation, and adaptation. Applied Psychol-
ogy: An International Review, 46(1):5-68.
Beus, J. de (1998). De cultus van vermijding. Visies op migrantenpolitiek in Ned-
erland. Utrecht: Forum.
Beytur, M.B. (1965). Mesnevî Gözüyle Mevlânâ: Şiirleri, Aşk ve Felsefesi [Mew-
lana in the light of Mesnevi: His Poems , Love and Philosophy]. Istanbul: Sulhi 
 153
Garan Matbaası.
Blanchard, C.M. (2006,). Islam: Sunnis and Shiites, CRS Report RS21745, 11 
December 2006. Retrieved 1 June 2008, from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RS21745.pdf.
_________. (2008,). The Islamic traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya. 24 
January 2008. Retrieved 3 June 2008, from http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/
RS21695.pdf.
Bohm, D. (1997). On dialogue. Ed. by L. Nichol. London: Routledge. 
Bolkestein, F. (1997). Moslims in de Polder. Frits Bolkestein in gesprek met Ned-
erlandse moslims. Amsterdam and Antwerp: Uitgeverij Contact.             
Bolt, D. de (2005). Tolerance and Dialogue: Gülen’s thought in the light of Greek 
thought and Jürgen Habermas, in: Islam in the contemporary world: The Fethul-
lah Gülen movement in thought and practice (pp.38-52). Houston, TX: Rice Uni-
versity.
Borgman, E. and Valkenberg, P. (2005) (eds). Islam and Enlightenment: New 
Issues. Concilium 5. 
Borne, M.E. (2008,). Excluded Turks revolt. Le Monde, 22 January 2008.
Bowen, J.R. (1996). The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict. Journal of Democracy, 
7(4):3-15.
Braude, B. and Lewis, B. (1982). Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: 
The Functioning of a Plural Society. New York: Homes & Meier.
Brewer, M.B. (1997). The social psychology of intergroup relations: Can research 
inform practice? Journal of Social Issues, 53(1):197-211.
Bruijn, J. de and Clemens, Th. (1998) (eds). Geen heersende kerk, geen 
heersende staat. De verhouding tussen kerken en staat, 1796-1996. Zoeter-
meer: Meinema.
Bruinessen, M. van (2007). Foreword in: Joost Jongerden, The settlement issue 
in Turkey and the Kurds: An analysis of spatial policies, modernity and war. (pp. 
xxi-xxiv). Leiden: Brill.
Buber, M. (1970). I and Thou Transl. and prologue by Walter Kaufmann. New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. [originally published as Ich und Du].
Bulaç, A. (2005). Fethullah Gülen: An intellectual and religious profile. Paper pre-
sented at the conference, entitled Islam in the Contemporary World: The Fethul-
lah Gülen Movement in Thought and Practice. (pp.193-204). 12-13 November 
 154
2005, Houston, TX: Rice University.
_________. (2006). The most recent reviver in the Ulama tradition: The intellec-
tual Alim, Fethullah Gülen. In Hunt, R.A. and Aslandoğan, Y.A. (eds). Muslim Citi-
zens of the Globalized World. Contributions of the Gülen Movement. (pp.89-106). 
Somerset, NJ: The Light & IID Press.
_________. (2008). Din-Kent ve Cemaat: Fethullah Gülen Örneği [Religion-City 
and Community: Fethullah Gülen’s Example]. Istanbul: The Light.
Bulut, F. (1998). Kim Bu Fethullah Gülen: Dünü, Bugünü, Hedefi [Who is Fethul-
lah Gülen? His Past, Today and Target]. Istanbul: Ozan Yayıncılık.
Burke, E. (1988). Islam and Social Movements: Methodological Reflections, in E. 
Burke and I. Lapidus (eds). Islam, Politics, and Social Movements. (pp.17-37). 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Buruma, I. (2006). Murder in Amsterdam, The Death of Theo van Gogh and the 
Limits of Tolerance. New York: Penguin. 
Çaldıralı, S. (1998). Hizmetkar Liderlik, Sizinti, 239 (December):489-493.
Can, E. (1997). Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Ufuk Turu [The Tour d’Horizon 
with Fethullah Gülen’s Hocaefendi]. Istanbul: AD Publishing.
Can, S. (2005). Fundamentals of Rumi’s Thought. A Mevlevi Sufi Perspective. 
New Jersey: The Light. 
Canan, I. (1993). Sulh Cizgisi [Line of Peace]. Izmir: T.O.V. 
Canikligil, R. (2008). Gülen cemaati 25 milyar doları yönetiyor. Hürriyet. 27 June 
2008. Retrieved on 1 July 2008 from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/9286607.
asp?m=1.
Çapan, E. (2005) (ed.). Terror and Suicide Attacks. An Islamic Perspective. New 
Jersey: The Light.
_________. (2007) (ed.). Interfaith Dialogue in Islam. Legal and Historical Foun-
dations. New Jersey: The Light.
Carle, R. (2006). The Demise of Dutch Multiculturalism. Society, 42(3):68-74.
Carroll, B.J. (2007). A Dialogue of Civilizations. Gülen’s Islamic ideals and hu-
manistic discourse. New Jersey: The Light.
CBS (2007). Ruim 850 duizend islamieten in Nederland. CBS Webmagazine. 
Central Bureau voor de Statistiek; Statistics Netherlands (CBS). 24 October 
2007. Retrieved 18 April 2008, from http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/bev-
olking/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2007/2007-2278-wm.htm.
 155
Celik, G. (2002). Stapsgewijs naar een Nieuwe cultuur en leiderschapsstijl [Step 
by Step Towards a New Culture and Leadership Style]. Hilversum: European 
Centre for Servant Leadership. 
_________. (2007). Van Mevlana naar Fethullah Gülen: Voorlopers van Inner-
lijke Vrede [From Mewlana to Fethullah Gülen: Frontrunners of  inner peace]. 
Zaman Nederland, 3(20):10-11.
Celik, G. and Alan, Y. (2003). Hizmetkar Liderlik [Servant Leadership]. Rotter-
dam: Libertas Media.
Celik, G. and Alan, Y. (2007). Fethullah Gülen as a Servant Leader. International 
Journal of Servant-Leadership, 3(1):247-265. 
Celik, G. and Celik, S. (2005). De rol van educatie ten behoeven van dialoog 
[The role of eduction in favour of dialogue], De Cascade, 2(2):28-30.
Celik, G. and Valkenberg, P. (2006). Fethullah Gülen en de dialoog [Fethullah 
Gülen and dialogue]. Begrip, (32)1:10-16
Celik, G. and Valkenberg, P. (2007) Gülen’s approach to dialogue and peace. Its 
theoretical background and some practical perspectives, International Journal of 
Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations, 7(1):29-37
Celik, G. et al. (eds) (2005). Voorlopers in de Vrede [Forerunners for Peace]. 
Damon: Budel. 
Celik, G., Kirk, K. and Alan, Y. (2007a). Gülen’s paradigm on peaceful coexist-
ence: Theoretical insights and some practical perspectives, in I. Yilmaz et al. 
(eds) Peaceful Coexistence: Fethullah Gülen’s initiatives in the contemporary 
world. (pp. 297-312). Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press.
Celik, G., Kirk, K. and Alan, Y. (2007b). ‘Modern Ideals and Muslim Identity: Har-
mony or contradiction? A text linguistic analysis of the Gülen teaching and move-
ment’, in I. Yilmaz et al (eds) Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the 
Gülen Movement. (pp. 246-267). Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press.
Celik, S. (2007). Kleur in Blauw: Implicaties van acculturatie van allochtone poli-
tiemedewerkers op werkgerelateerde uitkomsten. Apeldoorn: Politieacademie, 
LECD, and Rotterdam: Cosmicus.
Çetinkaya, H. (1997). Fethullah Gülen ve Moon Tarikati. Cumhuriyet Daily, 3 De-
cember 1997. 
Commissie Blok (2004). Eindrapport Bruggen bouwen. Tijdelijke Commissie 
Onderzoek Integratiebeleid. The Hague: Tweede Kamer.
Council of Europe (2006). Achieving Social Cohesion in a Multicultural Europe: 
 156
Concepts, Situation and Developments. Trends in Social Cohesion, no.18. Stras-
bourg: Council of Europe.
Coward, H. and Smith, G.S. (2003) (eds). Religion and Peacebuilding. Albany, 
NY: Suny Press.
Dagevos, J., Gijsberts M. and van Praag, C. (2003). Rapportage minderheden 
2003: Onderwijs, arbeid en sociaal-culturele integratie. SCP-publication-13, The 
Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.
De Ley, H. (2008). Moslims in de Europese, i.c. Belgische, Lekenstaat. 1 August 
2008. Retrieved on 1 August 2008, from http://www.flwi.ugent.be/cie/RUG/de-
ley30_2.htm#6.3.3.
Demir, H. (2004), Hills like White Elephants: Analysis according to Seven Stand-
ards of Text Linguistics. Retrieved 1 February 2007, from http://www.ingilish.com/
hd7.htm. 
Dijk, T.A. van (1998). Ideology. A multidisciplinary study. London: Sage.
Dumanlı, E. (2007). Medya, Kendi Secim Karnesine de Bakmali, Zaman. 23 July 
2007.
_________. (2008). Understanding Fethullah Gülen – 2. Today’s Zaman. 15 Feb-
ruary 2008. 
Eickelman, D.F. (1999). The coming transformation of the Muslim world. MERIA, 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, 3(3):78-81.
Eickelman, D.F. and Piscatori, J. (1996). Muslim Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princ-
eton University Press. 
Entzinger, H. (1975). Nederland immigratieland? Beleid en Maatschappij, 
2(12):326-336.  
_________. (2007). The parallel decline of multiculturalism and the welfare state 
in the Netherlands. In K. Banting and W. Kimlyka (eds). Multiculturalism and the 
Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Entzinger, H., Siegers, J. and Tazelaar, F. (eds) (1994). Immigrant ethnic mi-
norities in the Dutch labour market. Analyses and policies. Amsterdam: Thesis 
Publishers.
Erdoğan, L. (1995). Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi: Kucuk Dunyam [Fethullah 
Gülen Hocaefendi: My Small World]. Istanbul: AD Publishing.
Ergene, M.E. (2008). Tradition witnessing the Modern Age. An analysis of the 
 157
Gülen Movement. Istanbul: The Light. 
Esposito, J.L. (1998). Islam. The Straight Path. (3rd edition). New York and Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
Esposito, J.L. and Voll, J.O. (1996). Islam and Democracy. New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Esposito, J.L. and Voll, J.O. (2001). Makers of contemporary Islam. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Essed, P. (1991). Understanding everyday racism. An interdisciplinary theory 
and analysis of the experiences of black women. Amsterdam: Universiteit van 
Amsterdam.
Eustis, C.B.  (2006). ‘The Cry of the Nightingale’: Fethullah Gülen – A Modern-
Day Rumi? In: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Islam in 
the Contemporary World: The Fethullah Gülen Movement in Thought and Prac-
tice. 4-5 March 2006 (pp.80-91). Dallas TX: Southern Methodist University.
Eygi, M.S. (2000, 5 May). Turkic world. Milli Gazete. 5 May 2000. 
_________. (2000, 26 May). Secret agreement with papacy. Milli Gazete. 26 May 
2000.
Fakhry, M. (2002). Al-Farabi, Founder of Islamic Neo-Platonism. His life, Works 
and Influence. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.
Feirabend, J. and Rath, J. (1996). Making a place for Islam in politics: Local 
authorities dealing with Islamic associations, in W. Shadid and P.S. van Konings-
veld (eds) Muslims in the Margin: Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in 
Western Europe. (pp.243-58). Kampen: Kok Pharos.
Fermin, A. (1999). Inburgeringsbeleid en burgerschap. Migrantenstudies, 
15(2):96-112.
FOM/FDJP (2008). Report of the Federal Office for Migration (FOM) and Fed-
eral Department of Justice and Police. Foreign Nationals and Asylum Seekers in 
Switzerland. 3rd edn. Bern-Wabern: FOM.
Foran, J. and Goodwin, J. (1993). Revolutionary outcomes in Iran and Nicara-
gua: Coalition fragmentation, war, and the limits of social transformation. Theory 
and Society, 22(2):209-247.
Forbes (2008). Gülen inspires Muslims worldwide. Forbes magazine, 18 Janu-
ary 2008. Retrieved on 21 February 2008, from http://www.forbes.com/busi-
ness/2008/01/18/turkey-islam-gulen-cx_0121oxford.html?feed=rss_business. 
 158
Foreign Policy (2008a). Top 100 Public Intellectuals. Foreign Policy, May/June 
2008. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Foreign Policy (2008b). Meet Fethullah Gülen, the World’s Top Public Intellec-
tual. Issue August. Retrieved on 11 August 2008 from http://www.foreignpolicy.
com/story/cms.php?story_id=4408.
Freire, P. (1972). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Furkan, T. (2004). Leadership Qualities in General Terms. De Cascade, 1(2):19.
Gadamer, H.-G. (1997). Gadamer on Celan: ‘Who Am I and Who Are You?’ and 
Other Essays. Trans. and ed. by R. Heinemann and B. Krajewski. Albany, NY: 
Suny Press.
_________. (1977). Philosophical Hermeneutics. Trans. and ed. by D.E. Linge. 
Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
Geertz, C. (1971). Islam observed. Religious development in Morocco and Indo-
nesia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gemeente Utrecht (2004). De Kracht van Verschillen. Utrechtse visie op inter-
culturalisatie. [The Power of Differences: Utrecht Vision on Interculturalisation]. 
Utrecht: De Utrechtse Mix, Gemeente Utrecht.
Ghorashi, H. (2005,). Benauwd door de Verlichting; de witheid van de huidige de-
batten over emancipatie [Suffocated by the Enlightenment. The whiteness of the 
current debate about emancipation]. 29 June 2005. Retrieved 18 October 2006, 
from http://www.sammas.nl/documenten/Inleiding-H.%20Ghorashi.pdf. 
Gökcek, M. (2005). Gülen and Sufism. Islam in the contemporary world: The 
Fethullah Gülen Movement in Thought and Practice. (pp.357-364). Houston, TX: 
Rice University.
Gökdemir, S. and Gökdemir, A. (eds) (1990). Yunus Emre: Güldeste. Book No. 
1112. Ankara: Publications of Turkish Ministry of Culture. 
Goldberg, A. (2002). Islam in Germany, in Hunter, T.S. (ed.) Islam, Europe’s Sec-
ond Religion. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Göle, N. (2000). Snapshots of Islamic Modernities. Daedalus, 129(1):91-117.
Gopin, M. (1997). Religion, Violence, and Conflict Resolution. Peace & Change, 
22(1):1-31.
Gopin, M. (2001). Forgiveness as an element of conflict resolution in religious 
cultures: Walking the tightrope of reconciliation and justice.’ In M. Abu-Nimer 
(ed.). Reconciliation, Coexistence, and Justice in Interethnic Conflicts: Theory 
 159
and Practice. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Gopin, M. (2002). What do I need to know about religion and conflict? in J.P. Led-
erach (ed). Handbook of Conflict Resolution. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Gowricharn, R. (2002a). Integration and social cohesion: The case of the Nether-
lands. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28(2):259-274.
_________. (2002b). Het omstreden paradijs. Over multiculturaliteit en sociale 
cohesie [Contested Paradise. On multiculturalism and social cohesion]. Utrecht: 
Forum.
_________. (2006) (ed.). Caribbean Transnationalism. Migration, pluralization, 
and social cohesion. Oxford: Lexington Books.
Greenleaf, R.K. (1991). The Servant as Leader. Indianapolis, IN: The Robert K. 
Greenleaf Centre.
Gülen, M.F. (1977). Altin Nesil [The Golden Generation]. Conference speeches. 
Istanbul: Nil (compact discs).
_________. (1980). Ahlaki Mülahazalar: series of sermons. No.3. Nil Sesli Yayin-
lari (audio cassettes).
_________. (1987). Yitirilmis Cennete Doğru [Towards the Last Paradise]. Lon-
don: Truestar.
_________. (1990). Cağ ve Nesil [This Era and the Young Generation]. Izmir: 
T.O.V. 
_________. (1995a). Prophet Muhammad: Aspects of his life, Vol. 1. Fairfax, VA: 
The Fountain.
_________. (1995b). Kur’an ve Sünnet Perspektifinde Kader [The Problem of Destiny 
from the Qur’anic  and Prophetic Sunna Perspective]. Izmir: Isik Yayinlari.
_________. (1996b). Prophet Muhammad as Commander. London: Truestar.
_________. (1996b). Towards the Last Paradise. London: Truestar.
_________. (1997a). Fatiha Üzerine Mülahazalar [Considerations on the Chap-
ter Fatiha]. Izmir: Nil.
_________. (1997b). Yeşeren Düşünceler [Growing Thoughts]. Izmir: T.O.V.
_________. (1997c). Zamanin Altin Dilimi [The Golden Piece of Time]. Izmir: 
T.O.V.
_________. (1997d). Buhranlar Anaforunda Insan [The Human in the Whirlpool 
 160
of Chaos]. Izmir: T.O.V.
_________. (1997e). Prizma 2 [Prism]. Izmir: Nil.
_________. (1998a). Questions this Modern Age puts to Islam. Vol. I (3rd edn). 
Izmir: Kaynak. 
_________. (1998b). Cihad veya I’la-yi Kelimetullah [Jihad or exalting the word 
of Allah]. Izmir: Nil. 
_________. (1998c). İrşad Ekseni [The Axis of Guidance]. Izmir: Nil. 
_________. (1998d). Ahlaki Mülahazalar [Ethic Considerations], vols. 1-14. Se-
ries of sermons. Istanbul: Nil (typescript)
_________. (1998e). Science and Religion, in A. Kiyimba, F. Gülen, Y. Mermer, 
S. Adem et al. (eds). Knowledge and Responsibility: Islamic Perspectives on Sci-
ence (pp.32-63). Izmir: Kaynak.
_________. (1998f). Ruhumuzu Heykelini Dikerken [Building the Statue of Our 
Souls]. Izmir: Nil.
_________. (1998g). Ölüm Ötesi Hayat [Life after Death]. Izmir: Nil.
_________. (1998h). Varlığın Metafizik Boyutu [The Metaphysical Dimension of 
Existence]. Izmir: Nil.
_________. (2000a). Forgiveness. The Fountain 3 (April-June):4-5.
_________. (2000b). At the threshold of a New Millennium. The Fountain 3 
(29):7-8.
_________. (2000c). Işığın Göründüğü Ufuk [The Horizon that Light Appears]. 
Izmir: Nil. 
_________. (2000d). Kırık Mızrap [The Broken Plectrum]. Izmir: Nil.
_________. (2000e). Kur’an’dan İdrake Yansıyanlar [Reflections from the Qur’an 
on our understanding]. Istanbul: Zaman Gazetesi.
_________. (2001). A comparative approach to Islam and Democracy, SAIS Re-
view, 21(2):133-138.
_________. (2002). Çekirdekten Çınara: Bir Başka Açıdan Ailede Eğitim [From a 
Seed to a Cedar Tree: Another Perspective of Family Education]. Istanbul; Nil.
_________. (2004a). Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance. Lon-
don: Truestar.  
_________. (2004b). Key Concepts in the Practice of Sufism. Emerald Hills of 
 161
the Heart. Vols.1-3. Rutherford, NJ: The Fountain.
_________. (2004c). Love and the Essence of Being Human. Istanbul: Journalist 
and Writers Foundation.
_________. (2004d). The Necessity of Interfaith Dialogue: A Muslim Perspective. 
New Jersey: The Light. 
_________. (2004e). Örnekleri Kendinden Bir Hareket [A Movement originating 
its own Models]. Istanbul: Nil.
_________. (2005a). Pearls of Wisdom. New Jersey: The Light.
_________. (2005b). The Statue of Our Souls. Revival in Islamic Thoughts and 
Activism. New Jersey: The Light.
_________. (2005c). Fethullah Gülen’s message to the International Confer-
ence on Islam. Theme: Islam and Dialogue. 29–30 April 2005. WI: University of 
Wisconsin-Madison.
_________. (2005d). The Essentials of the Islamic Faith. New Jersey: The 
Light. 
_________. (2005e). The Messenger of God: Muhammad. An Analysis of the 
Prophet’s Life. New Jersey: The Light.
_________. (2006). Ikindi Yagmurlari [Mid-afternoon Rains]. Istanbul: Journalist 
and Writers Foundation.
_________. (2007a). Kirik Testi 1-6 [Broken Pitcher]. Istanbul: Journalists and 
Writers Foundation.
_________. (2007b). Prizma 1-6 [Prism]. Istanbul: Nil.
_________. (2007c). Fasildan Fasila 1-5 [From Time to Time]. Istanbul: Nil.
Guelke, A. (2006). Terrorism and Global Disorder: Political Violence in the Con-
temporary World. London: I.B. Tauris.
Gündem, M. (2005). Days with Fethullah Gülen: An analysis of a movement with 
question-and-answers. 5th edition. Istanbul: Alfa.
Gulay, E.N. (2007). The theological thought of Fethullah Gülen: Reconciling Sci-
ence and Islam. Master thesis. St Anthony’s College, University of Oxford.
Hablemitoğlu, N. (1999). 28 Şubat Kararları Sürecine Bir Katkı: Organize Suçlar 
ve Fethullahçılar, Yeni Hayat, 5(52):3-9.
Halliday, F. (1995). Islam and the myth of confrontation. Religion and politics in 
 162
the Middle East. New York: I.B. Tauris.
Hartmans, R. (2007). Jonathan Israel: Alle moderne warden komen van Spinoza. 
De Groene Amsterdammer, 6 August 2007, 23-25.
Hay, I. (2000). Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography. South Mel-
bourne, Vic., and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Haylamaz, R. (2007). Gonul Tahtimizin Essiz Sultani Efendimiz-1. Bidayetten 
Bedir’e. Istanbul; Isik Yayinlari. 
Heffner, R.W. (1998). Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam and Hinduism in a 
globalizing age. Annual Review of Anthropology, 27:83-104.
Hendrick, J.D. (2006). The Regulated Potential of Kinetic Islam, in: R.A. Hunt and 
Y. A. Aslandoğan (eds). Muslim Citizens of the Globalized World. Contributions of 
the Gülen Movement. (pp.11-29). Somerset, NJ: The Light & IID Press.
Hermansen, M. (2007) The Cultivation of Memory in the Gülen Community, in I. 
Yilmaz et al. (eds) Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Move-
ment. (pp.60-76). Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press.
Hick, J. (1973). God and the Universe of Faiths. London: MacMillan.
Hoffer, E. (1989). The True Believer. Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Move-
ments. New York: HarperCollins.
Hollis, M. (1994). The Philosophy of Social Science. An Introduction. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Houtum, H. van, U. Rossi and J. Uitermark (2005). Reinventing Multiculturalism: 
Urban citizenship and the negotiation of ethnic diversity in Amsterdam. Interna-
tional Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 29(3):622-640.  
Hsieh, H.F. and Shannon, S.E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content 
analysis. Qualitative Health Research, 15(9):1277-1288.
Hudson, A. (2008). Turkish Islamic preacher - threat or benefactor?, Reuters. 13 
May 2008. Retrieved 17 May 2008, from http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080514/
lf_nm/turkey_religion_dc.
Hume, D. (2000). A Treatise of human nature. Norton, D. and Norton, M. (eds). 
Oxford; Oxford University Press. 
Hunt, R.A. and Aslandoğan, Y. A. (eds) (2006). Muslim Citizens of the Globalized 
World. Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Somerset, NJ: The Light & IID 
Press. 
Hunter, S.T. (1998). The Future of Islam and The West. Clash of civilization or 
 163
peaceful coexistence? London: Praeger. 
_________. (ed.) (2002). Islam, Europe’s Second Religion: The New Social, Cul-
tural and Political Landscape. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3):22-49
_________. (1998). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. 
London: Touchstone
_________. (2000). Try again: A reply to Russett, Oneal and Cox. Journal of 
Peace Research, 37(5):609-610.
_________. (2004). Who are we? The challenges to America’s national identity. 
New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Ireland, P. (2004). Becoming Europe, Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare 
State. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.  
Israel, J. (2001). Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the making of Modernity 
1650–1750. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Izetbegovic, A.A. (1984). Islam Between East and West. Indianapolis, IN: Ameri-
can Trust Publications.
Jang, J-H. (2005). Taming political Islamists by Islamic capital. The passions and 
the interest in Turkish Islamic society. Dissertation, The University of Texas, Aus-
tin, TX. 
John Paul II, Pope (2002,). No peace without justice, no justice without forgive-
ness. His message for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace. The Vatican, 
1 January 2002. Retrieved on 9 August 2007, from From http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/john_paul_ii/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_20031216_
xxxvii-world-day-for-peace_en.html
Joppke, C. (2007). Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immi-
grants in Western Europe. West European Politics, 30(1):1-22.
Kakar, S. (1996). The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion, and Con-
flict. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press. 
Kalse, E. and Valk, G. (2006). ‘Ongekende crisis met een ongekend slot.’ NRC 
Handelsblad, Binnenland. 14 December 2006.
Kalyoncu, M. (2008a). A Civilian Response to Ethno-Religious Conflict: The 
Gülen Movement in Southeast Turkey. Istanbul: The Light.
Kalyoncu, M. (2008b). Gülen and the AK Party. A common quest for democracy 
or something more? (2) 3 July 2008. Retrieved on 9 August 2008, from http://
 164
www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=146451.
Kandur, J.L., Citlak, F., Bingül, H. and Onge, K. St. (2006) (eds). Rumi: His Sufi 
Path of Love. New Jersey: The Light.
Karakaş, F. (2006). Global Peaceful Social Innovation: The Case of Gülen Net-
work. In: Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Islam in the 
Contemporary World: The Fethullah Gülen Movement in Thought and Practice. 
4-5 March 2006, (pp.175-188). Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University.
Keles, O. (2007). Promoting Human Rights Values in the Muslim World: The 
Case of the Gülen Movement, in I. Yilmaz et al. (eds). Muslim World in Transition: 
Contributions of the Gülen Movement. (pp. 683-708). Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan 
University Press.
Kelman, H.C. (1982) Creating the conditions for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1, 39-76.
Kelman, H.T. (1999). The Interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian National 
Conflict. The Role of the Other in Existential Conflict. Journal of Social Issues, 
55(3):581-600.
Kılıc, R. (2006). Sayyids and Sharīfs in the Ottoman State: On the borders of the 
True and the False. The Muslim World, 96(1):21-35. 
Kirk, K. and Celik, G. (2007). Opening the road to dialogue: An amalgamation of 
Gülen’s and Spinoza’s ideas on tolerance applied to the situation of Muslims in 
the Netherlands, in I. Yilmaz et al. (eds) Peaceful Coexistence: Fethullah Gülen’s 
initiatives in the contemporary world. (pp.169-182). Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan 
University Press.
Kiyimba, A. et al. (1998). Knowledge and responsibility: Islamic perspectives on 
Science. Izmir: Kaynak. 
Köbben, A.J.F. (1979). De gijzelingsakties van Zuidmolukkers en hun effekten op 
de samenleving, Transaktie, 8(2):147-154.
Koningsveld, P.S. van, and Shadid, W. (2002). The negative image of Islam and 
Muslims in the West: Causes and Solution, in W. Shadid and P.S. van Konings-
veld (eds). Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of 
Islam in the European Union. Opportunities and obstacles in the acquisition of 
equal rights.(pp.174-196).  Kampen: Kok Pharos.
Küçük, M. (2006). Adanmış Bir Gönül İnsanı Hacı Ata. Istanbul: Kaynak.
Küçükcan, T. (2004). The making of Turkish-Muslim Diaspora in Britain: Reli-
gious collective identity in a multicultural public sphere, Journal of Muslim Minor-
ity Affairs, 24(2):243-258.
 165
Küng, H. and Kuschel, K-J. (eds). (1993). A Global Ethic. The Declaration of the 
Parliament of the World’s Religions. London: SCM Press.
Kurtz, L.R. (2005). Gülen’s Paradox: Combining commitment and tolerance. The 
Muslim World, 95(3):373-384.
Kuru, A.T. (2003). Fethullah Gülen’s search for a middle way between modernity 
and Muslim tradition, in M.H. Yavuz and J.L. Esposito (eds). Turkish Islam and 
The Secular State. The Gülen Movement (pp.115-130). New York: Syracuse Uni-
versity Press.
_________. (2005). Globalization and diversification of Islamist movements: 
Three Turkish cases. Political Science Quarterly, 120(2):252-274.
_________. (2007). Changing Perspectives on Islamism and Secularisms in Tur-
key: The Gülen Movement and The AK Party, in Yilmaz et al. (eds) Muslim World 
in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement. (pp.140-151). Leeds: Leeds 
Metropolitan University Press.
Kurucan, A. (2006). Nicin Dilayalog? [Why Dialoque?]. Istanbul: Isik.
Laan, C. van der (2007). Help de Islam zich te wortelen in Nederland, Trouw, 14 
July 2007.
Lagendijk, J. and Wiersma, J.M. (2008). Travels among Europe’s Muslim Neigh-
bours. The Quest for Democracy. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
Landman, N. (1992). Sufi Orders in the Netherlands: Their role in the institutional-
ization of Islam, in W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld (eds). Islam in Dutch 
Society: Current Developments and Future Prospects. (pp.40-53). Kampen: Kok 
Pharos.
Laub, J.A. (1999). Assessing the servant organization. Dissertation, Florida At-
lantic University, Boca Raton, FL.
Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral partici-
pation. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Lee, Y-T., C. McCauley, C., Moghaddam, F. and Worchel, S. (eds.) (2004). The 
Psychology of Ethnic and Cultural Conflict. Westport, CT, and London: Praeger. 
Levinas, E. (1986). The Trace of the Other. Trans. by A. Lingis. In M. Taylor (ed.). 
Deconstruction in Context (pp.345-359). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lewis, B. (1968). The Emergence of Modern Turkey. (2nd edn) London: Oxford 
University Press.
_________. (1995). Cultures in Conflict: Christians, Muslims, and Jews in the 
 166
Age of Discovery. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lijphart, A. (1975). The Politics of Accommodation. Pluralism and Democracy in 
The Netherlands. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
_________. (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press.
Locke, J. (1955). A Letter concerning Toleration (2nd edn). Trans. by W. Popple, 
ed. by P. Romanell. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. 
Longhurst, B. (1989). Karl Manheim and the Contemporary Sociology of Knowl-
edge. London: MacMillan. 
Luijters, K. (2008). Making Diversity Bloom. Coping effectively with cultural differ-
ences at work. Dissertation. Groningen Rijks Universiteit, Groningen.
Macionis, J.J. and Plummer, K. (2005). Sociology. A Global Introduction. (3rd 
edn). Harlow, Essex, UK: Pearson Education.
Malcolm, N. (1996). Bosnia: A Short History. Rev. edn. London: Macmillan.
Mardin, S. (1998). Some notes on normative conflicts in Turkey, in P.L. Berger 
(ed.). The Limits of Social Cohesion. Conflicts and Mediation in Pluralist Societ-
ies. (pp.207-232). Oxford and Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Mason, R.O. and Mitroff, I.I. (1981). Challenging Strategic Planning Assump-
tions: Theory, Cases and Techniques. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Michel, T. (2003). Fethullah Gülen as educator, in M.H. Yavuz and J.L. Esposito 
(eds). Turkish Islam and the Secular State. The Gülen movement. (pp.69-84). 
New York: Syracuse University Press.
_________. (2005a). Sufism and Modernity in the thought of Fethullah Gülen. 
The Muslim World, 95(3):342-58.
_________. (2005b). Een analyse over de vrede, in G. Celik et al. (eds). Voorlop-
ers in de Vrede [Forerunners for Peace]. (pp.31-44). Budel: Damon.
_________. (2005c). Turkish Islam in Dialogue with Modern Society: The Neo-
Sufi Spirituality of the Gülen Movement. Concilium, 5:71-80.
_________. (2005d). Said Nursi’s Views on Muslim-Christian Understanding. Is-
tanbul: Soz Basin Yayin Ltd.
_________. (2006). Bir Bariş Öncüsü [A Frontrunner for Peace]. Istanbul: Ufuk.
_________. (2007). Fethullah Gülen: Following in the footsteps of Rumi, in I. 
Yilmaz et al. (eds) (2007b). Peaceful Coexistence: Fethullah Gülen’s initiatives 
 167
in the contemporary world. (pp.185-191). Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University 
Press.
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: an expanded 
sourcebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Ministerie van BZK (1994). Contourennota integratiebeleid etnische minder-
heden. [Contour Note Integration Policy Ethnic Minorities]. Ministerie van BZK 
(The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations), The Hague.
Nasr, S.H. (1980). Reflections on Islam and Modern Life. Al-Serat 6, 1.
Northouse, P.G. (2002). Leadership: Theory and Practice (2nd edn). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Nostra Aetate 3 (1996). Translation in: Vatican Council II. The Basic Sixteen Doc-
uments. A completely revised translation in inclusive language. Ed. by  A. Flan-
nery. Northport, NY: Costello Publishing, and Dublin: Dominican Publications.
NRC Handelsblad (2007, April 12). Kritiek op uitspraken Balkenende over ho-
mohuwelijk.
NRC Handelsblad (2007, July 19). Nederland krijgt joods-christelijke-islamitische 
tradititie.
Nursi, B.S. (1993). Münazarat [The Debates]. Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayinlari.
_________. (1995). Letters, vol. 2. Izmir: Kaynak.
_________. (1996a). The Damascus Sermon. Trans. by S. Vahide, Istanbul: Sö-
zler.
_________. (1996b). Letters, Seeds of Reality, from the Risale-i Nur Collection, 
trans. S. Vahide, Istanbul: Sözler.
_________. (2005). The Words. The Reconstruction of Islamic Belief and 
Thought. New Jersey: The Light.
Özdalga, E. (2000). Worldly asceticism in Islamic casting: Fethullah Gülen’s in-
spired piety and activism. Critique, 17(Fall):91-93.
_________. (2003a). Following in the footsteps of Fethullah Gülen, in M.H. Ya-
vuz and J. L. Esposito (2003) (eds). Turkish Islam and the Secular State. The 
Gülen movement. (pp.85-114). New York: Syracuse University Press. 
_________. (2003b) Secularizing trends in Fethullah Gülen’s movement: Im-
passe or opportunity for further renewal? Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Stud-
ies, 12(1):61–73. 
 168
_________. (2005). Redeemer or Outsider? The Gülen Community in the civiliz-
ing process. The Muslim World, 95(3):429-446.
_________. (2006). The Hidden Arab: A critical reading of the notion of ‘Turkish 
Islam’. Middle East Studies, 42(4):551-570.
Özer, A. (2006). Pensilvanya Gunlugu. Siradisi bir Gunluk Demesi [The Diary of 
Pennsylvania. An extraordinary diary. Istanbul: Ufuk. 
Pannenberg, W. (1985). Anthropology in Theological Perspective. Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press.
Parekh, B. (1989). The Rushdie affair and the British Press. Social Studies Re-
view, November, 44.
Parekh, B. (2000). Rethinking Multiculturalism; Cultural Diversity and Political 
Theory. London: MacMillan.
_________. (2008). European Liberalism and ‘The Muslim Question’. ISIM Pa-
per 9. Leiden: ISIM, and Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Pauly, R.J. (2004). Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization? Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate.
Peach, C. and Vertovec, S. (1997) (eds). Islam in Europe, The Politics of Religion 
and Community. New York: St Martin’s Press.
Penaskovic, R. (2007) M. Fethullah Gülen’s response to the ‘Clash of Civiliza-
tions’ Thesis, in Yilmaz et al. (eds) Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the 
Gülen Movement. (pp.407-418). Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press.
Peppinck, T. (2007). Van ‘nieuwe mens’ tot ‘wereldburger’. De weerslag van 
Fethullah Gülen’s visie op vernieuwing op het denken en handelen van de ‘Goud-
en Generatie’ in Nederland [From ‘New Man’ to ‘World Citizen’: The repercussion 
of Fethullah Gülen’s vision on renewal as an alternative to modernization, and its 
reflection on the ‘Golden Generation’ in the Netherlands]. Master’s dissertation, 
Leiden University, Leiden. 
Petito, F. (2007). Dialogue of civilisations as an alternative model for World Or-
der, The Middle East, 3(7):7-8.
Pettigrew, T.F. and Meertens, R.W. (1996). The Verzuiling Puzzle. Understanding 
Dutch intergroup relations. Current Psychology, 15(1):3-14.
Philipse, H. (2005). Science, Democracy and Religion, Religion and Modernity, 
Praemium Erasmianum jaarboek 2004 (pp. 32-40). Amsterdam: Praemium Eras-
mianum Foundation. Article based on the contribution to the Erasmus Prize Con-
ference, ‘Religion and Modernity’, held on 3 November 2004 in Amsterdam.
 169
Pieterse, J.N. (1995). Globalization as Hybridization, in M. Featherstone, S. Lash 
and R. Robertson (eds). Global Modernities. London: Sage.
PRI (1999). Government of Canada: Sustaining Growth, Human Development, 
and Social Cohesion in a Global World. Report by the Policy Research Initiative, 
Canada. 
Putman, R.D. (2007). E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-
first century. The 2006 Johan Skytte Lecture. Scandinavian Political Studies, 
30(2):137-174.
Ragin, C.C. and Becker, H.S. (1992) (eds). What is a Case? Exploring the Foun-
dations of Social Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rahman, F. (1982). Islam and Modernity: The transformation of an intellectual 
tradition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Ramadan, T. (1999). To be a European Muslim. Leicester: The Islamic Founda-
tion. 
_________. (2004). Western Muslims and the future of Islam. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Rath, J., Groenedijk, K. and Penninix, R. (1991) The recognition and institution-
alisation of Islam in Belgium, Great Britain and The Netherlands. New Commu-
nity, 18:101-111.
Riessman, C. K. (1994). Qualitative Studies in Social Work Research. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. (2003). Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social 
Science Students and Researchers. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Rizvi, F. (2005). Identity, Culture and Cosmopolitan Futures in: Blasi, P. and Van 
‘t Land, H. (eds) Intercultural Learning and Dialogue. Higher Education Policy. 
The Quarterly Journal of the International Association of Universities (IAU), 
18(4):331-339.
Robert-Schweiter, E. et al. (2006). Promoting Social Cohesion through Educa-
tion. Case Studies and Tools for using Textbooks and Curricula. Washington, DC: 
The World Bank.
Rosamond, B. (2000). Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Rosenfeld, M. (2003). Spinoza’s Dialectic and the Paradoxes of Tolerance: A 
Foundation for Pluralism? Cardozo Law Review, 25(2):759-792. 
 170
Roucek, J.S. and Warren, R.L. (1957). Sociology. An Introduction. Ames, IA: Lit-
tlefield, Adams & Co.
Rubin, H.J. and Rubin, L.S. (1995). Qualitative interviewing, the art of hearing 
data. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Rumi, M.b. H.M.C. (1969). Fihi Ma Fih. Trans. by M.Ü. Ambarcıoğlu. Istanbul: 
MEB.
Saritoprak, Z. (2005) (ed). Islam in Contemporary Turkey: The Contribution of 
Fethullah Gülen. Special Issue. The Muslim World, 96(1):325-471.
Saritoprak, Z. and Griffith, S. (2005). Fethullah Gülen and the ‘People of the Book’: 
A Voice from Turkey for Interfaith Dialogue. The Muslim World, 95(3):329-340. 
Saritoprak. Z. and Ünal, A. (2005). Interview with Fethullah Gülen. The Muslim 
World, 95(3):447-467.
Scheffer, P. (2000). Het multiculturele drama [The Multicultural Drama]. NRC 
Handelsblad. 29 January 2000. 
Schnabel, P. (2000). De Multiculturele Illusie: Een Pleidooi voor Aanpassing en 
Assimilation [The Multicultural Illusion: A plea for adaptation and assimilation]. 
Utrecht: Forum.
Schneier, A. (2002). Religion and Interfaith Conflict: Appeal of Conscience Foun-
dation, in D.R. Smoch (ed.). Interfaith Dialogue and Peace Building. (pp.105-114). 
Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press.
Seidman, I. (1998). Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Research-
ers in Education and the Social Sciences (2nd edn). New York: Teachers College 
Press.
Şen,  M. (2007). A background for understanding the Gülen Community. In M. 
Wahlrab-Shar and L. Tezcan (eds). Konfliktfeld Islam in Europa. SozW Soziale 
Welt. Sonderband 17 (pp.327-346). Broschiert: Nomos. 
Senge, P. (1999). The Fifth Discipline. London: Random House.
Sevindi, N. (2002). Fethullah Gülen ile Global Hosgörü ve New York Sohbeti. 
[Global Tolerance and New York Interview with Fethullah Gülen]. Istanbul: Ti-
mas.
_________. (2008). Contemporary Islamic Conversations. M. Fethullah Gülen 
on Turkey, Islam, and the West. Albany, NY: State University of New York. 
Shadid, W. and Koningsveld, P.S. van (1996a) (eds). Muslims in the Margin: 
Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe. Kampen: Kok 
 171
Pharos.
Shadid, W. and Koningsveld, P.S. van (1996b) Islam in the Netherlands: Con-
stitutional Law and Islamic Organizations, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 
16(1):111-118.
Shadid, W. and Koningsveld, P.S. van (2002) (eds). Religious Freedom and the 
Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union. Leuven: 
Peeters.
Shankland, D. (1999). Islam and Society in Turkey. Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire: 
The Eothen Press.
Sirozi, M. (2004). Understanding Muslim Internal Conflicts: Some Inspirations 
from Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, in Bringing Faith, Meaning, and Peace to Life 
in a Multicultural World: The Risale-i Nur’s Approach. Proceedings of the 7th In-
ternational Symposium on Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, 3-5 October. (pp.303-332). 
Istanbul: Nesil.
Smock, D.R. (2002) (ed.). Interfaith Dialog and Peacebuilding. Washington, DC: 
US Institute of Peace Press. 
Soeters, J. (2005). Ethnic Conflicts and Terrorism: The Origins and Dynamics of 
Civil Wars. London and New York: Routledge. 
Soysal, Y.N. (1997). Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making: 
Organized Islam in European Public Spheres. Special Issue on Recasting Citi-
zenship. Theory and Society, 26(4):509-527. 
Spears, L.C. (1998a). Creating Caring Leadership for the 21st Century. The not-
for-profit CEO Monthly Letter, 5(9):1-3.
Spears, L.C. (1998b) (ed.). The Power of Servant Leadership. Indianapolis, IN: 
The Greeenleaf Centre for Servant-Leadership.
Spruyt, B.J. (2007). ‘Can’t We Discuss This?’ Liberalism and the Challenge of 
Islam in the Netherlands. Orbis, 51(2):313-329.
Stake, R.E. (1992). The Art of Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage.
Swidler, L. (1998b). The Age of Global Dialogue, in J. Waardenburg (ed.). Islam 
and Christianity. Mutual Perceptions since the mid-20th Century. (pp.271-292). 
Leuven: Peeters.
Swidler, L. (ed) (1998a). Toward a Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic, in 
Theoria & Praxis. How Jews, Christians, and Muslims can together move from 
Theory  to Practice. (pp.201-213). Leuven: Peeters.
 172
Sykiainen, L. (2006). Democracy and the Dialogue between Western and Is-
lamic Legal Cultures: The Gülen Case, in R.A. Hunt and Y.A. Aslandoğan (eds). 
Muslim Citizens of the Globalized World. Contributions of the Gülen Movement. 
(pp.107-117). Somerset, NJ; The Light & IID Press.
Tas, N. (2004). Analysis of a Text from a Newspaper, retrieved 1 February 2007 
from http://www.ingilish.com/ned3.htm. 
Tavernise, S. (2008). Turkish Schools offer Pakistan a gentler vision of Islam. 
The New York Times. 4 May 2008.
The Economist (2008,). Turkey, the Kurds and Islam: A Religious Revival. The 
Economist. 30 January 2008. 
The Fountain (1998). Fethullah Gülen and his meeting with the Pope, The Foun-
tain 2(23):14-34.
Tokak, H. (2007). Önden Giden Atlılar. Istanbul: Ufuk Books, Da Publishing. 
Touraine, A. (2000). Can we live together? Equality and difference. Trans. by D. Macey. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Turam, B. (2007). Between Islam and the West: The Politics of Engagement. 
Stanford CA: Stanford University Press. 
Turgut, H. (1997). Nurculuk. Sabah Daily. 23–31January 1997. 
Ünal, A. (1998). Basortusu Meselesi, Zaman (USA). 30 September 1998.
_________. (2002). M. Fethullah Gülen. Bir Portre Denemesi. Istanbul: Nil.
_________. (2006a). The Qur’ān. With annotated interpretation in modern Eng-
lish. New Jersey: The Light.
_________. (2006b). Islam addresses Contemporary Issues. New Jersey: The 
Light.
_________. (2008a). Körlük ve akıl tutulması, Zaman Avrupa. 18 March 2008.
_________. (2008b). Degisim [Change]. Retrieved 10 November 2008, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=758732&title=degisim.
Ünal, A. and Williams, A. (eds) (2000). Advocate of Dialogue: Fethullah Gülen. 
Fairfax, VA: The Fountain.
Uitermark, J. and Steenbergen, F. van (2006). Postmulticulturalisme en stedelijk 
burgerschap. Over de neoliberale transformatie van het Amsterdamse integratie-
beleid [Post-Multiculturalism and Urban Citizenship. On the Neoliberal Transfor-
mation of Amsterdam’s Integration Policy]. Sociologie, 2(3):265-287.
 173
Valkenberg, P. (2006). Sharing Lights On the Way to God. Muslim-Christian Dia-
logue and Theology in the Context of Abrahamic Partnership. Amsterdam and 
New York: Rodopi.
Valkenberg, P. and Celik, G. (2006). De bijdrage van Fethullah Gülen aan de 
dialoog tussen religies, culturen en beschavingen [The Contribution of Fethul-
lah Gülen to the dialogue between religions, cultures and civilizations]. Sophia 
Magazine, 1(1):16-21.
Valkenberg, P. et al. (2004) (eds). In de voetsporen van Abraham [In the foot-
prints of Abraham]. Budel: Damon.
Verkuyten, M. (2005a). The Social Psychology of Ethnic Identity. Hove and New 
York: Psychology Press.
_________. (2005b). Ethnic group identification and group evaluation among 
minority and majority groups. Testing the multiculturalism hypothesis. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 88(1):121-138.
_________. (2007). Social Psychology and Multiculturalism. Social and Person-
ality Psychology Compass, 1(1):280-297.
Verkuyten, M. and Zaremba, K. (2005). Interethnic relations in a changing politi-
cal context. Social Psychology Quarterly, 68: 375–386.
Vermeij, L. (2006). What’s Cooking? Cultural boundaries among Dutch teenagers 
of different ethnic origins in the context of school. Veenendaal: Universal Press.
Vertovec, S. (1998). Multi-multiculturalisms, in M. Martiniello (ed). Multicultural 
Policies and the State. A Comparison of Two European Societies. (pp.25-38). 
Utrecht: Ercomer.
Vogelaar, E. (2008). Antwoorden op Kamervragen over de Fethullah Gülenbe-
weging.[Answers to Parlemantary Questions on the Gulen movement]. The Dutch 
Parliament (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Vergaderjaar 2008-2009, Aan-
hangsel) (pp.33-34). The Hague.  
Volkan, V. (1994). The Need to Have Enemies and Allies, From Clinical Practice 
to International Relationships. Northvale, NY: Jason Aronson Publications.
Voll, J.O. (1983). Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Taıjdid and Islah, in 
J.L. Esposito (ed.). Voices of Resurgent Islam. (pp. 32-47). New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Wal, J. ter (2004). De Islam in de publieke discussie. Inhoudsanalyse van de 
Volkskant 1998-2002. In K. Phalet and J. ter Wal (eds), Moslim in Nederland, 
deel c [Muslims in the Netherlands, part c]. The Hague and Utrecht: SCP/Ercom-
er-UU.
 174
Walcott, H.F. (1999). Ethnography: A way of seeing. Walnut Creek, CA: AltraMira 
Press. 
Walzer, M. (1989). The Sins of Salman. The New Republic, 10 April 1989.
_________. (2002). Five Questions about Terrorism. Dissent, 49(1):5-11.
Webb, L.E. (1983). Fethullah Gülen: Is there more to him than meets the eye? 
Patterson, NJ: Zinnur Books. 
Weller, P. (2006). Fethullah Gülen, Religions, globalizations and dialogue, in 
Hunt, R.A. and Aslandoğan, Y.A. (eds). Muslim Citizens of the Globalized World. 
Contributions of the Gülen Movement. (pp.75-88). Somerset, NJ; The Light & IID 
Press. 
_________. (2007). Dialogue as a source for peaceful co-existence between 
Muslim and Orthodox Christians in a Secular State, in I. Yilmaz et al. (eds). 
Peaceful Coexistence: Fethullah Gülen’s initiatives in the contemporary world. 
(pp.269-278). Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University Press.
Withol de Wenden, C. (2004). Multiculturalism in France, in J. Rex and G. Singh 
(eds). Governance in Multucultural Societies. (pp.70-80). Aldershot, Hampshire: 
Ashgate.
World Economic Forum (2008). Islam and the West: Annual Report of the State 
of Dialogue. Economic and Social Development. Geneva, Switzerland. 
WRR (2004). The European Union, Turkey and Islam. Full translation of report 
No. 69. WRR (The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy) Am-
sterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Yavuz, M.H. (1999). Towards as Islamic Liberalism? The Nurcu Movement and 
Fethullah Gülen  in Turkey. The Middle East Journal 53:584-605. 
_________. (2000). Being Modern in the Nurcu Way. ISIM Newsletter, 6:7,14.
_________. (2003a). The Gülen movement. The Turkish Puritans, in M.H. Yavuz 
and J.L. Esposito (eds). Turkish Islam and The Secular State. The Gülen Move-
ment. (pp.19-47). New York: Syracuse University Press.
_________. (2003b). Islamic Political Identity in Turkey. London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
_________. (2004). Is there a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence 
and Consensus. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 24(2):213-232.
_________. and Esposito, J.L. (2003) (eds). Turkish Islam and the Secular State. 
The Gülen Movement. New York: Syracuse University Press.
 175
Yildirim, S. (1998). Fethullah Gülen’s Meeting with the Pope. Zaman, Istanbul. 
11–12 April 1998.
Yilmaz, I. (2001). Ijthihad and Tajdid by Conduct: Gülen and his movement. Ox-
ford Centre of Islamic Studies, Georgetown University, Washington DC.
_________. (2003). Ijtihad and Tajdid by Conduct, in M.H. Yavuz and J.L. Esposito 
(eds). Turkish Islam and the Secular State. The Gülen Movement. (pp.208-237). 
New York: Syracuse University Press.
_________. (2005a). Muslim Laws, Politics and Society in Modern Nation States: 
Dynamic Legal Pluralisms in England, Turkey and Pakistan. Aldershot, Hamp-
shire: Ashgate. 
_________. (2005b). State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Tur-
key, The Muslim World, 95(3):385-411.
Yilmaz, I., E. Barker, H.J. Barkey et al. (2007a) (eds).  Muslim World in Transi-
tion: Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds: Leeds Metropolitan University 
Press.
Yilmaz, I., K. A. El Fadl, M. J-M. Cros et al. (2007b) (eds). Peaceful Coexistence: 
Fethullah Gülen’s initiatives in the contemporary world. Leeds: Leeds Metropoli-
tan University Press.
Yin, K.R. (2002). Case Study Research. Design and Methods. Third Edition. Ap-
plied social research methods series, volume 5. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage.
Yukleyen, A. (2004). Sources of Tolerance and Radicalism among Turkish-Islam-
ic Organizations in Europe. Boston, MA: Boston University.
Zaman (2004). Fethullah Gülen’s interview with Nuriye Akman. Zaman, 22 March 
2004.
Zürcher, E. J. (2007). Turkey. A Modern History. London and New York: I.B. Tau-
ris.
_________. (2000). Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish nationalists. 
Identity politics 1908–1938. In K.H. Karpat (ed.). Ottoman past and today’s Tur-
key (pp.150-179). Leiden: Brill.
Zürcher, E-J. and Linden, H. van der (2004). Searching for the Fault-Line. A sur-
vey of the role of Turkish Islam in the accession of Turkey to the European Union 
in the light of the ‘clash of civilisations’, in WRR (Netherlands Council for Govern-




Adanmışlık ruhu   : Spirit of devotion
Ahlak    : Ethics, morality
AK Party    : Justice and Development Party
Alim (singular of ulama)  : Religious intellectual-scholar
Altın Nesil   : Golden Generation
Amentu    : Basic principles of belief
Ashq    : Love
Baskası için yaşama  : Living for others 
Burger    : Citizen
Dar al-dawa   : The abode of testimony
Dar al-harb   : The abode of war
Dar al-hizmet   : Country of service
Dar al-Islam   : The abode of Islam
Diğergamlık   : Altruism 
Diyanet İşleri Bakanlığı : Diyanet, the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs
Dostane    : Friendliness
Lesser jihad  : External struggle 
Ezan    : The Arabic prayer call
Fiqh    : Islamic jurisprudence
Furuat    : Secondary methods of jurisprudence
Gaye-i hayal   : Ultimate goal 
Gönül insanı   : A person of heart 
Himmet    : Personal commitment
Hocaefendi   : Esteemed teacher
Ifrat    : Excesses
Ijtihad    : Independent reasoning
Iman    : Faith
Insan-ı kamil   : Perfect individual or ideal human
Integratie   : Integration
Greater jihad  : Internal struggle 
Işık evler    : Light Houses 
Istişare    : Consultation, collective decision making
Kemalism   : State ideology of the founders of the Turkish Republic
Kişla    : Barrack
Madrasa    : Medrese, educational religious institute
Marifetulllah   : Knowledge of God
Mes’uliyet duygusu   : Sense of personal responsibility
Minderhedennota   : Minority Memorandum
Molla    : A male teacher of religious texts and Arabic
Mu’min    : Believer, one with faith
GLOSSARY OF TERMS178
Mürid    : Pupils
Müsbet hareket   : Positive action
Mütevelli    : Board of trustees
Muhabbetullah   : Love of God
Muhasaba   : Inner self-evaluation
Mujaddid    : Renewer of Islamic truths
Muraqaba   : Reflection
Muslim    : One who follows Islam
Ahl al-kitab  : People of the Book 
Qiblah    : Prayer direction in Islam
Risale-i Nur   : The Epistles of Light
Sahabe   : Prophet Muhammad’s companions 
Şahş-ı manevi   : Common spiritual identity
Salaf al-salihin   : Religious predecessors
Salam    : Peace
Salamah    : Safety
Sayyids, sharifs   : Ahlul-Bayt, people of the house of the Prophet Muhammad
Şeriat-ı fıtriye   : Laws of creation
Şeyhülislam   : Administrator of religious affairs on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan
Shaykh    : Religious guide
Shura, majlis  : Mutual consultation, a consultative body
Silm    : Security
Sırat-ı müstakim   : The straight path
Sohbet    : Conversation meeting
Sulh    : Reconciliation
Sunnetullah   : Laws of creation 
Tanzimat    : The Ottoman Reformation period
Taqwa    : Piety
Tarikats    : Mystical brotherhoods, dervish orders
Tasawwuf   : Sufism
Tebliğ    : Preaching
Tefrit    : Deficiency
Tekkes, zaviyes   : Sufi lodges
Temsil    : Action, example
Türbes    : Sacred tombs
Üstad    : Respected master
Ummah    : Community of Islam












































aPPendix: list of resPondents
The respondents were categorised alphabetically. 

samenvattinG (summary in dutch)
Summary in Dutch
De Gülenbeweging:
bouwen aan sociale cohesie door dialoog en educatie
De moderne wereld is steeds vaker getuige van latente en openlijke conflicten tus-
sen bevolkingsgroepen. Die conflicten en spanningen zijn verschillend van aard 
en hebben vooral betrekking op politieke, economische, etnische, religieuze en 
historische aspecten.
De bronnen van de conflicten liggen zowel op lokaal als globaal terrein. In het 
westen worden conflicten in toenemende mate toegeschreven aan etnische mind-
erheidsgroepen. Daarbinnen wordt de problematiek vaak vernauwd tot de islam. 
Vooral in bepaalde politieke kringen wordt systematisch gesteld dat de islam 
achterlijk en ondemocratisch is en dat het een voedingsbodem vormt voor radi-
calisme en extremisme. Sinds de aanslagen van 11 september 2001 zien west-
erse mogendheden de islam als vijand en bedreiging van westerse waarden en 
normen en proberen zij het proces van islamitische radicalisering te beheersen. 
Daarnaast wordt de druk op migranten opgevoerd om cultureel te assimileren. Dit 
alles verhardt het maatschappelijke klimaat en leidt tot polarisatie.
De reacties op deze ontwikkelingen komen vanuit politieke, religieuze en maat-
schappelijke hoek. Ook vanuit moslims in westerse landen en daarbuiten wordt 
gereageerd op de lokale ontwikkelingen en de spanningen elders in de wereld. 
Er is hierbij een differentiatie zichtbaar in respons of oplossing. Deze varieert van 
radicalisering tot liberalisering. Er zijn talrijke politieke of religieuze groepen die 
een radicale respons geven of extreme acties ondernemen. Hierbij valt te denken 
aan al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hizb-ut Tahrir en Kaplancilar. In tegenstelling tot deze 
radicale aanpak, zijn er ook liberale, gematigde benaderingen zoals die van Fethul-
lah Gülen (1941). Hij is een islamitische intellectueel en wordt ook Hocaefendi 
(meester leraar) genoemd door met name diegenen die geïnspireerd zijn door zijn 
leer. Dit proefschrift richt zich op de beweging die zijn naam draagt.
De extremen tussen de liberale en radicale vertakkingen binnen de islam zijn 
deel gaan uitmaken van de persoonlijke en publieke aangelegenheden van vele 
moslims en niet-moslims, zowel in westerse landen als in de islamitische wereld.
Opvallend is dat diverse westerse en islamitische intellectuelen de mening delen 
dat de oplossing van religieuze problematiek moet komen uit de religie zelf. De 
oplossing voor sociale conflicten ligt in het zoeken naar een weg tot accepta-
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tie, tolerantie, zelfrespect en een nieuwe identiteit in een nieuwe, veranderende 
omgeving. Dit vergt een hybride aanpak die ruimte biedt voor lokale vertalingen 
van ideeën naar uiteenlopende activiteiten en projecten. De Gülenbeweging stelt 
diverse methoden en interventies voor om sociale conflicten op te lossen. Zij ziet 
dialoog en educatie als de twee middelen om sociale cohesie tot stand te bren-
gen, de maatschappelijke kloof te dichten die moslims en niet-moslims onderling 
verdeelt en om radicalisering, in het bijzonder islamitisch extremisme, te elimin-
eren. Islamitische principes worden door Gülen eclectisch aan de orde gesteld en 
uitgelegd met het oog op de actualiteit. Het is belangrijk om op te merken dat deze 
beweging zich niet kenmerkt door een revolutionaire en reactionaire oppositiebe-
weging, omdat haar participanten niet handelen in reactie op de initiatieven van 
anderen, maar zelf initiatieven ontplooien.
Dit proefschrift is een bundeling en een bewerking van eerder gepubliceerde ar-
tikelen. Het richt zich op de hoofdvraag: Wat is de boodschap van de Gülenbe-
weging ter bestrijding van sociale conflicten? Centraal staan daarbij de mogelijke 
oplossingen van maatschappelijke conflicten die de Gülenbeweging aandraagt. 
Hoewel deze beweging op individueel vlak veelal religieus georiënteerd is, wordt 
zij over het geheel genomen beschouwd als een apolitieke en seculiere beweg-
ing. De beweging wordt ook wel ‘hizmet’ genoemd, wat ‘dienst’ of ‘dienstbaarheid’ 
betekent. Zij kenmerkt zich door een los netwerk van zelfstandige, juridisch au-
tonome organisaties zoals scholen, universiteiten, niet-gouvernementele instel-
lingen en media- en uitgeversondernemingen. Er is sprake van een veelheid van 
lokale initiatieven met verschillende doelstellingen die naar plaats en tijd verschil-
len. De beweging is daarom geen monolithische, centraal aangestuurde organi-
satie (Vogelaar 2008).
Tot op dit moment zijn er slechts weinig wetenschappelijke studies die handelen 
over Gülens boodschap ten aanzien van maatschappelijke conflicten en verzoen-
ing. In dit opzicht draagt dit proefschrift bij aan de bestudering van sociale co-
hesie als een concept van vrede, doordat zij inzicht verschaft in de omgang met 
diversiteit, de toepassing van multiculturalisme en de bevordering van de sociale 
samenhang. Dit proefschrift voorziet in een overzicht van Gülens denkwijze en de 
toepassing hiervan, met name op het gebied van dialoog en educatie.
De Gülenbeweging vindt zijn oorsprong in Turkije en wordt door een groep Turkse 
moslims gezien als een nieuwe manier om islamitische waarden uit te dragen in 
de moderne wereld, en deel te nemen aan duurzame dialoog en synergie met 
mensen met een andere levensbeschouwing. De beweging heeft zich snel ver-
spreid middels onderwijsinstellingen die werden geopend door de Turkse diaspo-
ra in Europa, Noord-Amerika, Australië en Azië. Gülen en zijn volgelingen richten 
zich vooral op het westen en de dialoog met het christendom. Gülen, die sinds 
1999 om politieke redenen in de Verenigde Staten verblijft, ondervindt in Turkije 
veel weerstand. Deze komt niet alleen van bepaalde islamitische groeperingen 
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en nationalistische kringen die hem zijn gerichtheid op het westen – vooral de 
samenwerking met de Abrahamitische religies – verwijten, maar vooral ook van 
een groep aanhangers van de Kemalistische staatsideologie die in zijn beweging 
een bedreiging zien voor de emancipatie van vrouwen en de seculiere aard van 
het Turkse staatsbestel. Zij stellen dat de Gülenbeweging de Turkse staat infilt-
reert om de sharia in te voeren en de maatschappelijke participatie van vrouwen 
belemmert.
Sociale cohesie als een concept van vrede
Onderwerpen als multiculturalisme, religieus pluralisme en sociale cohesie geven 
in westerse landen de aanzet tot een levendig publiek debat. Het multiculturele 
beleid is lange tijd relatief flexibel geweest ten aanzien van immigranten en heeft 
hen de ruimte gegeven om in de publieke sfeer uiting te geven aan hun identiteit. 
De periode na 11 september wordt gekenschetst door een plotselinge toename 
van westerse achterdocht en angst ten opzichte van moslims. Het leven in het 
westen is daarmee voor veel moslims aanzienlijk gecompliceerder geworden.
In reactie hierop zijn er verscheidene maatschappelijke projecten en interventies 
opgezet om hun maatschappelijke incorporatie te optimaliseren. Deze projecten 
hebben als doel de problemen te ondervangen die voortkomen uit migratie, het 
ontstaan van transnationale en minderheidsgroepen en de rol die deze spelen 
binnen (inter)nationale conflicten. Al deze inspanningen zijn er op gericht de so-
ciale cohesie te bevorderen.
Sociale cohesie is een begrip dat regelmatig naar voren komt in zowel academ-
ische als politieke verhandelingen. Ondanks de populariteit ervan is er nauwelijks 
enige consensus over de definitie van dit begrip. Over het algemeen genomen 
wordt het gebruikt in contrast met ongewenste maatschappelijke condities, zoals 
criminaliteit, werkloosheid, armoede en schooluitval. Gowricharn (2002b:22-28) 
onderscheidt de volgende vier betekenissen van sociale cohesie:
Een functionele betekenis,1.  die verwijst naar de verdeling van arbeid. Deze 
beschouwing gaat terug op Durkheim en concentreert zich op de arbeids-
deling als zijnde de wederzijdse economische afhankelijkheid van mensen 
binnen het economische proces.
Een institutionele betekenis2. , die verwijst naar instituten als de marktecono-
mie, het sociale verzekeringsstelsel en de staat. Ook hier is er sprake van 
een wederzijdse afhankelijkheid, in dit geval tussen burgers en instituten.
De normatieve benadering3. , waarin een scala aan kenmerkende eigenschap-
pen van groepen centraal staat. Deze omvatten ongelijk verdeelde eigen-
schappen als tolerantie, groepsloyaliteit, affiniteit met uiterlijke verschijnings-
vormen en morele kenmerken als het vertrouwen dat toegekend wordt aan 
vreemdelingen.
SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH)184
Sociale participatie4. , wat verwijst naar de incorporatie van migranten in het 
educatieve systeem, de arbeidsmarkt of het bestuurlijke stelsel en andere 
primaire instituten binnen de ontvangende samenleving.
Er wordt een onderscheid gemaakt tussen interne en externe cohesie, dat door 
Putnam (2000) bonding en bridging is genoemd. Het eerstgenoemde verwijst naar 
het bij elkaar komen van leden van een groep waarbij de interne cohesie van de 
groep gevoed wordt, terwijl het tweede refereert aan activiteiten en communica-
tie tussen groepen onderling, waarbij de kloof tussen deze groepen overbrugd 
wordt.
Gezien de aanwezigheid van culturele verschillen – hetzij etnisch of religieus – zijn 
harmonie en conflict de twee tegenovergestelde uitkomsten van relaties tussen 
groeperingen. Het realiseren van een stabiele maatschappelijke context waarin 
de verschillende culturele of etnische groepen relaties van wederzijds begrip en 
respect ontwikkelen, vormt om deze reden de basis voor het streven naar sociale 
cohesie. Gülen neemt in zijn leer ten aanzien van sociale cohesie de vaak als 
antagonistisch beschouwde relatie tussen moslims en de westerse wereld als uit-
gangspunt. Zijn idee van sociale cohesie – die hij overigens benoemt als ‘vrede’ 
– is het bereiken van sociale harmonie binnen en tussen groepen. Gülen onder-
scheidt hierbij vier dimensies: eeuwige vrede, innerlijke vrede, wereldwijde vrede 
en interpersoonlijke vrede of vrede tussen gemeenschappen.
Educatie en dialoog als twee middelen voor sociale cohesie
Gülen onderschrijft in zijn wereldbeeld de westerse waarde van de democratie. 
Hij beschouwt binnen dit kader educatie en dialoog als twee cruciale middelen om 
tot vrede en sociale cohesie te komen. Dat wil zeggen dat hij impliciet een beroep 
doet op democratische vrijheden (vrijheid van godsdienst en van meningsuiting, 
conflictoplossing en levensfilosofie). Echter, Gülen is geen voorstander van cul-
turele assimilatie aan de westerse waarden. Integendeel, volgens hem is weder-
zijds respect en acceptatie vereist om etnische, religieuze en culturele identiteiten 
te kunnen behouden. 
Gülen heeft de overtuiging dat de enige ware en betrouwbare weg die tot vrede en 
rechtvaardigheid voor de mensheid leidt, ligt in het verschaffen van een adequate 
interculturele en morele educatie waarin wetenschappelijke kennis en ethische 
waarden geïntegreerd zijn. Alleen dan zal er voldoende begrip en tolerantie zijn 
waardoor het respect voor de rechten van anderen veiliggesteld kan worden. 
Zijn educatieve filosofie is gebaseerd op vier basiswaarden:
De eerste is een waardering voor educatie en het geven of volgen van  ●
onderwijs. Gülen stelt educatie voor als de belangrijkste plicht binnen het 
menselijk leven en de enige blijvende oplossing voor maatschappelijke prob-
lemen zoals onwetendheid, armoede en verdeeldheid. Hij heeft de overtuig-
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ing dat onwetendheid (cehalet) het primaire probleem is. De oplossing voor 
alle problemen wordt gerelateerd aan kennis en ligt bij de mensen die onder-
wijs genoten hebben (Gülen in Ünal & Williams 2000:305-331).
De tweede waarde is altruïsme op het gebied van educatie. Dit verwijst naar  ●
het verwezenlijken van onbaatzuchtig sociaal activisme op het gebied van 
onderwijs en morele begeleiding van de mensheid. In dit opzicht maakt Gül-
en een onderscheid tussen onderwijzen en lesgeven. “De meeste mensen 
zijn er wel toe in staat om anderen iets te leren” zo stelt hij, “maar het aantal 
onderwijzers is zeer beperkt” (1996a:36). Een onderwijzer of opleider draagt 
bij aan de vorming van het karakter en de persoonlijkheid van zijn leerlingen 
en stelt hen in staat om kwaliteiten als zelfdiscipline, tolerantie en altruïsme 
te internaliseren.
Gülens organisatorische opvatting omvat een driehoeksrelatie bestaande uit  ●
de onderwijzer, de ouders en de sponsor voor altruïstische dienstverlening. 
De beweging die door Gülens ideeën is geïnspireerd, heeft een groeiend 
aantal programma’s en coördineert momenteel meer dan vijfhonderd (se-
culiere) onderwijsorganisaties. Deze zijn dankzij de inzet van goed gemo-
tiveerde onderwijzers en de steun van toegewijde ouders en lokale onderne-
mers over de hele wereld opgericht.   
Gülen en zijn volgelingen gaan uit van een gebrek aan onderlinge samen- ●
hang tussen wetenschappelijke kennis en spirituele en ethische waarden. 
Ze hebben een nieuwe stijl van onderwijs geïntroduceerd waarin deze el-
ementen met elkaar worden verzoend. Deze onderwijskundige visie betreft 
een synthese van hart en verstand, het spirituele en het intellectuele en het 
religieuze en het wetenschappelijke. Onderwijzers die actief zijn binnen 
deze beweging streven naar een verbinding van verstand en hart om vorm 
te geven aan “het denken, het handelen en de inspiratie” (Gülen 1996a:12).
Volgens Gülen dragen onderwijzers als rolmodel deze vier waarden uit. Zij zijn de 
primaire instrumenten binnen het educatieve activisme van de beweging.
Zijn onderwijsfilosofie richt zich op de ontwikkeling van het individu in relatie tot zijn 
of haar leefmilieu. De ouders en de school fungeren als primaire pedagogische 
omgeving. Beide zijn verantwoordelijk voor het stimuleren van de ontwikkeling 
van het kind. Bij zijn onderwijsfilosofie staan drie componenten centraal: hoofd, 
hart en handen (houding), oftewel het 3H-model. Hoofd refereert aan de intellec-
tuele ontwikkeling en de kwaliteit van verworven kennis en inzichten. Hart verwijst 
naar de spirituele en sociaal-emotionele ontwikkeling. Handen staan voor de ged-
ragsontwikkeling, de houding en de karakterontwikkeling.
Met betrekking tot dialoog, het andere centrale element van zijn leer, promoot 
Gülen dialoog, begrip en gedeelde waarden om zo tot samenwerking in plaats 
van botsing tussen beschavingen te komen. Dialoog vereist een vreedzame at-
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mosfeer met wederzijds vertrouwen en respect als structurele elementen. Gülen 
(2004a,b,c) beschouwt de dialoog als een methode om tot sociale harmonie en 
vreedzaam samenleven met anderen te komen, een instrument voor mensen om 
nader tot elkaar te komen, en van elkaar kennis te nemen en te leren. 
Gülens concept van dialoog omvat drie opeenvolgende stadia. Allereerst beschou-
wt hij de dialoog als een middel om wederzijds respect te creëren voor elkaars 
identiteit. Dit houdt nog niet direct wederzijdse acceptatie in. Het tweede stadium 
vereist daarom het accepteren van de ander met diens waarden en identiteiten, 
ook als deze anders zijn dan de eigen waarden. Het derde stadium betreft het 
concept van het delen van waarden binnen elkaars culturele setting. De laatstge-
noemde fase impliceert tevens de kennisneming over elkaars culturele identiteit, 
religieuze overtuigingen en spirituele waarden. Deze drie stadia zijn essentieel 
binnen de formule die Gülen hanteert om de bredere samenleving te benaderen 
en om een duurzame dialoog te realiseren met mensen met een andere levens-
filosofie.
Vijf lessen uit de Gülenbeweging
Gülen en zijn beweging kunnen een vliegwielfunctie vervullen in de vernieuwing 
(tajdid) en modernisering van de islam en de openstelling van de islam voor be-
trokkenheid bij westerse idealen. Zijn ideeën over onderwijs en dialoog behelzen 
toepassingen op wereldwijde schaal, uit te voeren door zijn civil society beweging. 
Op basis van de inzichten die in dit proefschrift verzameld zijn, worden vijf lessen 
getrokken die een illustratie vormen voor de hoofdpunten die in de voorgaande 
hoofdstukken naar voren zijn gekomen. 
1. Een globaliserende en interafhankelijke wereld
Mede als gevolg van globalisering en multiculturalisme zijn instituten en groeper-
ingen in toenemende mate globaal en onderling afhankelijk geworden. In het al-
gemeen is de meest zekere voorspelling die men kan doen over bijna elke mod-
erne samenleving, dat zij steeds diverser en complexer zal worden. Globalisering 
en multiculturalisme vormen een uitdaging voor de vroegere loyaliteiten en affi-
niteiten. Hoewel dit proces van onderlinge afhankelijkheid nieuwe mogelijkheden 
voor samenwerking en ontwikkeling met zich meebrengt, wordt het evenzeer 
gekarakteriseerd door confrontaties en onrechtvaardigheden die een voedingsbo-
dem vormen voor nieuwe spanningen en conflicten. De behoefte aan een vreed-
zame oplossing van conflicten is nu groter dan ooit. 
Bij de analyse van de visie, projecten en activiteiten van de Gülenbeweging komt 
nadrukkelijk naar voren dat zowel dialoog als educatie bruikbare instrumenten zijn 
voor het bouwen aan sociale cohesie.
Echter, dit is slechts mogelijk als politieke en maatschappelijke standpunten in 
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een dialectische context worden ontwikkeld, in plaats van in een fundamentalis-
tische. Het accepteren en respecteren van de ander, het luisteren naar en leren 
van anderen in een dialoog en het in beschouwing nemen van hun gezichtspunt 
bij het trekken van conclusies kan leiden tot een maatschappelijke binding tussen 
moslims en niet-moslims in de globaliserende wereld.
2. De islam en het westen vullen elkaar aan
Volgens het gedachtegoed van de Gülenbeweging zijn de islam en het westen 
complementair. Gülen heeft bijgedragen aan het ontstaan van een connectie 
tussen oost en west, waar veel islamitische jongeren en intellectuelen naar ver-
langden. Binnen de vele onderwijsprojecten en de dialoogactiviteiten waarin de 
mens centraal staat, brengt de beweging een harmonieuze verbinding tot stand 
tussen islamitische en westerse gezichtspunten. Gülen betoogt dat zowel westerse 
als islamitische visies vereist zijn voor de ontwikkeling van een nieuwe generatie 
die bestaat uit ‘ideale mensen’. Hij veronderstelt dat “het westen het menselijk ver-
stand vertegenwoordigt, terwijl het oosten het hart van de mens voorstelt” (Ünal 
& Williams 2000:188). Het eerste baseert zich op de exacte wetenschap, terwijl 
het laatste voornamelijk refereert aan spiritualiteit en innerlijke waarden. Gülen 
brengt de wijsheid die beide bevatten samen in de dialoog en het onderwijs, die 
op hun beurt worden ingezet als middel om tot een samenhangende maatschappij 
te komen. 
Gülen verschaft lessen die niet zozeer gericht zijn op het behoud van het ‘islami-
tische geloof’ in een seculiere tijd, als wel op het vinden en toepassen van oploss-
ingen voor de maatschappelijke problemen onder moslims en voor hun verwarring 
op het punt van de moderniteit.
De boodschap van de Gülenbeweging vertegenwoordigt een nieuwe uitingsvorm 
van de islam, en cultiveert daarbij de kunst van het samenleven binnen de maat-
schappij ondanks de verschillen. Gülen en de participanten van zijn beweging 
beschouwen de islamitische identiteit enerzijds en moderne, westerse idealen 
(bijvoorbeeld democratie, gelijkheid, rechtvaardigheid, mensenrechten en vrijheid 
van denken en van meningsuiting) anderzijds als verenigbaar en aanvullend, in 
plaats van strijdig met elkaar. Het sociologische resultaat van deze dialectiek kan 
beschouwd worden als een Turkse Volksislam waarin religieuze waarden en west-
erse idealen met elkaar gecombineerd worden. Gülen relateert dialoog aan diver-
siteit en uitwisseling opdat moslims en niet-moslims naast elkaar kunnen leven en 
er uiteindelijk vrede tot stand gebracht wordt tussen de mensen. 
3. Dialoog als sleutel van sociale cohesie
In de benadering van de Gülenbeweging is dialoog het sleutelwoord voor de bev-
ordering van sociale cohesie. Gülen beschouwt de dialoog als een kader voor 
wederzijdse acceptatie en respect voor identiteit: dialoog is de eerste en belan-
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grijkste opstap naar samenwerking tussen de wereldreligies die de verschillen in 
doctrines overstijgt. Hij predikt dat het respecteren van verschillen noodzakelijk 
is om wederzijdse vernietiging te vermijden. De ware dialoog en de vier dimen-
sies van vrede zijn slechts haalbaar als zij vergezeld gaan van morele waarden, 
wederzijdse kennis en acceptatie van culturele en religieuze identiteit. Hij heeft de 
overtuiging dat elk alternatief voor dialoog en tolerantie uiteindelijk verwoestend 
zal zijn voor onderlinge relaties.
In zijn filosofie stelt Gülen dat mensen meer gemeenschappelijke aspecten heb-
ben dan verschilpunten. Hij adviseert een dialoog tussen beschavingen, religies 
en culturen, in plaats van de veel besproken “botsing der beschavingen” van 
Huntington. Zijn mensbeeld is te typeren als antropomorfisch: in zijn leer staat 
de mens centraal. Voor hem is iedereen in eerste instantie mens. Pas daarna 
komen eventuele verschillen als geaardheid, religie, etnische afkomst of sociaal-
economische klasse aan bod. 
De visie van de Gülenbeweging is gevormd langs de lijnen van zijn leerstellingen 
die een doctrine omvatten van liefde, vrede, dialoog en tolerantie. De participant-
en van zijn beweging hebben de overtuiging dat dialogische vormen van begrip 
perspectieven kunnen bieden voor het begrijpen van de ander en het creëren van 
sociale cohesie. In lijn hiermee vestigt de beweging aandacht op interculturele 
dialoog als een instrument voor een alternatieve conflictoplossing binnen de con-
text van verdeeldheid, hiërarchie, rivaliteit en conflict die haar wortels heeft in de 
sociaal-economische en politieke realiteit.
4. Onderwijs als effectief middel van een samenhangende maatschappij
Onderwijs is de meeste effectieve lange termijn investering in sociale cohesie 
die een maatschappij kan doen. Gülen heeft zijn volgelingen en sympathisanten 
aangespoord om zowel binnen als buiten Turkije educatieve instellingen op te 
richten, met als uiteindelijke doel blijvende sociale cohesie en vreedzaam samen-
leven te bevorderen. Zijn volgelingen en sympathisanten zijn vaak actieve deel-
nemers aan de samenleving. In plaats van zich af te zonderen van de samenlev-
ing, verbinden zij hun spirituele leven met het aardse. De door hen opgerichte 
scholen streven ernaar om menselijke waarden door te geven. Zij doen dit door 
de onderwijzers en het overige personeel als rolmodellen het goede voorbeeld te 
laten geven.
Zoals Yılmaz (2007b:40) en Michel (2003:69) benadrukken, is het enthousiasme 
van de beweging voor het oprichten van seculiere en moderne scholen in zowel 
islamitische als niet-islamitische landen nieuw. Bovendien staan deze scholen 
open mensen van alle religies en nationaliteiten. Zij zijn, ongeacht de plek waar 
zij zich bevinden, toonbeelden van interreligieuze en interculturele relaties en van 
een succesvolle vereniging van geloof en rede (cf. Tavernise 2008; Borne 2008). 
Dit is een fenomeen dat nog niet eerder is waargenomen, noch bij Soefi’s, noch 
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bij andere religieus georiënteerde groeperingen en bewegingen en dit maakt de 
Gülenbeweging maatschappelijk innovatief.
Voorbeelden van onderwijsinstellingen van de beweging zijn wereldwijd te vinden. 
Zij spelen een rol in de afname van spanningsniveaus in gebieden waar etnische 
en religieuze conflicten escaleren, zoals Albanië, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Mace-
donië, de Filippijnen, Banda Atjeh, Georgië, Noord Irak en Zuidoost Turkije. Op 
de scholen van de beweging ontvangt een groot aantal mensen met verschillende 
achtergronden onderwijs binnen een pluralistische omgeving. Men koestert de 
hoop dat de leerlingen hierdoor in hun latere leven open zullen blijven staan voor 
dialoog en dat zij er in zullen slagen hun sociaal-economische positie te verbeter-
en. Dit vloeit voort uit Gülens vaste overtuiging dat de weg naar rechtvaardigheid 
gebaseerd is op adequate onderwijsvoorzieningen. 
Naast het formele onderwijs dat uitgedragen wordt in de scholen, streeft de be-
weging ook naar het geven van informele educatie door middel van televisiezend-
ers en radiokanalen, kranten en tijdschriften en culturele en professionele sticht-
ingen. Gezien het feit dat Gülens betoog en handelen diepe wortels hebben in de 
Islam, kan er gezegd worden dat hij de islam van binnenuit probeert te vernieuwen 
(tajdid); opnieuw een dimensie van zijn sociale innovatie binnen de wereld van 
vandaag. 
Zowel in het Arabisch als in het Nederlands wordt gezegd dat “onbekend onbe-
mind maakt”: als mensen elkaar leren kennen is het te verwachten dat spannin-
gen afnemen of zich zelfs in het geheel niet meer voordoen. De beweging vormt, 
met haar mediaprojecten, scholen, dialoogactiviteiten en hulpprogramma’s, een 
brug tussen culturen, landen, naties en religies. Leerlingen aan de scholen van de 
beweging hebben niet het gevoel verloren te zijn tussen verschillende culturen. 
Integendeel, zij ‘navigeren’, om het met Ballard’s woorden (1982:190) te zeggen, 
“op succesvolle wijze tussen de verschillende culturen door”. 
5. Tegenstrijdige krachten
In het licht van de voorgaande paragrafen kunnen twee op het oog tegengestelde 
visies op de wereld naar voren gebracht worden: vanuit het ene perspectief gez-
ien is zij meer en meer het toneel van conflicten, maar vanuit een ander per-
spectief gezien is er ook behoefte aan synergie, liefde, vergiffenis en eenheid. 
Een adequate en effectieve omgang met deze tegenstelling vereist maatschap-
pelijke toewijding, cultureel inlevingsvermogen, een ethisch bewustzijn van ver-
antwoordelijkheid, een vrije en kritische mentaliteit en een omvattende visie op 
esthetiek en cultuur. Als de meerderheid van de mensheid zich openstelt voor 
deze waarden, komt een ideale wereld binnen handbereik. Dit kan echter slechts 
verwezenlijkt worden door mensen die toegerust zijn met de hiervoor benodigde 
competenties.
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De Gülenbeweging voedt de hoop op een tolerante wereld dankzij de onderwijs-
projecten en de dialooginitiatieven die zijn opgestart met de vertegenwoordigers 
van de Abrahamitische religies: moslims, christenen en joden. Hoewel zij eeuwen-
lang met elkaar hebben gewedijverd en elkaar lang hebben bestreden, hebben 
zij ook gedeelde principes. Zij zijn geworteld in en worden gevoed door dezelfde 
bron.
Inmiddels hebben de dialoogprojecten tussen de drie wereldreligies zich uitge-
breid zodat nu ook het Hindoeïsme, Boeddhisme en Confucianisme, maar ook 
andere geloofsovertuigingen evenals atheïsten hierbij betrokken worden. Dialoog 
en vrede worden slechts mogelijk als zij vergezeld gaan van morele waarden, 
kennis van elkaar en acceptatie van culturele en religieuze identiteit. De beweging 
die rondom Gülens ideeën is ontstaan heeft het potentieel om moslims en niet-
moslims op een positieve wijze te stimuleren.
De eerste stap bij het voeren van een interculturele en interreligieuze dialoog om 
tegenstellingen te overwinnen, betreft het links laten liggen van de polemische 
onderwerpen die religies van elkaar onderscheiden, en juist het naar voren bren-
gen van de overeenkomsten. Gülen verlevendigt als zodanig de boodschap van 
Rumi: “Mijn ene voet staat in het midden terwijl de andere door 72 naties heen 
roteert”. Het volgen van deze leer stelt mensen er toe in staat een cirkel te be-
schrijven die wijd genoeg is om niet alleen religieuzen maar de gehele mensheid 
hierin te betrekken. Gülen beargumenteert dat tolerantie, liefde en medeleven 
ware islamitische waarden zijn en dat moslims de plicht hebben om deze in de 
moderne wereld uit te dragen. Door vanuit zijn kennis van de islamitische bronnen 
en profetische tradities deze islamitische waarden naar voren te brengen roept 
Gülen niet alleen moslims op om zich te wijden aan de dialoog en te streven naar 
vrede, maar betrekt hij ook niet-moslims in de discussie over gedeelde idealen. 
Volgens de beweging ziet de toekomst er onzeker, maar hoopvol uit. Gülens bood-
schap van verzoening draagt bij tot de weerlegging van de these van de “botsing 
der beschavingen”. De beweging biedt alternatieven voor dergelijke conflicten. 
Ook in de hedendaagse wereld met zijn wereldwijde onderlinge verbanden heb-
ben mensen de mogelijkheid om met elkaar in dialoog te gaan en relaties op 
te bouwen met mensen die een totaal andere wereldvisie hebben. De grootste 
uitdaging van deze tijd is om strategieën en capaciteiten te ontwikkelen voor een 
vreedzaam samenleven te midden van de bestaande verschillen en een slinkend 
aantal natuurlijke hulpbronnen.
Gülen streeft een inclusieve middenweg na tussen de toekomstperspectieven 
van de moderniteit en de islamitische traditie, waarbij hij deze aanvaardt als twee 
kanten van dezelfde medaille. 
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Tot slot
Onderwijs en dialoog zijn belangrijke methoden in deze tijd van globalisering 
waarin sprake is van intensivering van wereldwijde maatschappelijke relaties 
en van relaties tussen groepen onderling. Zij vormen een weg tot een samen-
hangende maatschappij en een preventieve strategie voor het oplossen van 
geschillen.
Dankzij de projecten van de Gülenbeweging is een generatie van mensen 
grootgebracht die een goede opleiding genoten heeft, beschikt over ethische 
waarden, in staat is tot empathie voor en acceptatie van anderen, verschil-
lende talen goed beheerst en het vooruitzicht heeft op goede banen en hogere 
maatschappelijke posities. Een nieuwe, zelfverzekerde generatie die onderwijs 
genoten heeft in een pluralistische omgeving zal niet gauw geneigd zijn tot radi-
calisering en polarisatie. 
Op grond van de uitkomsten van deze studie kan ik daarom concluderen dat de 
Gülenbeweging met haar educatieve en interculturele activisme een goede start 
is in de strijd tegen radicalisering. Als de projecten van de beweging op de lange 
termijn slagen, kan het hoofd geboden worden aan de drie belangrijkste bedreig-
ingen voor de mensheid (onwetendheid, armoede en onenigheid), zodat deze 
niet langer uitmonden in terreur, anarchie en conflicten.
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